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Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus stands out as a special case in 
transition blending, on the one hand, signs of relative prosperity, socially oriented policies and sprouts of 
entrepreneurships and, on the other hand, remnants of the communist past. The core of the Belarusian 
economic model throughout most of this period was a combination of external rents and soft budget 
constraints on the state-owned part of the economy backed by a strong system of administrative control. 
In periods of favourable external conditions this mix provided for relatively high rates of economic growth 
and allowed the authorities to maintain a ‘social contract’ with the population targeting close to full 
employment. But this model also led to the persistent accumulation of a quasi-fiscal deficit which time 
and again came to the surface, and its subsequent monetisation provoked macroeconomic and currency 
turmoil. At present, Belarus’ economic model has run up against its limits and policy changes seem 
inevitable. 
Is Belarus a transition outlier? 
The unique experience of Belarus defies many beliefs about the nature and the features of the process 
of post-communist transition. Belarus embarked on a transition path of its own, different from what was 
happening in other countries but still delivering a peculiar path of economic transformation. 
By the conventional measures of ‘progress in market reforms’, Belarus is basically ‘frozen’ in a state of 
stalled, unfinished market reforms, a point that most other post-communist countries passed by already 
in the mid-1990s. By this token Belarus lags behind not only the more advanced Central and Eastern 
European economies but also the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Ukraine. 
At the same time, during both of the past two decades, GDP growth in Belarus was higher not only than 
the average in its closer neighbours, but also than that of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) as well as the average rate of GDP growth in Southeast Europe. As a result, Belarus achieved a 
considerable degree of catching-up: by 2015 Belarus’ GDP per capita reached some 70% of the CEE-11 
average, up from 48% in 1995. Thanks to its policies of social welfare and internal cohesion, Belarus 
also achieved a relatively equitable distribution of the growth dividend. 
At the same time, Belarus was the country with the highest average inflation rates among all economies 
in transition; it did not manage to achieve lasting macroeconomic stabilisation and was hit by several 
subsequent currency crises. Thus in many ways Belarus challenges some of the conventional wisdoms 
about the transition process: it has been visibly different from other transition economies, following its 
own transition path, pursuing different political and policy objectives and achieving different outcomes. 
How was Belarus different from others? 
The mainstream interpretation of Belarus’ opaque transition path (also upheld by most international 
financial institutions) is that Belarus has been buying time to delay inevitable reforms thanks to rents 
extorted from Russia in exchange of political concessions. The Belarusian authorities did that by 
negotiating energy subsidies from Russia in exchange for political loyalty and alliance with its big 
neighbour. Belarus negotiated access to Russian gas and oil at prices significantly below world market 
prices which resulted in direct subsidies to Belarusian businesses and consumers; plus, it could export 
processed fuels and other oil- and gas-based chemicals at international prices. All this was equivalent to 
an implicit cash transfer to Belarus. 
Other interpretations drawing on the political economy of transition look at delayed reforms as a rational 
choice of local politicians and policy-makers. In most transition economies, the choice of the reform 
course was not a premeditated policy choice but a self-imposed one, forced by the limited available 
options. Only countries that had sufficient available or accessible resources to cushion the transition 
shocks could make deliberate choices on their policy course. Thanks to the long-lasting ‘loyalty rent’ 
from Russia, Belarus was among the very few post-communist economies that could make such choices 
with longer planning horizons. 
One original interpretation of Belarus’ unique experience draws on the notion of organisational capability 
and associates its decent growth performance with the preserved organisational capability of the 
country. Thanks to strong central controls Belarus prevented asset stripping in state-owned enterprises, 
reduced rent-seeking behaviour, prevented disorganisation and preserved engineering and production 
capabilities. 
Yet another specific in Belarus’ transition was the ‘social contract’ with the population under which the 
authorities provide stability, order and low levels of income inequality. It has been pointed out that the 
social values prevailing in Belarus and this ‘social contract’ played a special role in the way transition 
evolved in Belarus. 
Belarus’ unique economic model 
It has been suggested by Belarusian economists that the political and economic system that evolved in 
Belarus can be classified as ‘state capitalism’. Such a categorisation differentiates it from the previous 
system of central planning but also highlights the significant role that the state plays in the economy. 
The backbone of the political system is the highly centralised decision-making pyramid, featuring 
excessive powers concentrated at the top. Belarus adheres to a lopsided presidential system, in which 
the president de facto has greater power than the legislative branch (a ‘super-presidential’ political 
system) while the National Assembly has limited autonomous powers even in its legislative mandate. 
The members of the Council of Ministers are directly appointed by the president; the Council serves 
mainly to operationalise the rulings coming from the president’s office. 
Belarus pursues long- and medium-term policy objectives through ‘state programmes’ which usually 
cover a five-year cycle. There is a complex hierarchy of such programmes which is topped by the so-
called ‘programmes of socio-economic development’. As regards day-to-day policy-making and 
implementation, there exists an elaborate system of legislative and regulatory arrangements which 
prescribe specific top-down mechanisms of administrative control over the economy. 
However, a deeper and more critical look at the Belarus model of ‘state capitalism’ reveals one key 
feature that weakens this self-assertion, namely, the absence of hard budget constraints on the 
operation of state-owned firms. So there is still much more ‘state’ than ‘capitalism’ in the Belarusian 
economy of today. 
In principle, the state has all the levers to impose hard budget constraints on the firms that are under its 
patrimony. However, the fact is that Belarusian state-owned firms and banks still largely operate under 
soft budget constraints. State-owned banks have been actively engaged in financial support to state-
owned firms, in particular, related to the implementation of different state programmes through the so-
called mechanism of ‘directed lending’. Such loans are extended at preferential terms (below market 
interest rates) for the beneficiaries while the banks were subsidised by the government for the interest 
rate differential. Directed lending generated market distortions and had serious negative micro- and 
macroeconomic implications – such as the erosion of incentives of SOEs to restructure, deterioration of 
the quality bank portfolios and economy-wide misallocation of resources – and, ultimately, led to 
macroeconomic instability. 
No privatisation but growth of a de novo private sector 
One of the key differences of post-Soviet Belarus from other transition economies has been the restraint 
on large-scale privatisation of state-owned firms inherited from Soviet times. Privatisation has been a 
sensitive and contentious economic policy issue and the authorities have been reluctant to embark on 
privatisation on a mass scale; only a handful of experimental deals were launched. Some institutional 
change did take place in the management of state-owned firms mostly in terms of corporatisation – the 
transformation of Soviet SOEs into corporate business entities. 
The reasons behind the repeated privatisation failures are complex. Apart from the lack of political will, 
there has been a systematic conflict between ask and bid prices as the authorities usually based the ask 
price on book value while potential investors assess the ‘going concern’ value of the businesses, which 
is usually much lower. The government also would pose additional post-privatisation requirements and 
conditions, mostly about preserving employment and output levels, which make the offer unattractive to 
investors. Plus, potential investors perceive high political risks in Belarus, after several re-nationalisation 
cases. As a result the few privatisation opportunities in Belarus mostly attracted Russian state-owned 
corporations. The latter have been able to set prices in closed-doors non-transparent and often politically 
driven negotiations. Such Russian investors also de facto have sufficient political power of their own to 
ensure their property rights after the privatisation. 
Consequently, the state sector still dominates the economy of Belarus, both in terms of ownership and 
employment. State ownership prevails especially in the sector of manufacturing; at the other end of the 
spectrum are the sectors of retail trade and business services. While privatisation has been largely 
absent in these sectors too, the private sector is already by far the dominant one in most business 
services, both thanks to the organic growth of de novo private firms and the entrance of foreign firms on 
the Belarusian market. 
  
Economic governance subordinate to state targets 
The governance of SOEs is integrated into the Belarusian administrative system, within the ministries 
with functional responsibilities in economic policy implementation. The most important governance tool 
used to be the system of ‘state targets’ that are communicated from the top to individual state-owned 
firms and, in some case, to all economic agents. The targets have a hierarchical structure starting from 
key macroeconomic objectives in the programmes for socio-economic development. These are then 
translated into annual ones, which are in turn translated into indicative targets by sectors and regions, 
lower-level indicative economic performance targets as well as main targets for state-owned companies. 
This system prevailed during the 1990s and 2000s but it has been weakening in recent years as direct 
interference into the operations of state-owned companies was diminishing. Nevertheless it has had 
lasting effect on the performance of firms and banks which are still under state ownership. 
There has been a persistent productivity gap between the state sector and the private sector which 
negatively affected the overall growth in the country. Labour hoarding is key evidence of SOEs’ 
inefficiencies and poor performance. Maintaining or increasing employment levels is usually one of the 
performance targets of the enterprises, and this in itself is a barrier to restructuring. Directed lending also 
contributed to inefficient corporate performance as access to cheap loans made SOEs eager to 
overinvest in physical capital. Moreover, it creates wrong incentives in inefficient companies, as soft 
budget constraints serve to discourage restructuring. 
Energy and agriculture are two sectors that epitomise the opaque system of explicit and implicit 
subsidies that give rise to soft budget constraints and generate quasi-fiscal deficits. 
Distorted financial intermediation leading to misallocation of resources 
According to its formal legal status, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB) is ‘independent 
in its decision-making’, however, it is subject to informal pressures coming from the top which affect the 
central bank’s decisions. This has implications not only for its relations with commercial banks but also 
for its wider monetary and exchange rate policy decisions. 
The banking sector has a dominant role in the Belarusian financial system as capital markets are 
practically inexistent. The state still maintains a dominant position in Belarus’ commercial banking 
system: state-owned banks account for some 66% of the total assets of the banking system. 
The business model of state-owned banks implies using the capital base as an additional funding source 
for active operations thanks to their relatively high capitalisation. This translates into greater (compared 
to private banks) credit exposures including in directed lending by some state-owned banks. On the 
liability side, state-owned banks enjoy a relatively high share of deposits, largely due to informal 
instructions to state-owned enterprises to hold their accounts in state-owned banks. In the case of 
households, state-owned banks are successful in attracting deposits mainly due to their large regional 
networks. 
In the past several years the profitability, capital adequacy, and key indicators of the banking sector 
have been deteriorating primarily due to an increasing share of non-performing loans in the banks’ 
balance sheets. 
Flexible labour contracts and low unemployment protection 
The labour market in Belarus has some specific features: on the one hand, it is characterised by 
flexibility in terms of the duration and conditions of the employment contracts and, on the other hand, by 
excessive regulation generating rigidities. 
The availability of employment opportunities has been an important part of the social contract in Belarus. 
The principal declared objective of public labour market policies have been the access to jobs for 
everyone as well as rising personal income, in the first place, through wage growth, in the absence of 
significant wage differentials. The main policy instrument to target desired wage levels has been the 
wage scale regulating the salaries for every profession. 
There are two types of employment contracts in Belarus: permanent and fixed-term. Most of the 
employers prefer the fixed-term contract, with the usual duration of one year. This contract does not 
carry commitments for renewal of the employment after its expiration. It also allows firing an employee 
with only three-month severance payment if the occupied position is abolished. Thanks to the flexibility 
of the labour market in terms of contracts, employment has gradually shifted from less productive and 
low-paid jobs in agriculture and manufacturing to the emerging and rapidly growing services sector. 
Economic growth in Belarus during the past two decades was pro-poor, delivering some benefits of 
growth to everyone, decreasing poverty and preventing high inequalities in the society. The period from 
2000 to 2015 saw a 4-fold increase in average real disposable income. As per the ‘social contract’, the 
government did not rely on targeted handouts to vulnerable groups but instead sought to provide 
everyone with opportunities to find a job, offered a wide range of complimentary services and subsidised 
some prices and tariffs. 
At the same time, Belarus is a socially-oriented state without proper unemployment insurance or 
unemployment benefits. Technically unemployment benefits for the registered unemployed do exist, but 
they are very low and do not depend on the previous wage level. Moreover, to obtain the benefit the 
registered unemployed often have to participate in social or public works for free. 
Still eastbound trade … 
Historically Russia has been the most significant trading partner of Belarus both in terms of exports – 
over a half of total, and imports – over a third of total. The EU-28 has also been prominent as a 
destination for exports, as well as a significant origin of imports. Exports to Russia are relatively diverse, 
comprising, besides commodities and agricultural/food products, also transport equipment and 
machinery; imports are dominated by petroleum products. By contrast, exports from Belarus to the EU 
are mostly comprised of mineral fuels, while imports are formed by more advanced goods, including 
chemical products, machinery and transport equipment. 
Mineral fuels traditionally dominated both exports and imports as the key commodity group, constituting 
over a third of the country’s total trade with a wide gap from other products. Belarus inherited large oil 
refineries from the Soviet Union and processes crude oil coming from Russia into refined fuels, gasoline, 
etc., to be further exported to the EU. Over time, the share of primary commodities in Belarusian exports 
has been gradually increasing and squeezing the share of manufacturing exports that could only find a 
market niche predominantly in the CIS region. The global competitiveness of Belarusian industries is 
mostly concentrated in agricultural and food products, as well as chemicals. 
Both exports and imports of services have been growing steadily in the past 15 years. The positive 
balance in services trade partly offsets the chronic deficit in the trade in goods. In terms of their 
composition, services exports are dominated by the transports sector, with transit freight transportation 
via railway, motor transport and pipelines being the key modes of transport. Also, the ICT and travel 
sectors increased their shares in the total services exports. The import side is dominated by construction 
services, transport and travel. 
… FDI flows … 
FDI inflow in Belarus was marginal before 2007, but since 2008 annual inflows have been fairly stable, 
amounting to about EUR 1.5 billion per year. After controlling for the size of the country, Belarus has 
received more FDI than some of its neighbours but less than the new EU Member States. 
FDI in Belarus is mainly of Russian origin, amounting to nearly 60% of the stocks. Some Western 
companies are also finding their way to Belarus also through Russia. In addition, FDI from Cyprus is in 
all likelihood of Russian origin as well, thus the direct and indirect FDI dependence on Russia is 
probably greater. The second most important investor by a large distance to Russia is Austria, which 
accounts for only 3.5% of the FDI stocks. 
A significant part of FDI has taken place in the framework of large privatisation transactions; joint 
ventures with state-owned enterprises and greenfield investments account for smaller stocks. The low 
number of greenfield investment projects – which are the genuine FDI enterprises – is telling proof of the 
difficult business conditions in the country. Joint ventures between local state-owned companies and 
foreign investors are FDI practice favoured by the authorities of Belarus. While the number of such deals 
is considerable, they do not contribute to larger inflows. 
Most of the greenfield FDI projects in Belarus are located in special economic zones. Three such forms 
exist in Belarus: six free economic zones, a Chinese-Belarus industrial park and the Belarusian High-
Technology Park. Special zones can be useful vehicles of FDI policy especially in countries with a risky 
business environment and vague property rights. 
… and integration ties 
Traditionally, Belarus’ external economic relations have been closely associated with its strong 
economic linkages with Russia and, more recently, with the Russia-led Eurasian integration project. 
Eurasian economic integration has been progressing very fast formally, starting from the formation in 
2010 of the Eurasian Customs Union by Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. Two years later the bloc was 
replaced by the Eurasian Customs Union–Single Economic Space, and in 2015 by the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). The latter also expanded geographically and now includes, besides the three 
founding members, also Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 
While the customs union arrangement dealt only with the liberalisation of mutual trade in goods via 
elimination of tariffs and introduction of a common external tariff, the EAEU will seek to bring integration 
to a qualitatively new state reaching beyond trade-related matters, and also facilitating the so-called ‘four 
freedoms’ – a common market for goods, services, capital and labour, as well as the coordination of 
economic policies and energy markets, which is envisioned to be accomplished by 2025. 
Concurrent membership of the EAEU members in the WTO represents a challenge. Belarus remains the 
only country within the bloc that is not a WTO member and, in general, among the very few countries in 
the world still not in the WTO. At the same time, it has to indirectly adhere to WTO rules via 
commitments of its EAEU partners. Belarus itself still appears to be rather far from satisfying the original 
demands expressed by the WTO related to agricultural subsidies and the high level of government 
involvement in the economy. 
A growth model leading to macroeconomic instability … 
During the period 1996-2008 Belarus enjoyed a period of high growth thanks to, on the one hand, a 
favourable external environment (the re-integration with the Russian economy which opened the way for 
Belarusian exports and external rents) and, on the other hand, expansionary policies promoting fixed 
investment and rising incomes. 
Things started to change around 2007 when Russia began claiming back part of the Belarusian export 
oil duties and doubled the gas export prices for Belarus. The Belarusian authorities were faced with a 
dilemma: to change the policy course more radically (which would eliminate the demand surplus 
supported by rents) or to keep it while searching to attract additional external resourced compensating 
for the reduction in rents. The first policy option would have been associated with unpopular austerity 
measures, so the authorities opted for the second solution. 
The combination of a policy focused on demand-driven growth and diminishing external rents resulted in 
a persistent widening of external imbalances and fast growth of foreign indebtedness: in the second half 
of the 2000s, Belarus’ current account deficit kept growing, reaching over 15% of GDP in 2010 while 
gross external debt quadrupled between 2005 and 2010. 
One of the main sources of macroeconomic imbalances was the quasi-fiscal deficit resulting from 
inefficient directed lending and soft budget constraints. Directed credit, one way or another, entailed 
contingent fiscal liabilities as it was de facto underwritten by the Belarusian state. The bad loans 
resulting from inefficient directed lending ultimately accumulated as a quasi-fiscal deficit. 
The other main source of macroeconomic imbalances was the populist incomes policy which prevailed 
through most of the period of high growth. Mandated wage increases resulted in significant rises in unit 
labour costs and competitiveness losses as real wage growth outstripped productivity growth. This was 
also a source of inflationary pressure as there were no checks on the pro-inflationary effect of wage 
growth. In effect, monetary policy completely accommodated the upshots of expansionary incomes 
policies; plus, the quasi-fiscal deficit resulting from directed lending was gradually transformed into an 
open deficit and was also monetised. 
Thus both soft budget constraints and inconsistent incomes policies ultimately generated inflationary 
pressure and microeconomic instability. 
… which has hit its limits 
The policy mix prevailing n 2003-2007 was in broad terms a combination of: (i) exchange rate peg; 
(ii) monetary stimulation; (iii) direct wage stimulation; and (iv) fiscal stimuli (directed at the stimulation of 
both consumer and investment demand). Trying to mitigate the chronic pressure in the currency market, 
the authorities resorted to active external borrowings and this happened against the background of a 
considerable gap between the equilibrium exchange rate and the actual one. As a result, there was a 
sharp rise in foreign debt after 2008. 
Given the built-in inconsistencies of the underlying policies, between 2009 and 2015, Belarus 
experienced three episodes of currency crises (in 2009, 2011 and 2014-2015) which epitomised the 
inconsistency of the macroeconomic policy mix. All three cases entailed a massive forced devaluation of 
the Belarusian rouble reflecting the necessary real exchange rate adjustment. 
The policy setup stayed roughly unchanged until end-2014, perpetuating macroeconomic disequilibria. 
More emphasis on demand stimulation now led not only to a price overhang and a delayed impact on 
the real exchange rate, but also to direct pressure on prices and the exchange rate through less demand 
for national currency and more for hard currency. These inconsistencies further reduced the 
effectiveness of the policy efforts to boost output and incomes. 
Is Belarus moving towards a new policy model? 
At the turn of 2014, it became evident that the currency peg could no longer be sustained. In several 
steps, the authorities undertook a complete overhaul in the macroeconomic policy setup. In the first 
place, the currency peg was abandoned and a floating exchange rate regime was adopted. At par with 
the change in the exchange rate regime, monetary targeting was announced as the NBRB policy 
framework with rather restrictive targets for 2015. In turn, the government declared its intention to 
abolish or curb some of the demand stimulation tools. 
The policy setup at present could be summarised as follows: (i) floating exchange rate framework; 
(ii) monetary targeting with a tight intermediary goal; (iii) fiscal policy tightening; and (iv) less reliance on 
unconventional demand stimulation tools (directed credit, wage stimulation, etc.). 
The introduction of the floating exchange rate regime brought about positive outcomes by helping 
restore equilibrium and serving as a more effective shock-absorber. A relative tightening of fiscal policy 
also accompanied the dramatic changes in the monetary sphere. In particular, there were significant 
cuts in public capital expenditure as well as a reduction in the public procurement of goods and services 
and budget transfers. 
The macro environment in Belarus changed. Before 2015, the stylised macroeconomic picture was a 
combination of, on the one hand, GDP growth (albeit weakening in recent years) and low 
unemployment, and, on the other hand, substantial current account deficits, exchange rate overhang 
and high inflation. After 2015 the picture changed to the reverse: the actual exchange rate roughly 
corresponds to the equilibrium rate, the current account deficit is close to its estimated mid-term 
equilibrium and there are signs of disinflation; but this was coupled with output contraction and growing 
unemployment. In terms of GDP growth, 2015 was the worst year in the past two decades. 
Belarus is now facing new challenges and risks to financial stability … 
In the current macroeconomic environment, Belarus needs to find new impetus to invigorate growth. The 
question is whether and how policy can contribute to such impetus, given the challenges that policy-
makers are facing at present. 
High inflation expectations have become a challenge for the monetary authorities in many respects, 
effectively reducing its room for manoeuvre. They drive up real interest rates and curb fixed investment. 
Hence firms may be reluctant to invest, having in mind the poor growth potential and the low expected 
returns on investments even in the case of an improving external environment. 
Suppressing inflation expectations can be regarded as one of the priority goals of monetary policy and 
macroeconomic policy as a whole. Although the monetary targeting regime reduces the risks of currency 
crises, it does not help in addressing the problem of high and persistent inflation expectations (the 
Belarussian rouble was re-denominated in mid-2016). 
Breaking the current constellation of ‘dampened capital investments’ requires numerous changes 
relating both to structural and short-term issues and securing a stable monetary environment. Instability 
in expectations causes an obvious conflict between the price stability and output smoothing goals for the 
NBRB. From this viewpoint, prioritisation of price and financial stability leads to a tough stance of 
monetary policy in terms of output, which dampens business activity. 
These policy challenges are amplified by new risks to financial stability, in particular, the growing debt 
problems which pose risks for future macroeconomic stability. At the micro level, two groups of firms – 
state-owned enterprises (particularly the beneficiaries of directed lending) and foreign currency 
borrowers – were the most affected with respect to debt sustainability. The recession of 2015 and the 
significant depreciation reinforced the debt service problems. 
As regards the banking sector, there has been an increase in non-performing loans. The reported share 
of NPLs, which has already reached an alarming level, may still underestimate the real situation due to 
irregularities in accounting and reporting practices. 
The growing corporate debt burden could be damaging in many respects. The companies facing debt 
problems are to give up or downsize their investment plans. Banks that are burdened with non-
performing loans are forced to provision, which affects their lending capacity and reduces borrowing 
opportunities which impacts negatively on economic activity. Substandard portfolios affect banks’ 
operations; further deterioration may be a threat to their solvency, potentially creating risks for the 
banking system as a whole. 
The authorities are aware of these risks. Banks facing deteriorating quality of assets have been advised 
to seek recapitalisation; however, this may be difficult to implement, especially for state-owned banks. 
Recapitalising them will generate significant new claims on public resources which may be a threat to 
public debt sustainability. The government is considering establishing a special agency for managing 
non-performing loans. 
At the macro level, the main risks to public debt sustainability are associated with the currency structure 
of the debt, where hard currency obligations are dominating. While the level of future forex debt service 
will be rising, the amounts of future forex revenue of the government is uncertain; the level of 
international reserves is also low. The government will need to solicit new forex borrowings in order to 
service its forex obligation or roll over old debt. Public debt sustainability may become questionable in 
case new borrowings become unavailable, or if the debt burden continues to rise. 
… and needs to reinvent its relations with the IFIs 
During the 1990s, Belarus concluded two stand-by arrangements with the IMF (in 1993 and 1995); 
subsequently, however, these were scaled down on the initiative of the Belarusian side, due to 
contradictions between IMF conditionality and national policy priorities. The global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 and the urgent need by Belarus of external finance to support the currency peg pressed 
Belarus to apply in 2008 for IMF financial assistance through a stand-by arrangement. 
In this environment, the Belarusian authorities were more flexible in the negotiations and undertook a 
number of commitments not only with respect to short-term macroeconomic indicators, but also as 
regards a number of structural issues, which earlier had been considered as a taboo. The IMF, in turn, 
took a more flexible stance with respect to structural issues, which in the past had been considered as a 
starting point for negotiations with Belarus. 
Throughout 2009 Belarus abided strictly to the IMF conditionality and most of the stabilisation measures 
were implemented. However, the situation changed in 2010. The Belarusian authorities were keen to 
achieve rapid economic recovery and return to the habitual growth rates of output and incomes before 
the presidential elections. 
Aversion of the IMF agenda and availability of other sources of external finance (first of all, the Eurasian 
Fund for Stabilisation and Development – EFSD) made the Belarusian side reluctant to seek a new IMF-
supported programme in 2011-2015. Instead, in 2011, Belarus applied for a stabilisation EFSD loan with 
the implicit expectation that its conditionality would clash less with their policy objectives and that EFSD 
monitoring may be subject to political pressure, which indeed turned out to be the case. 
At present, Belarus seems to be playing a strategic game between the two possible sources of external 
financial support, seeking to achieve most favourable lending conditions for itself. 
  
What comes next? 
The most intriguing question now is whether Belarus can continue experimenting with an economic 
strategy and policy agenda which are so different from what other post-communist countries did in the 
past or whether it will have to accept the mainstream transformation reforms and converge to the 
common pattern seen elsewhere. 
It is important to distinguish between the sustainability of the country’s policy course and the 
sustainability of Belarus’ economic model as such. What concerns the first aspect, the answer seems 
clear: the past policy course has run its course and must be changed. Actually, change is already 
happening as a new policy model seems to take shape at present. 
As regards the sustainability of the country’s economic model which is rooted in Belarus’ brand of state 
capitalism, there are no obvious arguments to assert that this type of model is not sustainable. However, 
to ensure its longevity, the authorities would also need to undertake some reforms in the direction of 
‘more capitalism – less state’. 
The key test of the viability of the Belarusian model of ‘state capitalism’ would be the willingness of the 
authorities to impose hard budget constraints on state-owned firms and banks. Capitalism partly based 
on state ownership is in principle possible; however, it is not consistent with the policy of soft budget 
constraints. For the Belarusian authorities to be able to justify their claim of ‘state capitalism’, they would 
need to move in the direction of imposing hard budget constraints on state-owned firms and banks. 
However, such a policy change would have severe social consequences as it would entail restructuring 
of the state-owned sector of the economy to make it more efficient, including the shedding of redundant 
labour. Another component of the current economic model that needs reform for making it more efficient 
is the strictly hierarchical policy decision-making process. It remains to be seen whether the Belarusian 
authorities would be prepared to take radical steps in these directions.  
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Introduction 
After more than 25 years of post-communist economic and political transformation and tonnes of related 
literature it would appear that everything that can be said on the topic has already been said, and then 
repeated or re-interpreted many times. However, the unique transition experience of Belarus to some 
extent defies such a proposition. Moreover, for one reason or another, the country was rarely in the 
focus of pundits’ scrutiny for its own sake or merit. The reasons for that may be different: no dramatic 
events happened in this period; no radical economic or political reforms were undertaken domestically; 
no lobbying diaspora existed abroad. Plus, the opaque authoritarian model of ruling the country which is 
in existence for more than 20 years incited prejudice and a predisposition to criticism by the West of 
everything that was happening in Belarus. Western sanctions prompted ostracism by the outside world, 
and this served to further discourage deeper economic analysis. All this is a pity as outliers like Belarus 
can also provide thought-provoking and useful lessons of transition experience, both in terms of their 
peculiar transformation path and also in a comparative perspective. The picture that we observe 
nowadays in this country is the outcome of a unique policy course which defied the Washington 
Consensus in many ways. 
One debatable issue related to Belarus is: What was actually happening in this country during the past 
two decades? Was Belarus a ‘non-starter’ in the transition from plan to market? Is Belarus a case of 
‘stalled’ transition or of a ‘gradualist’ approach to transition reforms? The literature on Belarus is 
abundant in epithets and metaphors seeking to epitomise the nature of post-communist development in 
this country. 
By the token of the type and nature of changes observed in other post-communist economies, Belarus 
can be seen as a case of frozen transition, as gradualism would still suggest an ongoing process of 
reforms but at a slower pace; however, starting from the mid-1990s, there have been very little reforms 
of this type in the country. At the same time, as discussed in the report, the economic system of Belarus 
by no means remained frozen during the past 20 years. Belarus actually embarked on a transition path 
of its own; it moved in a different direction and established its own economic model. These changes 
were also performed in a gradual way, at the pace chosen by Belarusian policy-makers; nevertheless, 
they still delivered some type of systemic transformation of the economy, though different from what 
happened in other countries. Moreover, as discussed in the report, the Belarusian economic system at 
present is rather heterogeneous and fragmented, with a coexistence of markets, regulated markets and 
non-market features. From this perspective, there are probably arguments supporting all the different 
categorisations outlined above. 
Notwithstanding the different degrees of advancement with market reforms proper, all post-communist 
economies, including Belarus, nowadays are completely different from what they were some 25-30 
years ago. For those who remember the past, change and progress in all these countries were 
enormous, albeit different in scope and scale, and can be seen everywhere, in all aspects of 
socioeconomic and political life, but the progress of each country needs to be assessed with attention to 
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and assessment criteria similar to those that were addressed to the countries during the 1990s. 
Respectively, when looking to the future, the agenda for the next phase of reform policies needs to take 
due account both of the current state of the economy and the specificity of the current context – the 
opportunities and constraints stemming from it. 
The analytical study presented in this report is an attempt to fill some of the gaps in understanding the 
process of economic and political transformation in Belarus since the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union. Leaving aside the more theoretical insights and interpretation, one key argument in this paper is 
that, unlike the picture depicted by the conventional measures of progress in transition – which seem to 
portray a country frozen where it was some 20 years ago – Belarus has gone a long way in this period, 
but has done this in its own way, coming to a point somewhat different from that of the majority of the 
post-communist economies. 
Chapter 1 of the study looks at Belarus’ post-Soviet experiences and performance taking a longer view 
and seeks to put these experiences into a comparative perspective vis-à-vis other countries that 
underwent the transition from plan to market. Chapter 2 presents an overview of Belarus’ economic 
structure and institutional environment and analyses some of the challenges faced by the country. 
Chapter 3 reviews Belarus’ trade and international economic relations and analyses their effects on the 
domestic economic scene. Finally, Chapter 4 turns back to the current macroeconomic situation in the 
country and explores some of the challenges and dilemmas faced by Belarusian policy-makers at 
present. 
Belarus’ experience has its own merits and weak points; ups and downs. One may agree or disagree 
with the arguments behinds its policy course. But in any case, it enriches our understanding of the 
process of economic transformation with some unique features and provides some interesting new 
lessons for both economists and policy-makers. 
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1. Belarus’ unorthodox political and economic 
transformation 
BY RUMEN DOBRINSKY 
IS BELARUS A TRANSITION OUTLIER? A SNAPSHOT OF THE EVIDENCE  
Amongst the countries that started economic and political transformation after the fall of communism, 
Belarus is probably the only country that implemented a truly gradualist strategy of change over the past 
25 years. This is especially evident by the conventional measures of ‘progress in market reforms’ such 
as those applied by the EBRD. By those measures, Belarus has basically been ‘frozen’ in a state of 
stalled, unfinished market reforms, a point that most other post-communist countries passed by already 
in the mid-1990s (Figure 1.1). 
Moreover, by this token Belarus lags behind not only the more advanced Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) economies but also the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Ukraine. 
The lags are particularly pronounced in two of the reforms that are considered central to the economic 
transformation as a whole: privatisation and financial reforms. Thus the state-owned sector still accounts 
for a dominant share of GDP in Belarus which is not the case for any other post-communist economy. 
Commercial banks in Belarus are also still predominantly in the hands of the state; private and foreign 
ownership in the banking sector is limited and much below the level prevailing in other countries 
(Figure 1.1). 
Thus, as regards some of the key ingredients of the process of systemic transformation – which, in turn, 
are also considered as fundamental characteristics of the transition from plan to market – Belarus is a 
genuine outlier among the countries that embarked on this process some 25-30 years ago. 
At the same time, when looking at the growth performance of these countries in a medium-term 
perspective, Belarus is one of the countries that fared quite well (Table 1.1). 
During both past decades (1996-2005 and 2006-2015), GDP growth in Belarus was higher than the 
average in its closer neighbours (CIS and Ukraine), that of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
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Figure 1.1 / Progress in market reforms in Belarus compared to other post-communist 
countries 
A. Averages of the EBRD transition indicators, 1990-2014 
 
B. Share of private sector in GDP, %, 1990-2010 
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Table 1.1/ Comparative economic performance of selected transition economies, 1996-2015 
  
GDP, annual average rate of 
change, % 
CPI, annual average rate of 
change, % 
1996-2005 2006-2015 1996-2005 2006-2015 
CIS and Ukraine 
 
      
Armenia 8.8 4.0 5.6 5.2 
Belarus 6.9 4.2 66.8 20.9 
Georgia 6.6 5.0 10.2 5.1 
Kazakhstan 6.4 5.4 11.7 8.5 
Kyrgyzstan 4.7 4.5 13.6 9.7 
Moldova 2.2 3.4 16.0 7.4 
Russian Federation 3.8 2.4 25.5 8.8 
Tajikistan 4.0 6.5 47.9 9.5 
Ukraine 1.0 -0.7 18.3 10.1 
SEE 
    
Albania 5.5 3.5 7.8 2.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 13.4 2.0 .. 2.8 
Macedonia 1.9 3.0 1.9 2.7 
Montenegro .. 3.1 .. 2.8 
Serbia 3.7 1.5 38.0 8.1 
Memorandum items: 
    
CIS and Ukraine average 4.9 3.9 23.9 9.5 
SEE-5 average 6.1 2.6 15.9 3.8 
CEE-11 average*) 4.2 2.0 12.9 3.5 
*) Includes the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Source: wiiw databases; UNECE statistical database. 
It is quite instructive to compare Belarus’ relative performance in terms of growth of GDP per capita at 
PPPs vis-à-vis the same groups of countries (Figure 1.2).1 Amongst its immediate neighbours (panel A), 
it was only resource-rich countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan that displayed similar or better 
performance than Belarus by this measure, and that was mostly thanks to the favourable world market 
conditions for hydrocarbons in the past decade. Importantly, panel A of Figure 1.2 indicates that by the 
same token, Belarus performed better in a medium-term perspective than the CEE-11 (the new EU 
Member States) taken as a whole; the group that is also considered as comprising the leaders in the 
process of systemic transformation.2 
As a result, Belarus achieved a considerable degree of catching up to the CEE countries taken as a 
whole: by 2014 Belarus’ GDP per capita reached some 70% of the CEE-11 average, up from 48% in 
1995. When comparing Belarus to the Southeast European (non-EU) economies (panel B of Figure 1.2), 
none of the SEE countries can boast such catching up to CEE. 
 
1
  When measuring GDP per capita growth and catching up, transition economies are usually compared to more 
developed economies. By contrast, Figure 1.2 indicates relative GDP per capita growth within the former centrally 
planned economies with the group CEE-11 taken as a reference point which illustrates in a straightforward manner the 
relative catch-up performance of individual countries vis-à-vis its peers.   
2
  At the level of individual countries though there were CEE countries that performed better than Belarus. 
6
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There has been extensive research on the relationship between market reforms/systemic 
transformation, on the one hand, and growth performance during the transition from plan to market, on 
the other hand,3 and it is not the objective of this paper to reopen the debate associated with such 
research. Nevertheless, as an oversimplified stylised conclusion, this research indicates a positive 
correlation between the two, when properly controlling for some factors, in particular, institutions and 
initial conditions.4 Thus Belarus’ medium-term growth performance is a clear challenge to this conclusion 
stemming from rigorous research. 
Figure 1.2 / GDP per capita at PPP in selected non-EU transition economies relative to the 
CEE-11*) average, %, 1995-2014 




*) Includes the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Sources: wiiw databases; UNECE statistical database. 
 
3
  See Hare and Turley (2013a); Babetskii and Campos (2007); Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006); Grinberg, Havlik and 
Havrylyshyn (2008), among others. 
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Moreover, Belarus achieved a relatively successful growth performance in this period while at the same 
pursuing policies targeting social welfare and internal cohesion. By and large, wide circles of the 
population seem to have benefited from the aggregate welfare gains as evidenced by the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality: Belarus is one of the post-communist countries with the lowest degrees of income 
inequality (Figure 1.3). 
Figure 1.3 / Gini coefficients of income inequality in post-communist economies, averages 
for 2005-2013 
 
Sources: UNDP (Human Development Report 2015). 
In this regard, the absence of large-scale privatisation in the way this was done in Russia and other 
post-Soviet countries may have been an advantage in maintaining social equity and a higher degree of 
internal cohesion. It also restrained to some extent the process of emergence of a powerful local 
oligarchy (the latter exists in present-day Belarus but its degrees and spheres of influence on domestic 
economic and political life are notably lower than, say, in Ukraine or in Russia of the 1990s). 
In Soviet times, Belarus used to be one of the manufacturing workshops of the Soviet Union, 
specialising in a number of industries in the higher value added segment and relying on the large Soviet 
market. Agriculture was also relatively well developed, in particular industrial livestock production. Food 
processing, especially dairy and meat products, was another pillar of the traditional economy. In the 
main, this structural orientation of the Belarusian economy has been preserved over that past 25-30 
years, largely thanks to the gradualist approach to economic transformation and deliberate public policy 
(for more details see Chapter 3). 
In a cross-country comparative perspective (Figure 1.6), Belarus is still one of the post-communist 
countries with the largest shares of industry5 in total value added produced, although this share has 
been declining over the years. At the same time, Belarus is also one of the countries with the largest 
shares of agriculture (although the weight of agriculture also dropped substantially compared to the 
 
5
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past). As can be seen in Figure 1.6, it is this combination of specialisation in both industry and 
agriculture that makes the structure of the Belarusian economy stand apart from that in other post-
communist countries. 
Figure 1.4 / Share of agriculture and industry in gross value added in selected countries, 





1) Including forestry and fishery. 
2) Mining, manufacturing and utilities. 
Source: UNECE; National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
According to the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ rankings, in recent years Belarus has made 
dramatic progress in improving the local business climate: it moved up from 106th position in the overall 
ranking in 2005 to 44th position in 2016 (see Table 1.2). In 2010 Belarus was ranked 4th in the world in 
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Table 1.2 / Belarus and selected other countries in the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing 
Business’ ranking, 2005-2016 
Country 2005 2008 2012 2016* 
Lithuania 15 28 27 20 
Latvia 26 29 25 22 
Poland 54 76 55 25 
Armenia 46 44 32 35 
Kazakhstan 86 70 49 41 
Belarus 106 85 58 44 
 
Russia 79 120 112 51 
Azerbaijan 98 96 66 63 
Ukraine 124 145 137 83 
* Due to changes in methodology 2016 ranking is not directly comparable to other years. 
Source: The World Bank (2016). 
At the same time, Belarus was also the country with the highest average inflation rates among all 
economies in transition (CIS, CEE and SEE) (Table 1.1). As discussed in more detail later, during these 
years it did not manage to achieve lasting macroeconomic stabilisation and was hit by several 
subsequent macroeconomic crises. The combination of relatively high growth and high inflation also 
seems to go against the established understanding that macroeconomic stabilisation during the 
transition is a precondition for achieving sustained economic growth. 
Thus in many ways Belarus defies the conventional wisdom about the objectives and the nature of the 
process of economic and political transformation in the post-communist countries. Belarus has been 
visibly different from other transition economies, following its own transition path, pursuing different 
political and policy objectives and achieving different outcomes.  
This being said, Belarus is relatively little known in the West and largely remains a puzzle not only to the 
wider public but also to much of the mainstream economic community. Many questions related to the 
transition experience of this country remain without clear-cut answers. Why and in which features was 
Belarus different from other economies in transition? What were the factors and driving forces of this 
peculiar transition path? What is transition success and failure judging from Belarus’ experience in 
comparison with that of other countries?  
One could go one step further and ask even more fundamental questions based on this experience. 
Does Belarus’ performance provide evidence that transition in other countries could have followed 
different paths from what was observed in reality? Could such alternative routes have alleviated some of 
the pain of the transition and could they have helped achieve better outcomes? 
The next parts of this paper as well as the remaining chapters of the study will address these questions 
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WHY WAS BELARUS DIFFERENT? AN OVERVIEW OF INTERPRETATIONS  
It would be unfair to say that economists overlooked Belarus’ atypical transformation pattern during the 
transition. Indeed, it has been the topic of a number of studies, both academic and analytic, and they 
have offered a range of conjectures on this experience and its determinants. In this section we present a 
brief overview of the literature devoted to Belarus’ transition experience and its interpretation as well as 
to other related literature that may provide clues to this effect. 
Mainstream interpretation: Belarus buying time to delay inevitable reforms 
This is the most widely held view to which all international financial institutions also adhere, so it could 
be taken to represent the ‘Washington Consensus’ interpretation of the Belarus phenomenon. It 
amounts to the understanding that economic reforms in Belarus were put on hold in the middle of the 
1990s (see Figure 1.1) as a result of a political backlash by conservative powers who established an 
autocratic political regime resisting market reforms (see a discussion on Belarus’ political system below). 
Given the lack of political will to pursue economic and political transformation, the authorities have been 
looking for – and finding – ways to buy time to delay the inevitable reforms, as undertaken by most of the 
other economies in transition, thanks to its status as a ‘rentier state’. 
Belarus, similarly to all transition economies, experienced grave external shocks when its inefficient 
Soviet-type economic structure was exposed to the powerful competitive pressure of the international 
market. It also experienced a period of deep transformational recession in the first half of the 1990s and 
was facing similar policy dilemmas related to the speed of economic restructuring and the sequencing of 
transition reforms as other post-communist countries. However, instead of choosing one way or another 
to restructure the economy, Belarus chose a way to postpone market reforms by securing access to 
extraordinary external resources allowing it to cushion, at least partly, the magnitude of the external 
shocks. The Belarusian authorities did that by negotiating energy subsidies from Russia in exchange for 
political loyalty and alliance with Russia. Belarus’ negotiated access to Russian gas and oil at prices 
significantly below world market prices resulted in direct subsidies to Belarusian businesses and 
consumers plus, in addition, the exports of processed fuels and other oil- and gas-based chemicals at 
international prices. This was equivalent to a supplementary cash transfer to Belarus.  
The details of these bilateral arrangements have been changing over the years and the total amount of 
the subsidy has systematically been decreasing (for details see Chapter 3) but, one way or another, they 
are still in place. The availability of these considerable resources (‘loyalty rent’) at the hands of the 
authorities have made it possible for them to continue subsidising inefficient local economic structures 
and thereby delay the market reforms that would lead to their painful restructuring as happened in other 
countries.  
The loyalty rent can be considered as part of the historically strong economic, political and cultural links 
between Russia and Belarus which have been maintained after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia 
remains Belarus’ main trading partner and market thanks to both the traditional long-term cooperation 
links and to political support on both sides (see Chapter 4). As a consequence of the close economic 
ties, Belarus’ economic growth is strongly dependent on the state of the Russian economy and subject 
to shocks originating in Russia (Figure 1.5). 
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Figure 1.5 / GDP growth rates in Belarus and Russia, %, 1995-2015 
 
Source: wiiw database. 
The analytical publications of the IMF, World Bank and EBRD have systematically followed the above 
interpretation of Belarus’ transition experience throughout the years and up until the present day.6 
Consequently, this interpretation has set the tone for the majority of the analytical writings on Belarus. 
IFIs have systematically put the emphasis on their conclusion that Belarus’ economic course and growth 
performance are not sustainable and that postponing market reforms will not eliminate the need to 
undertake them at some point but will only make the adjustment more painful when these reforms 
become inevitable. 
This interpretation alone, however, leaves one important issue open. It does not provide a clue as to why 
Belarus turned out to be the only post-communist country to attempt cushioning the transition shocks, 
and hence delay reforms, thanks to the access to rents. Resource-rich countries, Russia included, 
obviously had access to rents that could have been diverted to such policies. But the fact is that no other 
transition economy, including resource-rich countries, chose a transition path similar to that of Belarus. 
The pure ‘rent-based’ interpretation of Belarus’ post-1995 growth also ignores another factor that 
probably gave a similar push to the Belarusian economy. In 1995, Belarus and Russia entered into a 
Customs Union which removed most of the tariff barriers in their mutual trade and served as a key driver 
boosting Belarus’ exports to Russia. In a way, the Customs Union was a powerful factor for the recovery 
of the Belarusian economy and reinforced the effect of energy subsidies. 
The political economy of transition: delayed reforms as a rational choice?  
The political economy of transition is about the political decisions on reform policies: How do these 
decisions take shape? What motivates such decisions? Which are the driving forces (and actors) behind 
the decisions on reforms (or non-reform)? How are reforms implemented? When implemented, how 
successful are the policies in achieving their objectives? Why are some attempted reforms successful 
while others fail? 
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Experiences of other transition economies (Bulgaria being a case in point) have provided evidence that 
delayed reforms can be a rational choice, at least up to a certain point.7 The arguments draw on the 
peculiar political economy of transition, in particular, the understanding of the endogeneity of the political 
process in a situation of a dynamic political equilibrium. In such a situation, market responses to 
economic policies affect the political equilibrium and can induce changes in policy; on the other hand, 
economic interests are very often a function of past policies.8 The literature on the political economy of 
transition also emphasises the role of political constraints, which by and large determine the space of 
feasible reforms as well as the degrees of freedom of policy-makers. Consequently, one should 
distinguish between ex ante political constraints (political factors that may block the adoption of reforms) 
and ex post ones (possible reversals after the reforms are implemented and their outcomes are known).9 
Another important feature of these models is the focus on the re-distributional nature (related to costs 
and benefits) of most economic reforms which gives rise to ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the reforms.10 
It should be pointed out, however, that most of the theoretical political economy models of policy reform 
assume fully democratic societies and their capacity to impose policy change and even policy reversal 
through electoral cycles. As will be discussed later, Belarus’ political system has some peculiarities that 
deviate from these assumptions. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that political economy arguments did 
play an important role in shaping the course of transition in Belarus.  
The degrees of freedom of policy-makers in transition economies to make autonomous and independent 
choices on the course of reforms, especially at the onset, were severely limited by the capacity of the 
economies to cushion transition shocks with available reserves or accessible resources such as foreign 
exchange and fiscal reserves, the ability to borrow on foreign exchange markets (hence the 
sustainability of foreign debt), and the ability of governments to borrow (hence the sustainability of public 
debt). In many cases, the choice of the reform course (e.g. between gradualism and radical reforms) 
was not a premeditated policy choice but a self-imposed one, forced by the limited available options, or 
the possibility to make a choice was simply overtaken by events such as macroeconomic crises when 
crisis-management or adjustment reforms imposed themselves on politicians and societies. At one 
extreme of the transition strategies, a fundamental crisis and the full depletion of reserves and resources 
could drive fast fundamental reforms which would otherwise not be possible due to political constraints. 
This was the case when the triple macroeconomic crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-1997 triggered the 
establishment of a currency board and speedy structural reforms. 
Only countries that had sufficient available or accessible resources to cushion the transition shocks had 
the luxury of being able to make deliberate choices on their policy course. Thanks to the long-lasting 
‘loyalty rent’ extracted from Russia in the form of oil and gas supplies at below-market prices, as well as 
the preserved access to the Russian market, Belarus was probably among the very few post-communist 
economies that could make such choices with longer planning horizons, including the luxury to consider 
options for gradual change and a change towards a direction different from most of the other post-
communist countries. It is thus at the other extreme of the spectrum of transition strategies. Furthermore, 
policy-makers in the country in principle could afford to consider ex ante the pros and cons of a 
 
7
  Dobrinsky (2013). 
8
  Krueger (1993). 
9
  Roland (1994, 2000). 
10
  Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
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gradualist course of slow reform, on the one hand, and that of painful reforms of economic restructuring, 
on the other hand. The above suggests some arguments in favour of the understanding that delayed 
reforms in Belarus also bear elements of a ‘rational choice’. 
At the same time, the possibility to make choices does not explain the actual choice of the policy course 
itself as policy-makers in Belarus presumably had at their disposal various options. Had they opted for a 
different course say, some 20 years ago, Belarus could have been very different today. It is argued 
below that the choices the country made at that point in time were determined by the specific context 
and the balance of power within the society. 
Preserved organisational capability  
One original interpretation of Belarus’ unique experience draws on the notion of organisational capability 
and associates its decent growth performance with the preserved organisational capability of the 
country.11 In this interpretation, the notion of organisational capabilities is understood as organised 
human capabilities such as knowledge, skills, experience and teamwork that are essential to exploit the 
potential of technological processes that lead to economies of scale or of scope. 
The broader argument in this interpretation is that mainstream transition economics as a strand in the 
economics literature was biased towards the theory of markets while ignoring the organisational side of 
the economy. It is furthermore argued that this provides an insufficient perspective which may represent 
a distorted picture of the transformation process and its outcomes if applied as a single framework. It is 
then conjectured that Belarus’ uniqueness among the transition economies is due to the fact that it 
largely preserved the inherited organisational capabilities of the economy. The argument is based on the 
understanding that organisational capabilities can represent an important factor behind growth of 
economies that operate behind the technology frontier and whose growth is based on imitation, as was 
largely the case in the post-socialist economies. 
The organisational capabilities perspective highlights some distinctive benefits and costs of the 
Belarusian economic model. On the positive side, strong central controls have prevented asset stripping 
in state-owned enterprises, reduced rent-seeking behaviour and prevented disorganisation; the country 
preserved engineering capabilities and developed production capabilities. On the negative side, there 
was little restructuring of old firms because enterprises were shielded from competitive pressure. 
However, it is still surprising to see the extent of enterprise restructuring activities which cannot be 
explained by ‘external’ pressures but largely by internal patterns of behaviour of large enterprises. 
Foreign direct investment and entry of new enterprises remain heavily controlled which deprives the 
economy of potential imports of new technologies as well as of an array of SMEs as potential 
specialised suppliers. Belarus also shows weak ‘experimentation activities’ and dynamic allocation in the 
economy which limits its potential to effectively participate in the international division of labour. 
Within this framework it is claimed that the case of Belarus provides evidence of the power of 
organisational economics as the inherited organisational capabilities allow firms to be efficient in terms 
of ‘static allocation’ and preserve some production and engineering capabilities in a new external market 
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context. But a key challenge for the Belarusian economy will be whether it can liberalise and 
democratise while at the same time preserving its organisational capabilities. 
The role of social values, expectations and external anchors 
Social values, expectations of economic agents and external anchors were an important part of the 
environment in which politicians made their policy choices – and hence of the political economy of 
transition. Belarus does provide ample evidence of their importance in shaping the course of transition. 
Thus, in analysing the Belarusian case, the EBRD pointed out the role of the specific social values 
prevailing in Belarus and the ‘social contract’ that the Belarusian authorities concluded with the 
population. Under it, ‘the authorities provide stability, order, modernity and low levels of income 
inequality. In return, the electorate remains politically quiescent ... Media control reinforces this contract 
and shapes people’s choices … independent surveys show that a large proportion of the population – 
although not a majority – values order over freedom.’12 
However, as discussed in this chapter, the Belarusian ‘social contract’ – which implies rising wages and 
nearly full employment – was to a large degree financed by external rents and the preservation of soft 
budget constraints on state-owned firms and banks. The key parameters of this contract (in the way it 
has been functioning until now) may be inconsistent with an absence of external rents. 
As regards the role of expectations for the shaping of the reform agenda, one needs to consider it in a 
dynamic perspective. In the 1990s and even in the early 2000s, expectations of economic agents in 
transition economies were largely shaped by the success or failure in their transformation reforms, 
especially in a comparative cross-country perspective. With the accession of a large group of CEE 
countries to the EU, the effect of the countries’ reform agenda on expectation has gradually declined, 
first as regards the new EU members and later as regards non-EU post-communist economies. To the 
effect that expectations do affect economic performance due to their potential to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, the indirect effect of reforms as a factor shaping some aspects of economic performance 
(transmitted thorough expectations) has also diminished. Now the ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’ motive 
does not seem to play a perceptible role for the shaping of domestic economic reform agenda in any of 
the former communist countries, Belarus included. 
External anchors played an extremely important role for institutional change in the transition economies 
and, ultimately, for the success (or failure) of the process of political, economic and social 
transformation, partly through their effect on the expectations of economic agents.13 Thus, the realistic 
prospect of EU membership was one of the most important drivers and catalysts of the reform process in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that either joined the EU or are in a process towards 
accession, providing a powerful impetus for the acceleration of their market reforms.14 
By contrast, in terms of the external anchors Belarus has been in a zone of ‘no gravity’ throughout its 
transition. EU membership has never been seen as a realistic perspective for Belarus on either side. On 
 
12
  EBRD (2013), pp. 31. 
13
  Di Tommaso, Raiser and Weeks (2007). 
14
  EBRD (2013); Roland (2000); Dobrinsky (2013). 
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the other hand, despite the close economic and political ties with Russia, after independence Belarus 
was keen on keeping its distance from the big neighbour, especially in view of the perception of a 
corrupt transition in Russia. Due to that, Russia did not serve as an attractive external anchor for Belarus 
either. In these circumstances, visionary politicians can shape (even manipulate) local expectations 
more easily, offering development models that are not anchored externally.  
Short-, medium- and longer-term aspects of the dichotomy ‘reforms – growth’ 
As already noted, there has been extensive research on the relationship between market reforms and 
growth performance during the transition from plan to market. The positive association between the two, 
as suggested by many of these studies, has served as an argument and impetus for policy-makers in 
the transition economies to speed up market reforms.  
It should be pointed out, however, that with time, the above association has become more obscure. 
During the initial years of transition, common transition-related factors – as well as changes therein – 
dominated the performance of the transition economies as a whole. Over the years, divergences in 
performance as well as the advance in transformation led to a considerable decline in the effect of 
transition-related factors while country-specific, idiosyncratic factors have become the dominant factors 
defining the performance of individual countries. At present it would be meaningless to judge policies 
and reforms in the former communist countries, even those that are lagging significantly behind in 
economic and political transformation, by the measures and criteria used 20 years ago. 
Most growth-related research on the transition economies so far has focused on the common factors 
that drove their growth performance during the transition period proper, when their performance was 
mostly determined by transition-related factors, and in terms of the time horizon had at best a medium-
term perspective. If one had to repeat similar exercises now, they would need to, on the one hand, take 
a longer-term perspective and, on the other hand, focus on idiosyncratic factors. 
As already noted, despite the rigorous analytical research of the dichotomy ‘progress in transformation 
reforms’ – ‘economic growth’, it would be an exaggeration to claim that this research produced clear-cut 
answers to this effect. Undoubtedly this research has helped deepen significantly the knowledge about 
the causal relationships between reform agenda and reform outcomes, but it has not revealed a magic 
recipe for success for any specific country taken on its own.  
As seen in the previous section, Belarus’ experience during the past 20 years largely defies the 
arguments that market reforms – under the agenda undertaken in other transition economies – have 
been an indispensable factor for achieving high economic growth. On the contrary, Belarusian policy-
makers have used arguments based on their own experience to claim that the Belarusian model of 
gradual transition can support better economic performance and can secure higher welfare to the 
population. Of course, the long-term sustainability of this model is something that still will need to pass 
the reality check. 
In summary, each of the above interpretations offers some evidence-based arguments and provides a 
different perspective to Belarus’ unique transition experience. These interpretations are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive but rather complementary, highlighting different aspects of this experience. The next 
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sections will seek to provide a deeper insight into the empirics of Belarus’ experience, which should 
shed further light on the possible empirical justification of these conceptual conjectures. 
BELARUS’ UNIQUE ECONOMIC MODEL 
Analysing the driving forces – and restraints – behind Belarus’ economic performance is hardly possible 
without a more in-depth understanding of its institutional structure and policy-making process, i.e. what 
is referred to in the paper as the ‘Belarus’ economic model’. During the past 25-30 years there were 
significant – albeit gradual – institutional changes which made this structure and its working completely 
different from what it was in Soviet times. At the same time, the Belarus’ economic model is quite unique 
and different from the way that the CEE countries are run nowadays. 
Belarus’ brand of state capitalism 
It has recently been suggested by some leading Belarusian economists that the political and economic 
system that gradually evolved in Belarus can be classified as ‘state capitalism’.15 Such a categorisation 
reflects at least two main characteristics of the Belarusian economic system and model: 
› on the one hand, it highlights the significant role that the state plays in the economy, in terms of 
ownership of production and business assets and direct interference in the economic process; 
› on the other hand, it differentiates it from the previous system of central planning as evidenced, in the 
first place, by the withdrawal of the state from the type of direct allocation of resources typical of 
central planning.   
The conjecture of state capitalism in principle implies that markets have a leading role as mechanisms 
and drivers of resource allocation. However, in Belarus this role is often constrained by the direct 
interference of the state in the working of markets; as discussed below, the state still plays a 
considerable role (both directly and indirectly) in the allocation of some resources. So if one is to adhere 
to such a definition, one needs to bear in mind that there is probably more ‘state’ than ‘capitalism’ in the 
Belarusian economy of today. 
The self-asserted categorisation of Belarus as a ‘state capitalist’ economy also contains a claim of 
significant systemic transformation from the starting point of a Soviet-type economic and political model 
to a different socio-economic and political system nowadays. At the same time, it also implies that this 
transformation was different from what happened during these years in most CEE countries, all of which 
were pursuing fundamental market reforms intertwined with pluralistic political systems.  
In line with such an understanding and self-perception, the points of reference for international 
benchmarking (including in terms of policy practices) in Belarus often are countries like China, Chile, 
South Korea and other Asian ‘tigers’ (all of which achieved economic success while at the same time 
adhering to authoritarian political regimes), rather than the leading EU economies. 
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However, a deeper and more critical look at the Belarus model of ‘state capitalism’ would reveal one key 
feature that weakens the credibility of this self-assertion, namely, the absence of hard budget constraints 
on the operation of state-owned firms. As will be discussed below in this chapter and throughout the 
report, state-owned firms and banks in Belarus still largely function under soft budget constraints, with 
the state always on standby, ready to extend a helping financial hand to bail out firms and banks in 
financial distress. 
The importance of soft budget constraint (a notion first introduced by János Kornai) as a legacy of 
central planning and a factor to be dealt with during the transition from plan to market was widely 
debated in the literature on transition in Central and Eastern Europe.16 Finding a radical way of 
uncoupling firms and banks from the state as a lender of last resort was among the key policy rationales 
for speedy privatisation in many CEE countries. 
In principle, the state has all the levers to impose hard budget constraints on the firms that are under its 
patrimony. However, the fact that Belarusian state-owned firms and banks still largely operate under soft 
budget constraints provides evidence that, as long as the symbiotic ownership relation exists, it may be 
next to impossible to do that. The political economy aspects of soft budget constraints in Belarus are 
discussed below; the fact to be stressed here is that the incidence of soft budget constraints is at odds 
with the self-asserted categorisation of Belarus as a ‘state capitalist’ economy. 
Political system 
An economic model based on ‘state capitalism’ requires a matching political system that governs and 
support such a model, and this has also been the experience of other countries adhering to similar 
economic systems. The backbone – and key building block – of Belarus’ political system is the highly 
centralised decision-making pyramid, cemented in the constitution of the country and featuring 
excessive powers concentrated at the top. 
Belarus adheres to a lopsided presidential system, in which the president de facto has greater power 
than the legislative branch (a ‘super-presidential’ political system). The fundament of the current political 
system was laid with the constitutional reform initiated in 1996 by the acting president Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka during his first mandate and approved by a referendum in the same year. The new 
constitution empowered the president with far-reaching authorities such as the right to dissolve 
parliament, call referenda, issue decrees with the force of law, nominate the prime minister, appoint half 
of the members of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, and a quota of the members of the 
upper house of parliament.17 An upper house of the National Assembly was instituted which consists of 
members appointed by the president and the local governments, diluting the power of the elected lower 
chamber of the National Assembly. In addition, there are no limits as to how many terms in office the 
president can serve. 
In accordance with these arrangements, the top of the decision-making pyramid is the president’s office 
which is equipped with the necessary administrative capability to support a comprehensive decision-
making process. The National Assembly de facto has limited autonomous powers even in its legislative 
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mandate. Thus, before a parliamentary vote, the draft of each piece of legislation needs first to be 
cleared with the presidential administration; many draft laws are actually prepared by the presidential 
administration. Plus, many areas of legislative ruling, which in a parliamentary democracy are usually 
subject to parliamentary statutory laws, are governed by presidential edicts in Belarus. The presidential 
office de facto has a veto power on all important public sector decision, overruling all other layers of 
state power. 
The members of the Council of Ministers, the executive branch of power, are directly appointed by the 
president (without the need of even formal parliamentary vote) and serve mainly to operationalise the 
rulings coming from the President’s office. The working of the lower levels of state power follow a similar 
pattern, mostly transmitting decisions originating at the level of the Council of Ministers along their 
respective vertical reporting lines (see an aggregate organigram of the economic administration in 
Belarus in Annex Figure 5). 
There are 24 ministries in Belarus each of which is responsible for policy implementation in the 
respective sector. Among them there are several dealing with economic policy issues: the Ministry of the 
Economy, the Ministry of Finance (in charge of the budget, but not tax collection), the Ministry of Tax 
Collection, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Architecture and Construction. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has an economic function of promoting exports. The functional responsibilities of the ministries 
sometimes overlap, which leads to rivalries, inefficiencies and sometimes paralysis. 
Political parties play a limited role in Belarus’ political life. Apart from incidences of political oppression of 
voices critical to the ruling elite, the weak constitutional power of the National Assembly has acted as a 
deterrent to the formation of a proper partisan system as it does not provide sufficient incentives for 
parties to compete for parliamentary seats. In the absence of limits to the number of presidential terms in 
office and the lack of alternative party-centred power bases, the presidential office has become a gravity 
centre for the political elite in the country.  
Given this power structure, the presidential elections are also by far the most important political events 
which define the political cycle in Belarus. In turn, in the absence of excessive economic turmoil, the 
outcomes of the political cycles are largely predictable. The political goal of preventing economic 
turbulence has thus been a key motivation of the ruling elite for pursuing a gradualist transition strategy 
in Belarus. Another key determinant of the policy agenda has been the intent to appease the population 
(i.e. the voting constituency) at large, including its less affluent segments. The lasting leaning of the top 
decision-making level towards more socially orientated policy choices has often produced openly 
populist policy decisions. 
While by Western standards, the political system in Belarus is far from being pluralistic and democratic, 
it does have pragmatic merits of its own. For example, as the political cycle de facto plays a relatively 
limited role, the ruling elite has in principle the privilege of longer planning horizons in policy-making and 
implementation than is usually the case in pluralistic democracies. This system also ensures a fairly high 
degree of predictability of the framework conditions for doing business. 
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Key policy instruments and mechanisms 
The central policy practice of the Belarus public administration in pursuing long- and medium-term policy 
objectives is through the so-called ‘state programmes’ which usually cover a five-year cycle. There is a 
complex hierarchy of such programmes which is topped by the so-called ‘programmes of socio-
economic development’. The backing of programmatic objectives by financial resources which are 
explicitly included as part and parcel of an adopted state programme is a kind of guarantee that these 
financial resources will then be included in the budgetary framework for the respective period covered. In 
turn, the mid-term budgetary framework follows the socio-economic forecast outlining the output targets 
for the economy as a whole and for key sectors. However, there are no clear procedures to justify the 
efficiency of public spending and no established practice of open discussion on targets and the 
budgetary process, nor an evidence-based impact assessment of policy evaluation. 
As regards day-to-day policy-making and implementation, there exists an elaborate system of legislative 
and regulatory arrangements which prescribe specific top-down mechanisms of administrative control 
over the economy. These are effectuated by a subordinate hierarchical system of rulings by the 
respective administrative bodies. Notably, Belarus maintains a class of well-educated and capable civil 
servants and administrators at all levels of the public administration who ensure its smooth running.  
What is specific for the existing system – and distinctly different from the central planning system under 
communism – is the relatively high degree of transparency of policy-making in Belarus. Coupled with the 
generally good level of ICT culture in the country, Belarus has gradually developed an efficient system of 
publicly available policy documents of various kinds. The process of policy-making and implementation 
takes place within the system of public administration and there is no parallel (and superior in power) 
decision-making process taking place along party lines; neither is there a dominant political party in the 
country. 
However – and this is one more specificity of the Belarus model – ‘transparent’ in the Belarusian sense 
is by no means synonymous with ‘democratic’. The actual process of decision-making is manifestly top-
down, along clearly defined vertical reporting lines. In addition, its autocratic nature also shows up in the 
disconnect between top-level ruling and responsibility. 
In reality, the ultimate decision-making authority (which is largely concentrated in the top level of the 
administrative pyramid) is practically uncoupled from the nominal responsibility for the outcomes of 
economic policy decisions (which are in principle delegated hierarchically to the various levels of the 
pyramid). This does not necessarily take the form of direct interference in lower-level decision-making 
processes. For example, some desired macroeconomic objectives (which may not be internally 
consistent) are usually set top-down as mandatory targets in the top level programmes for socio-
economic development. Subsequently, the macro targets are decomposed and channelled to the lower 
level of administration, carrying with them the inconsistencies they embody. However, such a 
constellation makes it possible for the top level, in the case of unfavourable outcomes of some economic 
policy decisions, to transfer the political responsibility for the unfavourable outcome to the stratum where 
the respective nominal responsibility is delegated. Thus changes at different levels of public 
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Furthermore, there is much less transparency as regards the implications and outcomes of economic 
decision-making and their ultimate consequences for public finances. In the first place, there is no 
established practice of (ex post) policy evaluation that would feed into ex ante policy-making. The 
problem is further complicated by irregular – but widespread – practice of opaque off-balance sheet 
fiscal operations and lack of proper fiscal accounting. Thus, very often the economic upshot of some 
economic decisions does not show up in the headline fiscal balance but results in various contingent 
fiscal liabilities which may surface only after some time lag. Consequently, the headline fiscal balance 
(and deficit) figures are not really meaningful as regards the fiscal position of the government as the true 
position should take into account the (often very large) quasi fiscal deficit. 
And third, what is peculiar in Belarus is the coexistence of rule-based and discretionary policy-making 
and implementation. Discretionary interventions coming from the top of the pyramid are frequently 
applied, especially as crisis management mechanisms, interfering into the working of rule-based 
processes and overruling rule-based decisions. While discretionary decisions may be made in good faith 
and be well meant to achieve positive economic outcomes, there is no guarantee that they are 
consistent with the overall policy objectives and environment and with the other components of the 
policy mix. Consequently, such decisions carry the risk of giving rise to market distortions and quasi-
fiscal liabilities. 
One widely used discretionary mechanism in Belarus’ system of state capitalism has been the imposition 
of price controls of different kinds such as fixed prices, price caps, markup ceilings, rate of return 
ceilings, and governmental indicative prices, among others. The extent of price controls has varied over 
time and periods of price liberalisation were followed by the re-imposition of price controls, especially in 
times of macroeconomic turbulence. 
Given the significant role of the state in the economy, line ministries in Belarus are also mandated with 
functional responsibilities that are not very typical of similar bodies of the public administration in a 
market economy. In particular, different line ministries are delegated with the authority to represent the 
state as the owner of state-owned companies that fall under their functional responsibilities. While these 
authorities are different and smaller in scope than was the case under the system of central planning, 
there is still a considerable degree of governance power and control over the behaviour and 
performance of state-owned companies which is channelled through such reporting lines. 
The state ownership representation is spread across the whole administration including the line 
ministries and the regional authorities and virtually all such bodies perform these functions. Apart from 
that, a few state-owned companies are under the direct control of the presidential administration which 
performs similar functions with respect to these selected companies which are among the cash cows of 
the Belarusian economy. 
Economic governance 
One of the key differences of post-Soviet Belarus from other transition economies has been the restraint 
on large-scale privatisation of state-owned firms inherited from Soviet times. Privatisation has been one 
of the most sensitive and contentious economic policy issues over the past 25 years and the authorities 
have been plainly reluctant to embark on privatisation on a mass scale. No proper privatisation law has 
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ever been enacted in Belarus and only a handful of experimental deals were prepared to be launched, 
without much success.  
Some institutional change did take place in the management of state-owned firms mostly in terms of 
corporatisation – the transformation of Soviet SOEs into corporate business entities. As noted above, 
this matched the recognition of the withdrawal of the state from direct allocation of resources in support 
of the mandatory planning output targets and the transfer of business management responsibilities to 
the companies. The respective line ministries were delegated with the authority to exercise the 
shareholder ownership rights of the state. This reorganisation can be considered as an initial stage of 
enterprise restructuring and preparation for privatisation; however, in Belarus it was not followed by the 
main next step – the ownership transfer. 
The governance of SOEs is integrated into the Belarusian administrative system, in particular, within the 
ministries with functional responsibilities in economic policy implementation. In addition, there are 
several State Committees and Agencies under the authority of the Council of Ministers.18 Among the 
Agencies there are four sectoral ‘concerns’ (de facto holding companies): Belpischeprom, bringing 
together 57 food-manufacturing companies; Bellegprom (110 light industry companies); Belneftekhim 
(more than 60 oil refining and chemical companies); and Bellesbumprom (46 companies in wood 
processing industries). The concerns have managerial responsibilities over the state-owned enterprises 
that are part of them; oddly enough, some private companies are also members of these concerns. 
Economic governance by the state under Belarus’ system of state capitalism is performed through 
different instruments, the most important of which is the system of ‘state targets’ that are communicated 
from the top to the individual state-owned firms19 and, in some case, to all economic agents.20 The 
targets have a hierarchical structure, starting from key macroeconomic targets contained in the medium-
term programmes for socio-economic development. These are then translated into annual ones, 
sanctioned in annual presidential edits on the main macroeconomic targets for the respective calendar 
year. In a next step, the Council of Ministers adopts decrees, translating the annual targets of socio-
economic development into indicative targets by sectors and regions, lower-level indicative economic 
performance targets as well as main targets for state-owned companies. These last targets are in fact 
among the main instruments for direct governance of state-owned companies. 
While the targets communicated to individual state-owned companies are in principle also proclaimed as 
indicative, de facto they act as mandatory since company managers are held personally responsible for 
their achievement. The mechanism of such company targets is the closest counterpart to the old system 
of central planning but there are also significant differences in the way these two mechanisms operate. 
Under the system of central planning, at least theoretically, the planning output targets were backed by 
the main input resources (also supplied by the state as represented by the central planning body) 
considered necessary for achieving these targets. I.e., the state at least had a declared responsibility to 
supply the enterprise with the necessary inputs; in reality it often failed to deliver on this responsibility.  
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  The State Control Committee is the only economic committee in direct subordination to the president. Its functions are to 
implement legislation on control and auditing, and to prevent money laundering and other economic crimes. 
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  As discussed below, the system of firm-level targets have lost substantially in importance in recent years. 
20
  For details see Rudyi (2016). 
22
 
BELARUS’ UNORTHODOX POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
   Research Report 413  
 
Under Belarus’ system of state targets, the state does not claim such an openly proclaimed 
responsibility on the input side while the indicative output targets are de facto treated as mandatory. On 
the other hand, however, through direct interference into the economy, the Belarusian state does 
provide indirect support to some state-owned companies to achieve targets that are considered vital for 
the economy and for achieving the overall macroeconomic targets. In fact, maintaining the practice of 
soft budget constraints acts as a matching financial mechanism of the system of state targets. 
The actual setting of individual company targets is one of the key governance tasks of the public bodies 
(line ministries and regional authorities) under whose functional responsibilities the respective 
companies fall. Apart from the setting of individual targets, there exist also other elements of direct state 
governance of state-owned companies such as negotiation and coordination of the companies’ business 
plans, monitoring of business activity and performance, support to sales and access to finance of 
selected activities. 
Notably, the degree of such direct economic governance by the state into the economy and into the 
operations of state-owned companies has been diminishing in recent years. In the first place, there has 
been a gradual withdrawal of the state from direct control of individual companies and reduction of the 
scope of such control. Thus, while during the 1990s, virtually all state-owned companies were subject to 
direct targeting, in 2010 it only covered 140 companies and in 2013 77 companies.21 In the 2015-2016 
annual planning cycle, the list of companies subject to direct government control has been reduced to 
29.22 23 
Concomitantly, the list of company targets has also been on the decline and their effect on resource 
allocation in the targeted firms has visibly weakened. Thus, in the latest (2015-2016) planning cycle, the 
list of such targets has been reduced to five: 1) export sales (for exporters), 2) profit rate, 3) profit level, 
4) reduction of excessive stocks of finished goods and 5) reduction of production costs.24 In previous 
years the list of such targets was much broader, including some rather fundamental performance 
indicators such as output level, productivity and wage level which distort much more significantly firm 
behaviour and performance.25 Moreover, there has been a general shift from ‘volume-based’ targets to 
‘qualitative’ ones which has been quite visible in the last couple of years. Thus, in general, the company-
level system of targets as described above seems to on the way of being phased out. 
Judging from the above, the trend of recent years suggests a possible intention of gradually phasing out 
the individual company targets as policy instruments of direct interference by the state in the running of 
state-owned firms. Moreover, the share of the state-owned sector of the economy itself is also declining. 
At present, the ownership structure situation in the Belarusian economy is rather mixed and 
heterogeneous across sectors of economic activity (Chapter 3). The sectoral differences are the upshots 
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  Ibid. 
22
  Government decree (2015). 
23
  The firms under direct state control are mainly large companies; there are many more firms which are controlled by line 
ministries, concerns, district authorities and other public bodies. But these SOEs are not subject to centralised firm-level 
targets. 
24
  Ibid. 
25
  As a simplified illustration, compare the production decisions of a firm maximising output under exogenously set labour 
cost with a firm maximising profit with no such constraints on the cost of labour. 
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of a mix of factors and, significantly, the outcomes of a differential public policy stance across sectors. A 
range of businesses, in particular those that are viewed by the top decision-making level as performing 
‘social functions’ (e.g. large employers, cases of ‘one city, one factory’, large collective farms, etc.), as 
well as businesses with questionable restructuring prospects have enjoyed preferential policy treatment 
and open policy support, which has enabled most of them to survive during the past 25 years or so. In 
other sectors such as business services where de novo private businesses were keen to enter and saw 
good prospects to grow, allowing swift redeployment of labour, the policy has been less interventionist 
and Belarus saw fast emergence of a new private sector that now dominates these industries. 
As an illustration of some of the outcomes of the diverse patterns of economic dynamics at the firm level, 
Annex Table 2 provides a concise rating of the largest companies in Belarus in 2014 by four criteria: the 
value of output; the value of tax contribution; the value of exports; and the number of employees. The 
group of ‘national champions’ as depicted in the table is still dominated by traditional large SOEs which 
are present in different sectors of economic activity, but it also includes de novo private firms as well as 
foreign-owned firms and joint ventures. 
Financial architecture 
State-owned banks, especially the two largest among them (Belarusbank and Belagroprombank), were 
actively engaged in financial support to the implementation of various state programmes through the 
intervention of the state into the process of credit allocation by the banks – the so-called mechanism of 
‘directed lending’. Such intervention is effectuated through the banks’ management boards which are 
staffed by top-level civil servants. These boards are the intermediary bodies which channel government 
policies and plans to the banks and translate higher-level plans into banks’ lending policy and 
operational lending decisions. There is a second important characteristic of directed lending in Belarus: 
such loans as a rule are extended at preferential terms (below market interest rates) for the beneficiaries 
while the banks are subsidised by the government for the interest rate differential. 
The mechanism of directed lending is close in spirit, though not equivalent, to the mechanism of central 
allocation of financial resources under central planning. Notably, it is far from market-based credit 
allocation matching the demand for credit by autonomous profit-making economic agents and credit 
supply by profit-maximising banks who perform stringent screening of such demand. As a result, 
directed lending generates market distortions and has serious negative micro- and macroeconomic 
implications such as the deterioration of the quality bank portfolios (due to the high share of substandard 
and not-performing loans), generally low profitability of banks’ credit activity and, ultimately, economy-
wide misallocation of resources.26  
In turn, as shown by the experience of the past about 20 years, the accumulation of financial distress in 
state-owned banks and the escalating risks of possible bank failures has on several occasions prompted 
another form of state intervention: the recapitalisation of ailing state-owned banks with public funds 
(either directly from the budget or through ad hoc refinancing decisions by the central bank). Thus state-
owned banks by and large also have been performing under soft budget constraints, at least up until 
now. The repeated pattern of such interventions gives rise to moral hazard among recipient economic 
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  See Kruk and Haiduk (2013). 
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agents (both state-owned banks and state-owned firms) and dampens external market restructuring 
pressures on them.  
The top-down administrative intervention model in Belarus also affects the operations of the country’s 
central banks – the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB). Although according to its formal 
legal status the NBRB is ‘independent in its decision-making’, similarly to other policy mechanisms in 
Belarus, it may be subject to informal pressures coming from the top which may and do affect the central 
bank’s decisions. This has implications not only for its refinancing policy and the relations with 
commercial banks (as discussed above) but also for its wider monetary and exchange rate policy 
decisions (as will be discussed later). 
The model of the banking sector as described above was typical of the late 1990s and the 2000s when 
significant amounts of directed credit were channelled to support government programmes, in the first 
place in agriculture and housing construction. In recent years, similarly to the corporate sector, the 
situation in the banking sphere has also gradually been changing and the degree of state intervention in 
the financial sphere has notably decreased. 
The most important institutional change was the establishment in 2011 of the Development Bank of the 
Republic of Belarus (DBRB). The DBRB is a specialised financial institution which was established with 
the main purpose to fund government development programmes and hence took over the respective 
portions of the portfolios of the two main commercial banks (Belarusbank and Belagroprombank) which 
had been engaged in such operations before it came into existence. Accordingly, the DBRB was due to 
become the only provider of directed credit in Belarus while the NBRB was due to discontinue non-
standard liquidity support to the commercial banks. 
However, the actual transfer of such functions to the DBRB took several years to be fully implemented 
and in the meantime the old and the new funding systems coexisted in parallel. As of the moment of 
writing, the DBRB had acquired only a small fraction of directed loans from Belarusbank and 
Belagroprombank. In reality, the DBRB has sought to position itself more as a development institution 
managing new directed credit rather than as a hospital bank and resisted the transfer of ‘old’ (and bad) 
directed loans. So, it still remains to be seen what the actual role of the DBRB will be in future. 
Another relatively new development was the establishment in 2005 of the budgetary National 
Development Fund. The revenue of the fund is provided by targeted mandated contributions by the most 
profitable Belarusian SOEs. At the beginning of every year, the Council of Ministers issues a decree 
listing those SOEs (97 in 2008, 60 in 2011, 36 in 2014 and 30 in 2016) which are mandated to transfer a 
portion of their profit to this national fund. 
The National Development Fund was conceived to function as a sovereign development fund. In 
principle it should accumulate adequate financial resources for the purpose of engaging in large-scale 
socio-economic projects. The funding decisions are to be approved at the level of the President of 
Belarus. However, in the case of Belarus, it is so far quite insignificant in terms of its endowment with 
funds and hence has limited capacity to perform such functions.  
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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE UNDER A GRADUALIST TRANSITION STRATEGY  
The drivers of growth in Belarus 
Between 1995 and 2011, Belarus experienced a period of unprecedented and uninterrupted high 
economic growth which produced impressive outcomes: real GDP tripled (Table 1.1, Figure 1.4 and 
Annex Table 1) and, in terms of catching up, Belarus was among the front runner transition economies. 
In chronological order, the period that we review in this paper (1996-2016) can probably be broken down 
into two: 
› A decade plus of growth (1996-2008)  
› A period of turbulence (2009-2015) 
The recovery that started in 1996 followed several years of transformational recession in the first half of 
the 1990s. It was followed by a phase of lasting and robust upturn with double-digit GDP growth in some 
years. Economic growth in Belarus in this period was predominantly driven by domestic demand 
(Figure 1.6). In statistical terms, private consumption made sizeable contributions to GDP growth 
throughout the period of robust recovery; in the first half of the 2000s and up until 2008, this was also 
matched by the important contributions of fixed investment. 
Figure 1.6 / Contribution of final demand to GDP growth in Belarus, %, 1996-2014 
 
Source: UNECE statistical database. 
The start of recovery coincided with the setting-up of the new political system in Belarus and the gradual 
establishment of its building blocks and economic model, so it is tempting to seek some causal links 
between the two. The observed type of economic performance is consistent with the conjecture that 
Belarus not only managed to preserve to a large degree the organisational capabilities and production 
capacity inherited from the past but also introduced targeted policies to support them which were 
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recovery of incomes and consumption so that a significant portion of the rent was oriented towards 
establishing and maintaining the ‘social contract’ with the population. 
In addition, the Belarusian economy benefited from the close economic ties with Russia which also 
experienced a robust economic upturn between 1999 and 2008 (Figure 1.4). The invigoration of 
economic ties with Russia after the introduction of the Customs Union in 1995 was probably the most 
important growth factor in this period. The strong import demand in Russia supported growing exports of 
Belarusian engineering products and capital goods (partly thanks to the supply chains preserved from 
the past) thus contributing to the revival of these sectors of the Belarusian economy. In turn, the 
production of engineering and capital goods stimulated both the imports of intermediaries and domestic 
demand in general, including private consumption, and the imports of consumer goods.  
One of the downsides of these policies was the development of a ‘rent addiction’ syndrome as what 
might at the surface appear as an economic miracle was partly boosted by the implicit transfers from 
Russia originating in below-market prices charged for the supplied oil and gas (by some estimates, in 
earlier years, the later amounted to several billion euro per year). Part of these implicit subsidies was 
channelled directly to recipient firms and the households through cheap energy and another part 
generated fiscal revenue through the export tariffs collected from exporters of fuels and oil-based 
chemicals and resided in the state coffers. There were different additional mechanisms (discussed 
below) that performed further redistribution and channelling of resources to businesses and households. 
Ultimately, this model of growth was partly driven by the artificially boosted domestic demand as rents 
were transmitted towards supporting fixed investment and private consumption.  
Publicly supported investment was a key component of many government development programmes 
that were implemented in this period. These programmes targeted accelerated fixed capital formation in 
a wide range of areas including purely public investment in infrastructure development but mostly 
business and household fixed investment supported by directed lending (such as the modernisation of 
industry, the construction of new production facilities, household construction, support to agricultural 
investment). Consequently, the Belarusian economy performed at unusually high investment ratios 
during much of the past two decades: gross fixed capital formation was above 30% of GDP between 
2006 and 2014 (Figure 1.7). 
The potential recipients of directed credit (these categories were specified in the respective government 
programmes) enjoyed two types of privileges: easier access to credit and subsidised (below-market) 
interest rates. Respectively, lending banks were compensated for the interest rate differential by the 
budget and government-recommended credits could carry state guarantees.27 Plus, state-owned 
enterprises were mandated to place their deposits in the banks engaged in directed lending. 
There are no comprehensive official statistics on the extent of directed lending but IMF estimates 
suggest that they were quite sizeable (Figure 1.7). In some years the level of directed lending reached 
between 5% and 10% of GDP, and it funded some 20-25% of gross fixed capital formation. 
While the activist industrial policy supported by an external stimulus boosted economic growth, it also 
produced significant distortions in the Belarusian economy. In the absence of proper market-based 
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intermediation through a well-functioning financial system, many of the investment decisions in the 
economy were hardly consistent with efficient resource allocation. Empirical studies indicate that fixed 
investment supported by directed lending in this period was quite inefficient: while the resulting 
investment boom did boost GDP growth through factor input, this was associated with a significant 
negative effect on total factor productivity.28 
Figure 1.7 / Directed lending and gross fixed capital formation in Belarus, % of GDP, 
2001-2015 
 
Sources: IMF; UNECE statistical database. 
Apart from investment, government policy targeted also the recovery of income and private 
consumption. The main policy instrument employed by the Belarusian authorities (especially in the 
period of high growth29) was represented by wage targets which used to be part of the government 
programmes of socio-economic development. Through the hierarchy of government programmes and 
other mechanisms of state control discussed above, wage targets were channelled virtually to all levels 
of economic governance. This also included the private sector either directly or indirectly as private 
entities needed to offer competitive wages for the skilled labour they were hiring.  
Similarly to directed lending, wage targets had a significant distortive macroeconomic effect as they 
impeded market-type wage formation. In effect both factor inputs – capital and labour – were subject to 
such distortive pressure driving allocative efficiency further down. Another specificity of wage policy was 
that while wage targets were announced in local currency, implicitly they carried the message of 
targeted dollar wages. These aspects of wage formation in Belarus had a number of negative 
implications of their own which will be discussed later. 
Summing up the above, the enterprise and banking sectors de facto served as extended arms of the 
government in implementing policy tasks as they performed important redistributive functions which, in 
principle, should be performed by the budget. 
 
28
  Kruk and Haiduk (2013). 
29











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Directed lending flow Gross fixed capital formation
28
 
BELARUS’ UNORTHODOX POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
   Research Report 413  
 
Despite the distortions, this model of growth performed quite successfully in the period when the rising 
fixed investment was delivering decent returns and the flow of energy rents was sufficient to back the 
growing domestic demand, and this was the case during the decade 1996-2005. Things began to 
change around 2007 when Russia started claiming back part of the Belarusian export oil duties and 
doubled the gas export prices for Belarus. While energy prices still remained well below international 
market prices, the amount of the energy rent to Belarus dropped significantly.  
The Belarusian authorities were thus faced with a dilemma: to change the policy course more radically 
(which would amount to eliminating the demand surplus supported by rents) or to keep it while searching 
to attract additional external resourced compensating for the reduction in rents. The first policy option 
was obviously associated with unpopular austerity measures and the authorities opted for the second 
solution. 
The Belarusian authorities might also have hoped that the terms of energy trade with Russia could be 
renegotiated towards terms more favourable for Belarus. However, in reality this never materialised; on 
the contrary, since that time, Russia has been moving ever closer to international market prices in the 
energy exports to Belarus. On the Russian side, the arguments for this have been its accession to WTO 
in 2012 as well as the establishment of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
which came into existence in 2010. With the formal launching of the Eurasian Economic Union (which 
came into force on 1 January 2015), the terms of energy trade between Russia and Belarus as members 
of the Union became in principle more rigid and, consequently, energy rents even smaller.30 
The combination of a policy focused on demand-driven growth and diminishing external rents resulted in 
a persistent widening of the external imbalance and fast growth of foreign indebtedness: in the second 
half of the 2000s, Belarus’ current account deficit kept growing, reaching over 15% of GDP in 2010 while 
gross external debt quadrupled between 2005 and 2010 (Annex Table 1).  
One might have expected to see a similar deterioration in Belarus’ public finances as these 
developments were clearly the outcomes of public policy choices. However, the public finance statistics 
for the same period do not indicate any major change to the negative, either in terms of the headline 
fiscal balance or in terms of the open public debt (Annex Table 1). The reason for this is the fact that the 
authorities basically channelled the implementation of this policy to state-owned enterprises and banks, 
de facto delegating them with atypical redistributive functions as noted above. This can clearly be traced 
in the dynamics of Belarus’ savings-investment balance broken down by sectors (Figure 1.8). 
Thus, while there was no notable worsening in the headline public sector balance in the period 
2005-2010 (as seen on Panel A, it was even positive in some years), there was a dramatic shift in the 
negative direction in the business sector balance (Panel B). In fact, as discussed below, the actual 
situation of public finances was considerably worse as quasi-fiscal liabilities kept piling up. Figure 8 also 
clearly demonstrates that the ‘investment boom’ after 2005 was almost entirely financed by increased 




  Nevertheless, with respect to gas, Belarus managed on several occasions to negotiate bilateral deals with Russia on 
more favourable price conditions. 
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Figure 1.8 / Belarus’ saving-investment balance: 1995-2015, % of GDP 
A. Public sector 
 
B. Business sector 
 
Source: wiiw database; UNECE statistical database; IMF, author’s calculations. 
Respectively, the chart illustrating the dynamics of Belarus’ current account balance by sectors 
(Figure 1.9) may also be misleading. By showing that it was the business sector that accounted for the 
significant rise in the current account deficit in the second half of the 2000s, it might suggest a parallel 
significant rise in the external indebtedness of the business sector matching this external savings-
investment imbalance. 
Again this was not quite the case in Belarus. While there were some cases of direct foreign borrowing by 
Belarusian companies, it was the public sector that was responsible for the overwhelming majority of the 
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Figure 1.9 / Belarus’ current account balance by sectors, 1995-2015, % of GDP 
 
Source: wiiw database; UNECE statistical database; IMF, author’s calculations. 
In summary, one could say that the demand-driven, rent-fed economic model in Belarus came to a halt 
by 2011 and the Belarusian economy has not managed to return to a stable growth path ever since. 
Overall, this model was also associated with persistently negative effects on macroeconomic stability as 
discussed in the next section. 
Macroeconomic stability: a delicate balancing act  
A superficial look at the two main policies aimed at macroeconomic stability – fiscal and monetary policy 
– would not reveal the underlying sources of macroeconomic turbulence in Belarus. For instance, there 
was not a single year in the period 2000-2015 when the headline fiscal balance would plunge in a 
dangerously negative territory; on the contrary, in many of these years the public sector reported 
surpluses. As to the monetary side, as noted above, Belarus’ central bank (NBRB) is ‘independent in its 
decision-making’ by its legal status and is supposed to take independent rulings on monetary policy. 
However, the reality has been different on both accounts. On the fiscal side, the headline fiscal balance 
only reflects the outcome of public policy decisions performed through the instruments of formal 
budgetary policy.31 In Belarus, as already noted, many policy decisions with fiscal and monetary 
implications were implemented through state-owned firms and banks. The latter de facto served as 
secondary redistributive mechanisms; however, the outcomes of such redistribution of public funds were 
not subject to the discipline of budgetary policy and were not recorded in the official budgetary accounts. 
Over the years, the resulting macroeconomic imbalances kept accumulating and periodically came to 
the surface in the form of exchange rate crises. 
On the monetary side, under the hierarchical decision-making system, with all key decisions being taken 
at the top of the pyramid, the NBRB was not in a position to take fully independent decisions on key 
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aspects of monetary and exchange rate policy. Ultimately, the central bank was obliged to act as part of 
the hierarchical system of state programmes even if this was in conflict with its own declared policy 
goals and objectives. 
One of the main sources of macroeconomic imbalances – and instability – was the quasi-fiscal deficit 
resulting from inefficient directed lending. Directed credit by and large bypassed proper market-based 
screening and, not surprisingly, led to a deteriorating quality of the portfolios of the lending banks. Plus, 
directed credit led to maturity mismatches in the banks’ portfolios and most of these loans were of a 
long-term nature. Taken together, these factors started causing liquidity problems in lending banks 
which, in turn, reduced their ability to engage in new directed lending. 
On the other hand, directed credit, one way or another, entailed contingent fiscal liabilities as it was de 
facto underwritten by the Belarusian state – either formally, in the form of credit guarantees, or 
informally, as an implicit obligation of the government that adopted the respective state programmes of 
which such lending took place. Thus the bad loans resulting from inefficient directed lending in effect 
accumulated as a quasi-fiscal deficit.32 
The appetite of the authorities for more directed lending as well as the banks’ liquidity problems led to 
several interventions by the state. These interventions were undertaken in two main forms: 1) by direct 
recapitalisation of troubled banks; and 2) via extraordinary financing by the NBRB. According to IMF 
estimates, the annual recapitalisations of state-owned banks from the state budget averaged about 1% 
of GDP annually in the period 2007-2010. A major bank one-off recapitalisation operation was 
undertaken in December 2010 which involved three major state-owned banks engaged in directed 
lending. This bank restructuring measure alone was estimated at some 5.3% of GDP in 2011; as a 
result, the statutory capital of the targeted banks was raised by 22%.33 
On top of that, the NBRB supported on a number of occasions the banks that experienced liquidity 
problems using mechanisms outside its standard refinancing facilities, via ad hoc decisions of the central 
bank Board. Thus, in 2009, the central bank opened an ad hoc refinancing facility targeting two state-
owned banks which amounted to some 45% of their statutory capital or 7% of their total assets.34 This 
type of central bank operations is an example of direct monetisation of the quasi-fiscal deficit which 
added to the macroeconomic imbalances in the Belarus economy. 
The other main source of macroeconomic imbalances was the populist incomes policy which prevailed 
through most of the period of high growth in Belarus. Wage targets had a multiple destabilising 
macroeconomic effect. Mandated wage increases resulted in significant rises in unit labour costs (as real 
wage growth outstripped productivity growth) and competitiveness losses (Figure 1.10). Excessive wage 
growth was also one of the main sources of inflationary pressure in the Belarusian economy. 
Imbalanced wage growth became especially manifest in the period after 2005 when the authorities 
 
32
  Directed lending was probably the main but not the only source of contingent fiscal liabilities (and the quasi-fiscal 
deficit). Other sources included the operations of the above-mentioned extrabudgetary funds, government guarantees 
on household deposits, for price controls resulting in the provision of goods and services at below-market prices, cross-
subsidisation through public utilities, specific support operations by state-owned banks or enterprises extended to some 
sectors, employees or to other enterprises, etc. See IMF (2005). 
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  IMF (2012); Kruk and Haiduk (2013). 
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  Kruk and Haiduk (2013). 
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increased the policy emphasis on welfare growth. The rapid accumulation of foreign debt in this period is 
clear evidence of the inconsistency of these policies. 
Figure 1.10 / Labour productivity, real wages and external debt in Belarus, 1995-2015, USD 
and indices 
 
Source: wiiw database; author’s calculations. 
The core of this inconsistency is the absence of any checks on the pro-inflationary effect of wage 
growth: de facto, wage targets were not matched in any way (explicitly or implicitly) by inflation targets. 
The wage target entirely dominated the macroeconomic policy mix; its other components were just 
residual. In other words, the social objectives (embodied in the wage targets) outweighed 
macroeconomic stability considerations; however, the resultant macroeconomic instability and high 
inflation actually almost fully offset any real wage gains thus annihilating the social effects of this policy 
course.  
Throughout most of the period under consideration, monetary policy in Belarus adhered to a regime of 
exchange rate targeting; inflation was de facto treated residually, as a target of secondary importance. 
Initially, the Belarusian rouble was pegged to the US dollar under a crawling peg regime. Under this 
regime, the central bank could allow the Belarusian rouble to depreciate by 1-1½% per month against 
the US dollar. In 2009, this was replaced with a crawling peg to a basket of currencies consisting of the 
Russian rouble, the US dollar and the euro, with a fluctuation band around the central parity. However, 
informally a return to a US dollar peg occurred in late 2009. 
The conduit of this type of monetary policy was a very challenging task in the Belarusian economic 
environment as the central bank was under different pressures and often faced conflicting objectives. 
The main problem for the NBRB was that safeguarding price stability – which is the principal raison 
d’être of a central bank – was inconsistent with government interference in NBRB decision-making and 
the price stability objective usually gave up to direct or indirect pressures resulting from government 
policies. The technical challenge that the NBRB was facing was the very consistency of the chosen 
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The policies of demand-driven growth pursued by the Belarusian authorities generated persistent 
inflationary pressure through various channels, in the first place through the mechanisms of directed 
credit and wage targets and the monetisation of the quasi-fiscal deficit associated with these policies. 
Through their effect on expectations, price controls have also had a rather controversial effect in the 
Belarusian context, sometimes adding to inflationary pressure. In turn, this generated persistent 
depreciation pressures on the exchange rate of the Belarusian rouble well above the monthly 
devaluation and the fluctuation band; under these conditions periodic devaluations of the currency were 
unavoidable. 
During the period of higher energy rents, part of the forex revenue was directed towards suppressing 
this pressure which made it possible to conduct relatively smooth devaluations and avoid currency 
crashes. However, with the gradual drying out of these rents, the smooth conduct of monetary policy 
became more and more problematic.  
One of the tricky outcomes of this type of exchange rate and income policies was the dynamics of the 
real exchange rate (Figure 1.11). During the 2000s, the ULC-deflated real exchange rate – which is the 
key measure of international competitiveness – started appreciating systematically and did so much 
more than the price-deflated real exchange rate. 
Figure 1.11 / Belarus real effective exchange rate, 1995-2015, index (2005 = 100) 
 
Source: wiiw database; author’s calculations. 
The data also provide evidence that exchange rate appreciation in Belarus in this period was negatively 
correlated with the dynamics of export performance and of the current account balance (Figures 1.12 
and 1.13). One could speculate that the Belarusian monetary authorities paid less attention to the ULC-
based real exchange rate than to the price-based measures and did not adjust their policies to prevent 
such real appreciation. In any case, the fact remains that the mounting macroeconomic imbalances in 
the 2000s were closely intertwined with the dynamics of the real exchange rate. 
Another interpretation of the real exchange rate dynamics can be that the implicit dollar wage targets 
interfered with the conduit of monetary and exchange rate policy as there was pressure on the central 
bank to prevent or reduce exchange rate depreciation which would make it easier to achieve the dollar 
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when the authorities were pushing for fast and visible positive welfare effects of their policies. This is 
also the period of the lasting trend of appreciation of the ULC-based real exchange rate. 
Figure 1.12 / Real effective exchange rate and export performance, 1995-2015 
 
Source: wiiw database; author’s calculations. 
Figure 1.13 / Real effective exchange rate and current account balance, 1995-2015 
 
Source: wiiw database; author’s calculations. 
Given the rising macroeconomic imbalances and turbulence, on the one hand, and the conflicting central 
bank objectives, on the other hand, the forex market was frequently questioning the consistency of the 
exchange rate regime, in particular the par value of the currency peg. In such circumstances, if policy is 
inconsistent, sooner or later there will be a correction which may take place through an orderly or 
through a forced adjustment.  
As the exchange rate was practically the main, if not the only adjustment mechanism in the Belarusian 
mix of macroeconomic policy instruments, the necessary corrections did take place through exchange 
rate adjustments. While the crawling peg was considered to be an instrument for orderly adjustment, it 
turned out to be insufficient in periods of high exchange rate volatility. In turn, high volatility provoked 
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The limits of the Belarusian economic model 
Between 2009 and 2016, Belarus experienced three episodes of currency crises (in 2009, 2011 and 
2014-2015) which epitomised the inconsistency of the macroeconomic policy mix.35 All three cases 
entailed a massive forced devaluation of the Belarusian rouble reflecting the necessary real exchange 
rate adjustment. These can be traced with the respective downturns (in 2009, 2011 and 2014-2015) on 
the real exchange rate charts presented in Figure 1.12. 
The key ingredients of the currency crises were those outlined in the previous section and these were 
present in all three cases. But there were also specific elements that exacerbated the situation in each of 
these episodes. The 2009 crisis was partly a fallout of the global economic and financial crisis which 
caused a deep recession in Russia (Figure 1.4), shrinking Russian import demand, further 
competitiveness losses due to the sharp depreciation of the Russian rouble, deterioration in the current 
account balance and depletion of forex reserves. At the same time the Belarusian authorities continued 
pushing an ambitious investment promotion programme supported by directed lending (Figure 1.8). In 
this situation the Belarusian authorities resorted to IMF financial assistance and concluded a 15-month 
stand-by arrangement, aimed at adjusting to the external shocks backed by appropriate policy reforms. 
In the course of implementing the IMF stand-by agreement, the policy stance was tightened significantly 
which helped maintain the macroeconomic equilibrium. In particular, there was one-off curbing of the 
real wage growth in 2009 (Annex Table 1) which contributed to a reversal of the real exchange 
appreciation and competitiveness gains. Domestic demand was curtailed while net exports contributed 
positively to GDP growth (Figure 1.7). However, after the last IMF tranche, the austerity policies were 
immediately reversed and the authorities resumed expansionary wage and credit policies aiming to 
invigorate economic growth. Then the same story was repeated of competitiveness loss, widening 
current account deficit and depletion of reserves. Ultimately the central bank abandoned the attempts to 
defend an inconsistent exchange rate target and allowed a sizeable devaluation of the nominal 
exchange rate, by more than 200% in 2011.  
However, given the reluctance of the authorities to change the policy course, a similar story developed 
again in the years that followed. A typical example of the populist policy stance that prevailed in this 
period was the target announced in 2010 to raise average monthly wages in Belarus to the equivalent of 
USD 1,000 by 2015. Again, this target was pursued through the same instruments: nominal wage 
targets and the nominal exchange rate. Respectively, the NBRB was subjected to pressure to put a 
brake on the depreciation of the Belarusian rouble and with time this policy course produced an 
unsustainable real exchange rate appreciation while foreign debt kept rising rapidly (Figures 1.11 and 
1.12). The authorities kept resorting to all possible sources of balance of payments support, but only 
managed to get such funding from the Russian government and Russian banks as well as the Anti-Crisis 
Fund managed by the Eurasian Development Bank. 
The effect of policy inconsistency were reinforced by contagion from Russia where the rouble was under 
attack following the drastic fall in oil prices in late 2014. The slump in oil prices also caused a significant 
drop in Belarus’ fiscal and forex revenue, reducing the government’s ability to intervene. All this 
provoked panic purchases on the Belarusian forex market as well as withdrawals of forex deposits 
towards the end of 2014. The NBRB tried to prevent further escalation of the crisis through a range of 
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administrative measures but ultimately it was compelled to give up these attempts and accepted a 
sizeable depreciation at the beginning of 2015. The most important monetary policy change was the 
abandoning of the crawling peg (and of the regime of exchange rate targeting altogether) and the switch 
to a floating exchange rate regime with monetary targeting. The previous basket of currencies 
(consisting of the euro, the US dollar and the Russian rouble) now only serves as reference in the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Ultimately, the currency crises, their nature and frequency in recent years epitomise the limits of the 
Belarusian economic model as such. The underlying policy strategy in recent years appears to have 
aimed to maintain the status quo and prevent an outright economic collapse accompanied by a plunge in 
living standards. During the past two decades, rising welfare has been one of the declared flagship 
political achievements and the authorities have been rather cautious about possible reversals. However, 
in the years after 2008, this has been achieved at the expense of large current account deficits (of the 
order of 10% of GDP or even higher in much of this period) and, consequently, growing external 
indebtedness. 
The most recent crisis demonstrated that the authorities have reached the limits in their ability to cope 
with such crises with the instruments and resources at their disposal. Apart from cementing in-built 
macroeconomic distortions, this policy course led to the fast accumulation of considerable external debt. 
Given the country’s current debt service capacity and policy track record, it is highly unlikely that any 
foreign entity or investor would be willing to continue lending to Belarus unless there is a clear and 
unequivocal commitment by the authorities to switch to a policy course that would ensure sustainable 
economic performance and debt service capacity.  
In most recent years, the conditions for access to fresh credit from Russia and the Eurasian 
Development Bank have been tightened considerably and although these remain the main sources of 
balance of payments support to Belarus, the inflow of such funds has dropped substantially. In 2015, 
Belarus also opened negotiations with the IMF for a Fund-supported economic programme. By the time 
of writing negotiations are still under way and it is not clear whether they will be concluded successfully. 
A key stumbling block is the reluctance by the authorities to take tough radical reform measures (see 
Chapter 4 for further discussion). 
In summary, the present policy course – implying the need to raise continuously new and ever-
increasing balance of payments support – is difficult to sustain in the medium and longer run. 
Addressing the root causes of the balance of payments crisis would require regaining competitiveness 
by a combination of lasting real exchange rate depreciation and structural reforms supporting 
productivity gains (the latter is discussed in the next section). Macroeconomic stabilisation accompanied 
by sustainable disinflation and contributing to a notable reduction in interest rates is also a key 
prerequisite for establishing a healthy economic environment. Sooner or later, the authorities will have to 
face these painful adjustment measures; apart from political considerations, the timing of adjustment will 
depend on the ability to continue financing the external debt and meet the balance of payments 
constraints. Thus, in a medium-term perspective, the Belarusian economy appears to be at a crossroads 
between the status quo and a new policy course leading to a more sustainable growth pattern. 
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IS BELARUS A SUCCESS OR A FAILURE? LESSONS FROM A UNIQUE 
EXPERIENCE 
The transition literature often sought to compare and categorise the types of transition seen in different 
countries and offered different taxonomies of the process. The most widely advocated dividing line 
among transition strategies was that between ‘big bang’ vs. ‘gradualism’. With time, dividing lines 
became less clear and even disappeared as some ‘big-bangers’ started putting brakes on the process 
whereas some ‘gradualists’ started catching up. As Hare and Turley put it, ‘In practice, … the difference 
between these two approaches is far less that one might suppose, since many of the reforms 
commenced at the start of the ‘big bang’ might still take years to implement, while even those countries 
that went for gradualism mostly dismantled central planning and introduced … price and trade 
liberalisation extremely quickly’.36 
Against this backdrop, and even within the broader interpretation formulated with the benefit of hindsight, 
Belarus still stands apart and does not seem to fit into any category. As discussed and argued 
throughout the paper, in many aspects, Belarus’ transition experience has been quite unique and very 
different from that seen in other transition economies. Belarus’ political regime is that of a strong 
presidential system; in that it may be different from the political systems in the CEE countries but is not 
much different from that in most countries in the post-Soviet space. What makes Belarus distinctly 
different from most post-communist countries is the type of economic policies to which the country 
adhered during the past 20-25 years. 
The summary below outlines the most characteristic aspects of Belarus’ economic policies during the 
transition, at least up to the moment of writing, that make it stand apart from other countries: 
› Belarus did not privatise most of the state-owned companies and banks inherited from Soviet times. 
Most of these firms and banks still exist and operate although they were re-organised and are now 
managed differently; 
› similarly, most of Belarus’ agriculture is still in the hands of collective farms inherited from Soviet 
times; 
› wide-ranging privatisation of state-owned firms and banks is still on the agenda of possible future 
policy reforms; 
› the sector of de novo private firms and foreign companies has been the most dynamic part of the 
Belarusian economy although being at a disadvantage compared to firms enjoying state support under 
state programmes; 
› targeted industrial policies were the main approach of pursuing the declared economic policy 
objectives of highest priority such as rising welfare and high employment; 
› large-scale industrial policy was implemented through various state development programmes 
supporting state-owned industrial firms and collective farms; 
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› the authorities also applied a number of unconventional instruments for pursuing policy objectives and 
implementing industrial policy, in particular, the instrument of directed credit and wage targets (the 
latter was de facto mandatory for the whole economy); 
› by contrast, price stabilisation was never among the priority objectives de facto followed by the 
authorities. The macroeconomic policy mix was rather accommodating and price stability was 
subordinate to policy objectives of higher priority; 
› during the past 25 years, Belarus’ achieved economic growth and welfare gains comparable with 
those of the best performing post-communist countries without undertaking many of the reforms that 
were vindicated as quintessential prerequisites for achieving such results by mainstream economic 
advice; 
› in determining its transition model and strategy, Belarus relied mostly on home-grown concepts and 
expertise drawing, among other things, on the country’s preserved organisational capability. External 
anchors played very little role, if any at all, in shaping the course of economic policy; 
› the viability of the Belarusian economic model was heavily conditional on the availability of exceptional 
external resources in the form of rents. With the drying up of rents its sustainability became 
questionable. 
With its experience Belarus defies the dogmatic understanding that there was no alternative to the 
mainstream recipe of a transformation reform agenda advocated at the onset of transition and provides 
hard evidence that the process of economic and political transformation in the post-communist countries 
could have indeed been undertaken differently, at least in some of these countries.  
In fact, many of the conventional wisdoms that governed the economic thinking about transition during 
the 1990s have now been revisited with the benefit of hindsight. As an example, one of the more recent 
conclusions regarding privatisation goes on to claim that: ‘… rather than concentrating on rapid 
privatisation, and frequently doing it badly, it would have been far better for many countries to focus on 
creating good conditions for new businesses to be set up’.37 
In this regard, the Belarusian experience offers new arguments and evidence for revisiting – and 
possibly reconsidering – some other aspects of the policy agenda advocated at the onset of transition. 
The whole spectrum of distinctively different policies listed above offers food for thought for such 
possible reconsideration. Both Belarus’ transition model and circumstances were unique so it would 
hardly have been possible to have exactly the same recipe in another country. But one is tempted to 
speculate that probably some policies in some countries could have also been applied elsewhere and 
could have brought better results than what happened in reality. 
Probably the most intriguing question is whether Belarus can continue experimenting with an economic 
strategy and policy agenda which are markedly different from what other post-communist countries did 
in the past or whether it will have to accept the mainstream transformation reforms and converge, with 
considerable delay, to the common pattern seen elsewhere. At this stage it is difficult to give a clear-cut 
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answer to such a question and therefore Belarus will remain a very interesting case to monitor and study 
for some time to come. 
In any case, it may again be tempting to speculate on the possible policy courses that the country may 
choose in the short to medium run. In this it would be important to distinguish between the sustainability 
of the country’s policy course and the sustainability of Belarus’ economic model as such. 
As argued in the paper, there is strong evidence, especially of more recent times, that the policies 
pursued through the 2000s and up until now have run their course and could hardly be sustained in the 
medium term. Belarus has reached a point when its balance of payments constraints impose some 
needed, if not inevitable, changes in macroeconomic policy. The most urgent policy changes necessary 
to avoid another round of forced adjustment include abandoning once and for all of the most distorting 
policy components such as the mandatory wage targets, directed credit and price controls, while 
maintaining a balanced mix of fiscal and monetary policy. As to the medium to longer run, some 
structural reforms also seem inevitable if the country is to establish a healthy economic environment and 
embark on a path of sustained growth. These include the rehabilitation and restructuring of the state-
owned part of the economy (the enterprise and banking sector and the collective farms). 
As regards the sustainability of the country’s economic model, which is rooted in Belarus’ brand of state 
capitalism, there are no obvious arguments to assert that the model as such is not sustainable. On the 
other hand, within the model as practised in reality, there are obvious flaws that can in principle be 
corrected to make it more efficient and effective. Here again, one might try to distinguish between the 
possible corrections of technical deficiencies and eventual changes that are embedded in the existing 
political system by its design (although a clear differentiation may be difficult). 
The key test of the viability of the Belarusian model of ‘state capitalism’ would probably be the capacity 
of the authorities to impose hard budget constraints on state-owned firms and banks. Capitalism partly 
based on state ownership is in principle possible; however, it is not consistent with the policy of soft 
budget constraints. So for the Belarusian authorities to be able to justify their claim of ‘state capitalism’, 
they would need to move in the direction of imposing hard budget constraints on state-owned firms and 
banks. That is, the state as the owner would only intervene in the allocation of the profit these firms and 
banks generate at purely market conditions without allocating soft financial resources to them. Imposing 
hard budget constraints would also be a key policy step towards the restructuring of the state-owned 
part of the economy and raising its efficiency. 
However, such a policy change would have severe social consequences as it would entail the shedding 
of redundant labour which is apparently now abundant in the state-owned sector of the economy. It is 
questionable whether the Belarusian authorities would be willing to take radical steps in this direction. 
However, if such a policy course is implemented gradually and selectively over an extended period of 
time, it may still be feasible to implement – although ultimately the social price will still have to be paid. 
One of the ‘technical’ weaknesses of the present model is associated with the instruments that the 
Belarusian authorities applied in the conduct of industrial policy. In a simplified sketch, this comes to the 
dichotomy of mandatory targets imposed top-down and policy support (direct and implicit subsidies and 
various administrative measures) to facilitate the achievement of such targets. As argued throughout the 
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paper, the present policy instruments inherently give rise to market distortions and are not consistent 
with efficient economy-wide allocation of resources. 
As demonstrated by the experience of other countries, industrial policy can be conducted more 
efficiently with other means and instruments than those applied by Belarus.38 Plus, industrial policy can 
be implemented with instruments that promote and enhance the competitive environment, rather than 
distorting it as happens with directed lending and wage targets. For instance, rather than providing 
public support across the board as often happened with directed lending, public support may be offered 
through open competitive calls and made conditional on achieving specific targets by recipient firms, 
especially those that raise productive efficiency and contribute to broader economic objectives. 
The replacement of the present outdated policy tools with market-based industrial policy instruments 
could allow the authorities to initiate the much needed process of rehabilitation of state-owned firms and 
banks. In turn, this would facilitate their further restructuring and eventual privatisation, in case there is 
the political will to go in that direction. The modernisation of policy instruments would also be 
instrumental for the improvement of the overall business and investment climate in the country.  
The more difficult and problematic part of an eventual effort to reform the current economic model is 
related to the strictly hierarchical policy decision-making process which has two principal flaws: 1) the 
existence of one supreme decision-making centre empowered to overrule; 2) the pervasive ad hoc 
discretionary policy-making (at the expense of a rule-based process). Such a system is ineffective and 
inefficient by all accounts and its continued functioning in this form will keep generating distortions in the 
economy. As an example, the establishment of a truly independent central bank – which is considered a 
sine qua non (though not sufficient) condition for pursuing macroeconomic and price stability – is clearly 
incompatible with a system of public policy in which there is only one overruling decision-making centre 
and it is outside the central bank, as is the current situation. 
However, the functioning of the policy process is part and parcel of the current political system in 
Belarus. Any eventual reforms in the policy process (in particular towards amending the two main 
weaknesses outlined above) would imply changes in the political system, whose constellation is now 
cemented in the current constitution. In principle the constitution as such is not an obstacle for the 
introduction of the needed changes in the policy process, but this would require good will at the very top 
to relinquish some of the powers now concentrated there and delegate them to the respective levels in 
the decision-making pyramid where they belong and where decision-making would be most effective. 
However, once a strictly hierarchical decision-making process is put in place – as in the case of Belarus 
– voluntary surrender or delegation of power and authority is not something that would easily happen on 
its own. So the effective way of changing the decision-making process would be through a constitutional 
change but this could be a long and cumbersome process with unclear outcomes. Whether and when 
this could happen is something still to be seen. And until then, the Belarusian economy will be destined 
to function with built-in inefficiencies that are inherent to the present decision-making process. 
In conclusion, Belarus will continue to be something of a unique laboratory of economic policy 
experimentation, offering live day-to-day evidence of the outcomes of policies not applied elsewhere. 
This unorthodox experience and its lessons do merit a deeper scrutiny by economists and policy-
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makers. And, even if at some point in time Belarus changes radically its policies and/or economic model 
and embarks on a very different policy course, this will not erase the 25 years or so of relatively 
successful economic performance and the fact that it managed to cushion some of the transition pain 
experienced by other countries. 
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2. Structural challenges 
BY KATERYNA BORNUKOVA 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
In Soviet times, Belarus used to be one of the manufacturing workshops of the Soviet Union, 
specialising in a number of industries at the higher value added segment and relying on the large Soviet 
market. Agriculture was also relatively well developed, in particular industrial livestock production. Food 
processing, especially dairy and meat products, was another pillar of the traditional economy. In the 
main, this structural orientation of the Belarusian economy has been preserved over that past 25-30 
years, largely thanks to the gradualist approach to economic transformation and deliberate public policy. 
Nevertheless, over the years of independence, there was a significant evolution in the structure of the 
economy (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
Table 2.1 / Breakdown of gross value added in Belarus by economic activity, 2000-2014, 
% of total 
  2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 13.81 9.64 10.18 9.13 9.48 7.78 8.30 
Fishing and fish farming 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Mining industry 1.03 1.49 0.33 1.21 1.23 1.11 0.88 
Manufacturing 27.74 29.05 26.55 30.91 29.10 25.67 24.56 
Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 5.71 5.17 3.21 1.87 3.23 2.89 3.21 
Construction 7.19 7.69 10.62 7.26 8.25 11.33 11.62 
Trade, repair, hotels and restaurants 13.24 12.06 14.27 17.60 16.39 15.33 15.38 
Transport and communications 10.27 9.30 8.41 8.03 8.36 9.22 8.74 
Financial activities and real estate 7.65 8.96 11.84 11.99 10.81 12.78 13.05 
Public administration 3.42 5.05 4.31 3.30 3.34 3.78 3.87 
Education 4.91 5.86 4.76 4.18 4.35 4.33 4.42 
Health care and social services 3.08 3.67 3.21 2.64 3.23 3.33 3.54 
Social, personal services and utilities 1.83 1.95 2.21 1.87 2.12 2.33 2.32 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
In summary, the current structure of the Belarusian economy can be characterised by some general 
features:  
› apart from agriculture and industry, construction also has a greater share in Belarus compared to other 
countries with a similar development level; 
› at the same time, a range of services such as retail trade, tourism, financial services, real estate and 
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› within manufacturing proper, food processing is the leading manufacturing sector in terms of its value 
added contribution; its importance has even increased during the past decade; 
› oil refining and processing into chemicals is another pillar of Belarusian manufacturing; 
› traditionally, textiles, heavy machinery and transport equipment have also been among the leading 
manufacturing sectors, but their importance has declined over the years. 
Table 2.2 / Breakdown of Belarusian manufacturing output by sectors, 2010-2015, % 
Manufacturing sectors 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Food and tobacco 22.9 20.1 22.4 27.3 
Textiles and apparel 8.2 4.6 3.8 3.2 
Leather and footwear 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Wood and products of wood 2.0 2.2 1.7 2.3 
Pulp, paper and printing 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.7 
Coke, refined petroleum products 17.1 21.7 19.6 18.7 
Chemicals 11.0 10.0 10.0 13.1 
Rubber and plastics 2.6 2.8 4.0 3.6 
Other non-metallic mineral products 4.0 4.5 5.8 5.0 
Basic metals and metal products 5.6 6.8 7.8 6.9 
Machinery and equipment  10.4 10.7 10.2 7.4 
Electrical and precision instruments 4.0 4.3 4.3 3.9 
Transport equipment 5.3 6.7 5.0 3.4 
Other manufacturing 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.7 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
Ownership transformation 
In the 1990s, Belarus, as other economies in transition, was pondering the restructuring and privatisation 
of its SOEs. In 1991-1999, 3,190 SOEs underwent restructuring, with 1,212 enterprises being 
transformed into joint stock companies, 561 enterprises sold to the lease holders, and 1,415 were sold 
directly to investors, either through auctions or during tenders39. However, it is still not clear how many of 
the corporatised enterprises were truly privatised: in many cases the state held on to 100% of the shares 
and holds them until now. Belarus also engaged in mass privatisation through vouchers which could be 
exchanged for stocks and shares in the corporatised companies. Out of 3,190 restructured enterprises in 
the 1990s, 1,649 where launched for mass privatisation with the use of vouchers. However, due to very 
low rates of privatisation, a significant share of the vouchers was never used. The vouchers where 
always traded below their nominal value as the demand for them was low and the opportunities to 
exchange them for shares were scarce. 
The process of ownership transformation markedly slowed down and took different turns after the 
accession of President Lukashenka to power in 1994. In 1997 the Presidential Decree No. 591 
introduced the ‘golden share’ mechanism. This mechanism allowed the government, either on the 
national or on the regional level, to intervene in the decision-making of any enterprise with a state share, 
however small the share is. Along with the practice to always leave some shares in the hands of the 
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state during privatisation, the ‘golden share’ mechanism de facto allowed the government to intervene in 
the activities of any privatised entity. The ‘golden share’ was cancelled only in 2008.  
In the 2000s the process of privatisation was in effect put on hold. A number of SOEs continued to 
undergo corporatisation, but in most of the cases the state still owned 100% of the shares. The largest 
SOEs such as MAZ, Belaruskali, BelAZ and Integral were turned into joint stock companies, but 
remained in complete state control.  
The State Property Committee has been regularly publishing the list of JSCs that it plans to privatise but 
these plans were never fully implemented. For example, in 2008-2010 the shares of 155 state-owned 
SOEs were to be sold according to the initial plans, but in the end only 16 enterprises were partially 
privatised.40 Likewise, the government made several attempts to sell a 51% stake in MTS, one of the 
three biggest mobile operators in Belarus. At the first announcement in 2011, the State Property 
Committee set the starting price at USD 1 billion. The main potential buyer, MTS Russia, which already 
owned the other 49% of the shares, challenged the price as it estimated it to be overly inflated 
(estimating it at the double of what it was ready to pay) and withdrew from the bid. Consequently, no 
buyers showed up at the auctions, even when the ask price was lowered to USD 863 million in 2014. At 
the beginning of 2016 the Ministry of Communications announced that there were no further plans to sell 
the state shares of MTS. 
There are many reasons behind the repeated privatisation failures in Belarus. First of all, as illustrated 
above, the state often sets the initial prices too high. The conflicts often arise because the authorities 
usually base the ask price on book value while potential investors are mostly interest in the ‘going 
concern’ value of the businesses, which is usually much lower. Also, the government often poses 
additional post-privatisation requirements and conditions, mostly about preserving the previous levels of 
employment and output, which make the offer unattractive to investors. In the case of MTS, for example, 
the requirement was not to decrease the cell network coverage. Last, but not least, potential investors 
probably perceive high political risks in Belarus, after several re-nationalisation cases.  
Due to the above, the privatisation opportunities in Belarus have mostly attracted Russian state-owned 
corporations. They have been able to set prices in closed-doors non-transparent and often politically 
driven negotiations. Such Russian investors also de facto have sufficient political power of their own to 
ensure their property rights after the privatisation. Thus the biggest recent privatisation deal was the sale 
of the Belarusian gas pipeline company Beltransgaz to Gazprom in 2012, after the major currency crisis 
in Belarus.  
In an effort to make the privatisation process more transparent and clear for the international investors, 
the Ministry of Economy with the support from the World Bank established the National Agency for 
Investment and Privatisation (NAIP) in 2010. Thanks to financial support from the World Bank, NAIP was 
able to hire qualified experts and build on international experience for attracting investors. NAIP has 
selected eight medium-sized SOEs for the pilot privatisation project. The Agency also managed to find 
potential investors for all the eight enterprises, and these investors were ready to meet all the 
requirements. However, none of the deals has been finalized until now, for a range of reasons and lack 
of political will. 
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The 2000s were also marked by several loud nationalisation cases. In some cases the government 
stepped in when the privatised enterprise met with some dire circumstances; thus an explosion in the 
Pinskdrev factory led to its re-nationalisation via the ‘golden share’ principle. The government also used 
the difficult financial circumstances of several companies as a pretext for buying out the shares in 
exchange for debt. This happened, for example, to the wood processing company Baranovichidrev. In 
such cases it was often unclear if the previous owners made the decision to transfer their property back 
to the state voluntarily or under administrative pressure. In 2013, the authorities claimed that the owner 
of the Kommunarka and Spartak confectionaries was siphoning off profits through shell companies 
acting as the vendors and dealers. The result was the nationalisation of the companies via a Presidential 
Decree, and not a court decision following a request by the management board. The most recent case 
has been the nationalisation of Motovelo, a company producing bicycles and motorbikes, in 2015. The 
state concluded that the investor did not abide to the terms of the privatisation deal, decreasing the 
production of bicycles and motorbikes and engaging in other kinds of economic activities, thus diluting 
the brand. These cases demonstrate the weakness of the rule of law in Belarus and the strong 
discretionary power of the authorities: even after privatisation, the state continues to view the enterprises 
as national property, and it feels free to reverse the deal if it is not happy with the developments in the 
enterprise.  
Current ownership structure 
Given the stalled transition reforms, the state sector still dominates the economy of Belarus, both in 
terms of ownership and employment. This dominance is extensive and spreads across most sectors, 
from very large to micro state-owned enterprises. According to the official statistics there were 
3,662 state-owned organisations in the first quarter of 201641; this number includes both enterprises 
owned solely by the state and organisations with mixed ownership. 
Figure 2.1 / Gross value added produced in Belarus by type of ownership, 2009-2014, % 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
State-owned enterprises come in different ownership forms: direct government/municipality property, or 
joint stock companies in which the state owns stakes (often a controlling stake and even 100% of the 
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shares). This variety of forms makes it difficult to estimate the exact size of the state sector. There are 
many cases of mixed ownership, with private companies owning stakes in state-controlled holdings (for 
example, Milavitsa, the largest lingerie producer on the post-Soviet territory, is part of the BelLegProm 
concern). Mixed ownership often limits private co-owners in their ability to make independent decisions 
and effectively makes them a part of the state sector. The official estimate of the state-controlled 
economy is 49.9% in value added in 2014, with 27.2% and 22.7% being pure state property and mixed 
property with a state share, respectively (Figure 2.1).  
There are also alternative estimates of the size and importance of the state sector in the Belarusian 
economy, using different methodologies and definitions. For example, it has been estimated that private 
sector companies without any government ownership employed 31% of the active labour force in 2013. 
However, if the private sector is defined to exclude private firms which are part of holding companies 
reporting to state bodies (like concerns or holdings), then the share of the private sector in employment 
drops to only 18%.42 
In any case, despite the differences in evaluation, all indications are that the state sector has been 
slowly decreasing in weight over time. Thus, while state-owned and co-owned enterprises contributed to 
58.6% of the gross value added in 2009, by 2014 this share went down to 49.9%. The enterprises in 
state ownership have the largest share in manufacturing, producing 80% of gross output volume. 
Consequently, the Belarusian private sector still accounts for a relatively minor share of Belarus’ 
industry: in 2014, 59% of total industrial output was produced by corporatised SOEs, 13% by 
unrestructured SOEs, 3% by foreign-owned firms while de novo private firms contributed 25% of the 
total industrial output.43 
The limited scope of the privatisation efforts in Belarus (see next section) created a very specific private 
sector distinct from its counterparts in Russia and Ukraine. No privatisation of large SOEs resulted in 
almost no oligarchs or financial-industrial groups. Yet it would be wrong to say that the private business 
in Belarus is completely separate or independent from state or politics. The list of the largest companies 
in Belarus at present (Annex Table 2) suggests that most of the private companies present there (except 
for Eurotorg) represent a lucky symbiosis with the state sector. For example, there are several 
companies engaged in trade of oil, fuels and tobacco – heavily regulated industries which also function 
as dealers for state-produced fuel, oil refinery products and tobacco. 
As regards agriculture and the organisation of farming activity, similarly to the situation in industry, the 
core economic structures inherited from Soviet times – the collective farms (kolkhoz) – are still in 
existence in Belarus. De facto these operate as SOEs employing workers from the surrounding area. 
Agriculture and farming have traditionally enjoyed close policy attention and support and over the years 
the authorities launched several state programmes of rural and agricultural development. These 
programmes entail generous public support to farming both in terms of direct budget subsidies and 
access to preferential ‘directed’ credit. In parallel, there is also a tiny de novo private farming sector, but 
its contribution to output is negligible. In 2014 private farms accounted for just 1.7% of total agricultural 
 
42
  Akulava (2015). 
43




   Research Report 413  
 
output, while collective farms contributed 76.2% of total output. Subsistence farming accounted for the 
remaining 22.1% of agricultural output.44 
At the other end of the spectrum of enterprise restructuring are the sectors of retail trade and ‘other 
business services’. While privatisation has been largely absent in these sectors too, the private sector is 
by far the dominant one in most business services, both thanks to the organic growth of de novo private 
firms and the entrance of foreign firms into the Belarusian market. Thus, in 2014, de novo private firms 
held 59% of all retail trade outlets in Belarus; 24% of these outlets were held by foreign companies and 
17% by SOEs.45 The picture was similar as regards the respective volumes of retail sales. Also, the 
largest Belarusian employer at present is the private retail company Eurotorg.46 
A sectoral success story is also worth mentioning – the IT sector, where Belarus was able to capitalise 
on the skilled human capital and the high quality of mathematical and engineering education inherited 
from the Soviet Union. In 2006 the government established the High-Tech Park, a special economic 
zone with tax exemptions for IT sector companies (see Chapter 3). The operations of the High-Tech 
Park have been highly successful and today it hosts 152 resident companies with about 24,000 
employees. Most of the companies began as outsourcers, but recently many of them have started 
developing their own products. The High-Tech Park is host to brands such as World of Tanks, Viber and 
MSQRD. EPAM, the only Belarusian company which went public on the New York Stock Exchange, is 
also resident of the High-Tech Park. 
The most dynamic drivers of structural change in the Belarusian economy have been the newly 
emerging (‘de novo’) private firms.47 This development has been formally lauded by the authorities but at 
the same time de novo private firms – unlike traditional SOEs – have never enjoyed meaningful policy 
support. The Belarusian private sector was born under harsh conditions and unequal treatment on the 
part of the state. 
Business environment 
In fact, the business climate in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s was quite hostile to the 
emergence of a de novo private sector. Entrepreneurs were referred to as speculators, cheaters and 
robbers in official speeches at the very high level. Since it was very difficult and even dangerous to enter 
into competition with the state sector companies, newly established private enterprises aimed mostly at 
export markets or worked in domestic sectors with low presence of the state such as services. 
A number of the technological de novo private companies created in the 1990s drew on the 
technological and scientific inheritance from the times of the Soviet Union. Inventions made by Soviet 
scientists helped some of these companies become world leaders in some high-tech niche businesses. 
Examples include (but are not limited to) Polimaster, a company specialising in radiation control 
solutions; Adani, a producer of high-tech medical equipment; and Regula, a producer of express 
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document verification equipment, which is installed in customs offices all over the world. These 
companies for a while preferred to stay as invisible as possible without attracting a lot of public attention. 
Because of this they are often referred to as hidden champions48.  
As the business climate improved in the second half of the 2000s and in the 2010s, the private sector as 
a whole picked up, mostly due to the creation of new micro and small-sized enterprises. Thus, between 
2003 and 2013, the number of micro and small-sized enterprises quadrupled, increasing from 2.5 to 9.7 
enterprises per 1,000 persons.49 If the majority of the first-wave private businesses in Belarus were 
focused on export markets or created new domestic markets, recently many of the new private 
businesses are targeting the domestic markets, developing services such as retail, tourist and business 
services, etc. 
But with time the situation started changing and the government stated the improvement of the business 
environment as a policy goal. A President’s Directive50 encouraged further liberalisation of the economy 
and the removal of barriers to business development. 
The change in policy attitude contributed to measurable improvements in the business climate. As noted 
in Chapter 1, Belarus has moved up from 106th position in the overall Doing Business ranking in 2005 to 
44th position in 2016, placing Belarus ahead of Russia, but still behind the other Customs Union 
colleague Kazakhstan (see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). In some Ease of Doing Business dimensions 
Belarus has been doing remarkably well. For example, Belarus is ranked 7th in the world by the 
Registering Property indicator and 12th by the Starting Business indicator in the world (it takes only 3 
days and 2 procedures to register a business in Belarus). The most problematic areas are Getting Credit 
(rank 109), Getting Electricity (rank 89) and Resolving Insolvency (rank 69). While enforcing contracts is 
relatively cheap and quick, the quality score of the judicial processes index is only 9 out of 1851. 
In 2005-2012 the tax system underwent a major overhaul, becoming lighter, understandable and easier. 
In particular, a flat personal income tax of 12% was introduced in 2009 which is the lowest in the region 
(in 2015 this rate was increased to 13%). 26 taxes and duties were cancelled or united into a single 
government duty. The corporate income tax was lowered from 24% to 18%. While before these reforms 
enterprises had to pay most of the taxes monthly, nowadays the payments are due quarterly or even 
once a year. The possibilities to pay electronically have also increased, making it easier to pay taxes. 
These tax reforms contributed to upgrading Belarus’ rank in the Paying Taxes category from 183rd in 
2010 to 63rd in 2016. 
At the same time, however, social security contributions are considered quite high: currently employers 
pay a 34% payroll tax, while employees pay a 1% levy. High social security contributions are often cited 
as the main reason behind tax evasion, which often takes the form of illegal salaries.52 Tax collection 
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itself is a cumbersome administrative procedure that takes a lot of time, and this is mainly due to 
excessively complicated regulations. 
The Belarusian tax legislation provides opportunities for selective preferential tax treatment, particularly, 
in the special economic zones. The High-Tech Park is one of them, enjoying exemptions from corporate 
income tax, property taxes and, most importantly, for labour-intensive industry, a reduced level of social 
contributions. Medium-sized and small towns in rural areas also enjoy preferential tax treatment since 
2012: newly created enterprises there are free from income tax and property tax for 10 years, and also 
enjoy concessions on VAT. Each of the six administrative regions in Belarus has a free economic zone. 
Businesses based in these zones benefit from a 5-year exemption from income tax, VAT discounts and 
do not pay property taxes. There are simplified tax schemes for micro enterprises and individual 
entrepreneurs which allow paying a single sales tax. 
At the same time, businesses and entrepreneurs in Belarus suffer from the excessive regulation and 
some cumbersome administrative procedures. There are many regulatory and controlling bodies, 
sometimes with overlapping scope. It is estimated that more than 90% of the inspections end up with 
levying some charges or fines.53 Laws often change; besides, laws are excessively harsh on some 
economic wrongdoings, often entailing criminal charges. All this is a downside of the legal environment 
for the business. 
Another problem is that in practice the enforcement of regulations and control is not neutral. The 
government, both local and national, is de facto more prone to supporting SOEs but not private 
businesses and tends to favour the state sector of the economy at the expense of private businesses. 
This is on top of the practice of directed lending which is usually available only to SOEs, while the rest of 
the business sector pays excessively high market interest rates. 
In 2015 Belarusian SMEs named macroeconomic instability, inflation and exchange rate risks as the top 
barriers to business development.54 They also quoted bureaucracy and administrative procedures, size 
of fines, number of inspections, and licensing and certification as important impediments. Thus, while the 
business climate (and the tax system in particular) in Belarus have improved greatly over the last ten 
years, there is still much to be done in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation, in streamlining the 
administrative regulation and ensuring neutrality of treatment of businesses. 
Ownership structure and governance challenges 
The Belarusian authorities have been reluctant to fully expose the state-owned sector, including the 
corporatised SOEs, to market pressure since these firms also serve as tools for the implementation of 
some state programmes. Various forms of state support, both direct and indirect, have been used over 
the years to cushion SOEs from market pressure and prevent bankruptcies and massive layoffs. While 
the degree of state support has been on the decline, especially in most recent years, it helps explain 
why and how there has been no dramatic change in Belarus’ industrial structure. 
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Economic research indicates that state-owned companies are less efficient than the companies of the 
private sector: they feature lower labour productivity, total factor productivity and productivity growth.55 In 
the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, the state sector of the economy, and manufacturing in 
particular, was benefiting greatly from preferential access to the Russian market, but due to low 
productivity growth it began to lose competitiveness by the end of the 2000s. Nowadays many of the 
state-owned manufacturing enterprises experience high competition from Russian and Chinese 
producers on the Russian market.56 The increasing productivity gap between the state sector and the 
private sector depresses overall growth in the country. 
There are multiple sources of state sector inefficiencies. As discussed in Chapter 1, despite the 
corporatisation of many SOEs, de facto most of them are still directly managed by the government and 
fall short of autonomous decision-making. Plus, the performance targets set by the government 
generated market distortions and inefficiencies. So even in periods of growth, it was extensive growth 
without productivity gains. Another problem is the motivation of the management, which is mostly based 
on ‘sticks’ rather than ‘carrots’. Thus the salaries of the SOE management are lower than that of their 
private sector colleagues and there are no key performance indicators to award managers for good 
performance of the firms they run. On the other hand, managers are subject to numerous regulations 
and controls and often subject to legal pursuit on allegations for corruption and misuse of power. These 
conditions also suppress the drive for innovation, which often leads to failures and high personal risks for 
the management. 
Labour hoarding is another attribute of SOEs’ poor performance. Maintaining or increasing employment 
levels is usually one of the performance targets of the enterprises, and this in itself is a barrier to 
restructuring. On the other hand, some studies show that the labour market itself is quite flexible in 
Belarus, and effectively redistributes labour from the inefficient state sector into the emerging private 
sector with high labour productivity.57 
Directed lending also contributes to inefficient corporate performance. Access to cheap loans made 
SOEs eager to overinvest in the accumulation of physical capital. Moreover, often this form of financial 
support from the state is offered to help loss-making companies, which creates wrong incentives. 
Directed lending also leads to misallocation of capital within the country: instead of going to the more 
efficient private sector, capital flows into the inefficient state sector, multiplying the negative productivity 
effects. 
On the other hand, being the representative of the state as an owner, the government is under constant 
political pressure to engage in direct financial support of some state-owned companies. The support for 
the national economy was estimated at around 15.5% of the budgetary expenditures in 2015 and almost 
half of it goes to support the inefficient agricultural sector.58 The majority of these funds cover the 
interest rate subsidies associated with directed lending. Such political pressures are likely to emerge as 
long as a large share of the economy is in the hands of the state. 
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The fact that up until now the authorities have direct control over a large share of the economy has thus 
a negative bearing on economic governance. Instead of focusing on the creation of favourable 
conditions for the development of the economy, the attention of the authorities is diverted towards 
micromanaging the state-owned parts of the economy. The conflict of interest between ownership, 
controlling and managing functions often leads to low effectiveness in governance and sometimes to 
political paralysis. 
Antimonopoly regulation was for a long time an example of the conflict between the functions of 
ownership and control. Since many of the state-owned enterprises are monopolies, and further 
concentration is promoted through the creation of holding companies, there were few incentives for the 
government to establish tough antitrust regulations. The antitrust policy was one of the functions of the 
Ministry of Economy, which also manages part of the state economy. There has been a slight change for 
the better in 2016, when the antitrust regulation functions were passed on to the Ministry of Trade. 
However, there are fears that the Ministry of Trade will use the new function mostly to impose price 
controls, as it often has done in retail trade in the past. 
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (with scores ranging from 0 to 100, higher indicators 
meaning better governance), Belarus had a score of 35.1 in government effectiveness, 22.6 in rule of 
law, and only 13.9 in regulatory quality.59 The highest-ranking indicator for Belarus is the control of 
corruption (47.6), which is also the only indicator where Belarus is doing better than Russia. 
Despite the fact that Transparency International gives Belarus a rank of 107 out of 168,60 hand-to-hand 
corruption, common in Russia and Ukraine, is almost nonexistent in Belarus. The surveys of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Belarus show that while 14.7% of SMEs consider corruption to be a 
widespread phenomenon, corruption is not among the top barriers to doing business, being well behind 
inflation, regulations, taxes and access to credit.61 
Economic institutions and governance in Belarus are thus much in need of reform. Ensuring rule of law, 
fair courts enforcing contracts and property rights are necessary prerequisites for economic growth in 
the years to come. As already discussed, institutional and governance reforms will be more efficient if 
they are part and parcel of broader policy reforms of the economic structure. 
THE ENERGY SECTOR 
The energy sector is of utmost importance for the Belarusian economy. The energy subsidies from 
Russia played a key role in shaping Belarus’ economic performance during the 2000s. However, the 
access to cheap oil and gas from Russia is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it provides 
Belarusian companies with a competitive advantage and supports the oil processing and chemical 
industries. On the other hand, cheap energy is a stumbling block on the difficult path to energy efficiency 
and energy security. 
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The total primary energy supply62 of Belarus is 27.28 mtoe63 as of 2013. The majority of the energy 
supply comes from natural gas (64%) and oil (27.2%), the rest is generated from biofuels, coal and other 
types of fuel.64 Natural gas is primarily used for the production of heat energy and electricity. Over 80% 
of Belarusian centralised heating stations use natural gas and nearly 95% of electric energy in the 
country is produced with natural gas as primary fuel.65 The population consumes around 16.8% of 
electrical energy and 33.3% of the heat energy. On the enterprise side, chemical manufacturing, 
metallurgy, and oil refineries are the largest consumers. 
The role of energy imports from Russia 
Belarus imports most of the fuels, while own production covers only about 15% of the needs.66 Russia is 
the dominant source of fossil fuel imports, providing virtually all natural gas supplies to Belarus and more 
than 90% of oil imports (Table 2.3). It should be noted that, while natural is mostly used for energy 
generation (and only partially as a chemical input), a significant share of the imported oil is processed in 
the oil-refining and chemical industries and a significant share of the final products are then exported, 
mostly to the EU, Ukraine and Russia. 
Table 2.3 / Belarus’ dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia, 2005-2014 
Imports of fossil fuels 
Oil 
year 
Total From Russia 
million million share of imports from Russia, % 
2005 4395.5 4372.0 99.5 
2010 7695.5 6171.4 80.2 
2011 12871.0 10826.5 84.1 
2012 13710.3 13299.6 97.0 
2013 8562.2 8475.4 99.0 
2014 7942.3 7861.7 99.0 
Natural gas 
year 
Total From Russia 
million million share of imports from Russia. % 
2005 997.9 997.7 100.0 
2010 4188.0 4186.7 100.0 
2011 5434.4 5433.8 100.0 
2012 3564.4 3563.9 100.0 
2013 3512.2 3511.7 100.0 
2014 3594.6 3594.3 100.0 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
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Russia offers important discounts on energy prices for Belarus. The negotiated subsidised price of oil is 
usually not announced (though it can be inferred later from the foreign trade statistics). The price of 
natural gas for Belarus in 2010 was 188 USD per a thousand m³, and it went down to 142 in 2015. 
The total amount of implicit Russian energy subsidies is significant but there is no official statistics on 
their volume. According to different recent estimates, the amount of subsidies ranged from 4% of GDP in 
2010 (the year of joining the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan) to the peak of 12% of GDP in 
2012. With the drop in world energy prices, the relative amount of Russian energy subsidies also 
declined, to around 7% of GDP in 2015.67 However, these estimates are probably also distorted and 
inflated as the consumption of energy and oil in Belarus would be lower at market prices. 
Energy was often a contended issue in the relations between Belarus and Russia and even led to ‘gas 
wars’ between the two due to different interpretations of the terms of gas supply agreements; in 2004, 
Russia even cut the supply of natural gas for one day. The important gas pipeline network in Belarus 
(which is also used for gas transit to Europe) was also a bargaining chip in energy disputes but in the 
end it was privatised to Russia’s Gazprom which gained total control over it in 2012. In compensation, 
Russia secured from the Eurasian Development Bank balance-of-payments support to Belarus which 
was shattered by the currency crisis.  
Belarus did attempt to get access to alternative oil suppliers. In early 2010, the Belarusian government 
signed an agreement with Venezuela and a first delivery was made by a railroad from the sea port of 
Odessa. The idea was to use the reverse of the Odessa-Brody pipeline to deliver the Venezuelan oil to 
Belarus. But Russia stepped in and in effect killed this deal by offering more lucrative oil supply 
conditions to Belarus. 
Oil processing plays an important role for the economy of Belarus. There are two big oil refineries: the 
Naftan (in Novopolotsk) and the Mozyr Oil-Refining plants (in Mozyr), both are subordinate to the 
Belneftechim holding company. The state controls 43% of the Mozyr oil refinery and holds a 99.8% 
share of Naftan. These enterprises generate over 30% of total Belarusian exports68 and are also very 
important taxpayers (Annex Table 2). Both refineries are obliged to supply gasoline to the domestic 
market at the administratively set low prices. Novopolotsk is a monocity, with Naftan employing a 
significant share of the town’s labour force. Thus the dependence on Russian oil supplies puts Belarus 
in a very vulnerable position not only due to energy security considerations but also social ones. 
When Belarus buys oil for its own consumption, it does not have to pay export duties to Russia. 
However, if the crude oil is re-exported, or used as an input for oil refineries and the oil refinery products 
are later exported, Belarus has had to refund the oil export duties that it charges to the Russian budget. 
Due to the narrow definition of refined oil products, Belarus on several occasions used different schemes 
of exporting alternative products, not formally covered by the agreements, without paying the export 
duties. For example, in 2012, Belarus increased dramatically its exports of dissolvents and dilutants.69 In 
2014, Belarusians used bitumen exports to shirk on paying Russian export duties70. Of course, such 
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schemes do not remain unnoticed but, in the event, Russia afterwards agreed on Belarus not having to 
return the export duties to the Russian budget. As a result, starting with 2015 Belarus receives a de 
facto subsidy of around USD 1-2 billion in unrefunded oil export duties. 
Despite the fact that Belarus enjoys low oil and natural gas prices, this does not necessarily translate 
into low energy prices for businesses. The state often sets low energy prices for households and 
charges the business sector with the price difference. For example, in 2010, when the natural gas import 
price was USD 188, businesses had to pay USD 240, while households only paid USD 158.71 This 
practice of cross-subsidisation leads to higher energy costs for Belarusian enterprises, and reduces their 
competitiveness on the Russian market.72 The increase in heating tariffs for the population is supposed 
to fix this problem. 
Nuclear power: is this a way out of energy dependency? 
Belarus has long been contemplating the idea of building a nuclear power plant as a way to reduce the 
dependence on natural gas imports from Russia and address energy security concerns. The authorities 
however were facing opposition from the public as the memories of the Chernobyl tragedy were still too 
powerful.73 
Despite these public concerns, in 2011 Belarus signed an agreement with Russia on a USD 10 billion 
loan to construct a nuclear power plant in the town of Astravets. The loan will finance 90% of the costs of 
the construction, mainly carried out by Russian subcontractors. The nuclear power plant will consist of 
two energy blocks producing 1200 Mw each. The first energy block is due to be launched in 2018; the 
second one in 2020. After the construction and launch of the plant Belarus will start repaying the loan to 
Russia in 2021; the loan repayment over 15 years will amount to almost USD 1 billion per year, a 
significant burden on the Belarusian current account. 
It is expected that the construction of the Astravets plant will supply around 40% of electricity 
consumption in Belarus.74 If this materialises, it will allow reducing significantly the dependence of 
Belarus on imports of natural gas, lowering it to 57% in total energy consumption.75 There are also plans 
to export electricity to Poland and Lithuania. But the infrastructure that allows electricity exports to 
Poland does not exist yet while Lithuania has recently announced plans to disconnect from the electrical 
power grids of the former USSR. Moreover, Lithuania is actively opposing the construction of the plant 
as Astravets is situated near the Lithuanian border. 
The opponents of the construction of the nuclear station claim that it would probably be cheaper to 
simply buy electricity from other nuclear plants also constructed in the region (in Lithuania and in the 
Kaliningrad region of Russia). Indeed, it is estimated that the launch of the nuclear plant will increase the 
electricity costs by some 16%.76 Energy dependence on Russia will not decline either, as Belarus will 
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have to buy nuclear power fuel from Russia. While the nuclear plant will reduce the current emission 
levels, it will generate new environmental hazards. Thus, the construction of the nuclear power plant will 
just change the nature of energy dependence and of the environmental risks. 
Energy efficiency 
On the regulatory side, the Belarusian government has introduced a range of policy initiatives aiming to 
increase energy efficiency. National Energy Savings Programmes are approved once in five years, and 
these Programmes are supported by substantial funding. The funding of the Energy Savings 
Programmes increases from year to year, from USD 1,200 million in 2008 to USD 1,784 million in 
2013.77 The funding comes mostly from the own financing of the organisations and from loans, with the 
budget financing only 20% of all expenditures. There are also several projects of the World Bank, UNDP 
and EU also aimed at improving energy efficiency. The major directions to increase energy efficiency in 
these programmes include: 
› increase in the efficiency of energy generation; 
› decline in losses in transporting energy; 
› utilisation of secondary energy resources;  
› increases in the energy efficiency of manufacturing companies and in the distribution of heating, gas 
and water to the population; 
› increase in the use of renewable energy sources. 
As a result of these efforts, energy efficiency in Belarus has increased. The energy-output ratio 
(measured as the consumption of energy in toe per USD 1000 GDP at 2005 PPP) decreased from 0.38 
in 2000 to 0.19 in 2013. Currently Belarus’ energy-output ratio is lower than in Russia, Ukraine or 
Kazakhstan, but higher than in Lithuania or Poland.78 Belarus is also developing the use of renewable 
energy resources, but they constituted only 5% of the total energy in 2012 (compared to 12.4% in 
Germany or 34.7% in Finland). Most of the renewable energy came from firewood. 
However, given the artificially low energy prices in Belarus, energy efficiency can only achieve a limited 
effect. The way towards genuine energy efficiency should go through a comprehensive price reform in 
the energy sector as a whole. 
THE BANKING SECTOR  
A general profile of the banking system 
The banking sector in Belarus has a traditional two-tier structure. The National Bank of the Republic of 
Belarus (NBRB) performs the functions of a central bank, which in particular develops the licensing 
procedures for the rest of the banks and oversees their activities. The second tier consists of commercial 
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banks. As of June 2016, there were 26 licensed commercial banks, two non-bank financial organisations 
and five representative offices of foreign commercial banks. 
The state still maintains a dominant position in Belarus’ commercial banking system: state-owned banks 
account for some 66% of the total assets of the banking system; 32% of the assets of the banking 
system are held by foreign-owned banks while local private banks account for the remaining 2% of the 
assets (Table 2.4). The ownership structure of Belarusian banks is closely associated with the size of 
the banks. State-owned banks are mainly large banks; foreign banks are mainly medium-sized and 
small ones79; and private Belarusian banks are small ones. 
Table 2.4 / Breakdown of commercial bank assets in Belarus by type of banks’ ownership, % 
Groups of banks by ownership 01.01.2009 01.01.2012 01.01.2014 01.01.2016 
State-owned 78.0 71.2 63.8 65.7 
Foreign 20.5 27.9 35.2 32.3 
Private national 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: NBRB. 
The banking system is heavily regulated and relatively stable. The statutory capital requirement is 
BYR 450 billion (around EUR 20.5 million). Before 2014 the statutory capital requirements were 
denominated in euro, creating problems for the banks immediately after episodes of fast depreciation, 
especially after the currency crisis of 2011.80 The introduction of a blanket guarantee on household 
deposits in 2008 contributed to an increase in confidence in the banking system and turned out to be a 
very timely measure before the crises of 2009 and 2011.81 During the period of independence of 
Belarus, 25 banks were liquidated but most of them were small ones and none of these cases led to a 
general bank panic. Business surveys also indicate high levels of confidence in the banking system: 
over 59% of respondents consider the banks as reliable.82 
In terms of financial intermediation, the banking sector has a dominant role in the Belarusian financial 
system, since the stock market is practically inexistent. The excessive role of the government is another 
distinctive feature of the Belarusian banking sector as the state-owned sector has privileged access to 
finance. The mechanism of directed lending directly supports government programmes and fulfils some 
other ‘non-market’ functions for the government. 
State capital dominates in five banks (three large banks, one medium-sized and one small). Among 
these are the two largest banks, Belarusbank and Belagroprombank, which account for some 60-65% of 
the capital and assets of the entire banking system. They have also been (at least until recently) the 
main agents for implementation of directed lending schemes, and fulfil other functions required by the 
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government.83 Belarusbank is mostly responsible for securing directed lending for manufacturing and 
housing loans in urban area, while Belagroprombank deals mainly with agriculture and housing in rural 
areas. 
One more bank, Belinvestbank, is owned by the government, but the authorities have been seeking for a 
strategical investor in this bank during the past decade. A similar situation prevails in the case of Bank 
Moskva-Minsk. It is owned by NBRB after the bank was saved from bankruptcy, but the authorities are 
looking for opportunities to sell it. 
Until the mid-2000s, there was almost full dominance of the state-owned banks. This constrained the 
access to capital by the de novo private sector as state-owned banks at large were reluctant to acquire 
private sector exposures and engage in the more elaborate and laborious credit screening and 
monitoring practices needed for that purpose (especially as regards small businesses). They also had 
excessive exposures to state-owned enterprises which were in effect crowding out the private sector. 
Most private banks were relatively small and could hardly meet the demand of the private sector. 
Moreover, private banks preferred to concentrate in the retail segment of the banking market, which was 
expected to secure higher returns. 
Given the growing demand for financial intermediation since the mid-2000s, foreign banks have become 
more active on the Belarusian market. The Belarusian authorities generally welcomed the local 
expansion of foreign banks, in contrast to their attitude regarding other sectors of the economy. For 
example, while there exists a formally set ceiling for the share of foreign capital in the banking system, 
this regulatory lever was never enacted as a barrier for foreign banks to enter the Belarusian market. 
Instead, the ceiling was actually raised from 10% at the beginning of the 2000s to 50% at present.84 
Russian banks were the most aggressive in the period of foreign bank expansion in Belarus. This was 
due to the close ties of the Belarusian economy with the Russian one, and the geographical 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, during the era of expensive oil, Russian banks deepened their 
capitalisation and were looking for options of expansion in foreign markets. The CIS region, and Belarus 
in particular, were among the easiest targets for such expansion. In turn, the Belarusian authorities, 
despite striving to diversify by origin the banking capital entering the Belarusian market, had limited 
alternatives to Russian capital. Hence, many large Russian banks became active players on the 
Belarusian market through their subsidiaries. Foreign banks of other capital nationality are mainly 
smaller (Priorbank being an important exception). 
The ownership structure of the Belarusian banking sector to a large extent also matches the banks’ 
strategies. The business model of state-owned banks implies using the capital base as an additional 
funding source for active operations thanks to their relatively high capitalisation. This translates into 
greater (in comparison to other groups of banks) emphasis on credit exposures. Some of these banks 
also have a bulk of directed lending in their asset portfolios. On the liability side, state-owned banks 
enjoy a relatively high share of deposits, largely due to informal instructions to state-owned enterprises 
to hold their accounts in state-owned banks. In the case of households, state-owned banks are 
successful in attracting deposits mainly due to the largest regional network of their branches. 
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Furthermore, once they are servicing large state-owned enterprises, these banks have the privilege to 
service card accounts for wages and salaries. Finally, until 2008, state-owned banks had advantages 
within deposit insurance regulations, which could still influence depositors’ preferences. 
Foreign banks can reasonably be divided into two subgroups, depending on their size. Those that are 
larger usually focus on an individual industry or individual large firms which are somehow affiliated with 
the bank, and correspondingly represent a core of the business model. Servicing energy, construction, 
oil-refinery or retail are examples of such a specialisation of individual foreign banks. On the assets side, 
a large part of their portfolio usually matches this specialisation; for the rest of the portfolio these banks 
prefer a high degree of diversification. Hence, they tend to target different industries of private business, 
and some of them are also actively engaged in retail banking. On the liability side, the main advantage 
of these banks is the access to cheap and sizeable resources in hard currency from their parent banks. 
Due to this advantage, foreign banks try to expand in the targeted segments of the market. Attracting 
large household deposits is not necessarily a priority objective for some of these banks. 
Smaller foreign banks and small private Belarusian banks are usually mainly concentrated on retail 
business. Respectively, consumer loans and household deposits are the dominating items on the two 
sides of their balance sheets. Retail banking (both in the loan and deposit market) is probably the most 
competitive segment in the Belarusian banking sector: the number of banks specialising in retail banking 
is high, and larger banks sometimes exert extra pressure on the market by exploiting their scale 
advantages. The trend of rising competition in retail banking and the increasing importance of this 
market are among the most important features in the evolution of the banking sector during the last 
decade. 




Before the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, household credit was developing rapidly in Belarus: its 
share of consumer credit in total banking credit in the economy grew from only 9.8% in 2001 to 28.1% in 
2009 (Figure 2.2).85 Household credit was always dominated by long-term housing loans, which were 
subsidised and promoted by the state. These housing loans are mostly not mortgages, but guaranteed 
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loans, as mortgage legislation in Belarus does not make it possible to claim the property from the non-
paying debtor. Household loans were denominated both in national and foreign currency, although the 
national currency was predominant – subsidised housing loans could be issued in national currency 
only. 
Household credit grew not only due to subsidised housing lending. In 2002-2009 several new private 
banks (most of them with foreign capital) entered the market, and since most of the incumbent state 
banks were mostly focused on subsidised housing credit only, the new banks targeted the empty niche 
of the market – retail short-term consumer loans. By the end of 2008 almost half of the household credit 
was non-housing consumer loans; 60-80% of new cars were bought with credit funding86. 
After the 2009 currency crisis when the Belarusian currency lost 33% of its value overnight, the NBRB 
temporarily banned household credit in foreign currencies in order to protect the population from the 
currency risk. Furthermore, in 2011 the ban was extended for an indefinite period. This regulation had a 
significant restraining effect on household credit as high inflation (and inflationary expectations) drove up 
the interest rates in national currency and new loans became unaffordable or unattractive to consumers. 
As a result household credit again refocused on long-term loans mainly.  
The economy rebounded relatively quickly after the currency crisis of 2011, and despite the exorbitant 
interest rates consumer credit picked up slightly in 2012-2013 (Figure 2.2). Many Belarusian banks with 
Russian capital, which enjoyed access to cheaper resources on the Russian financial markets, started 
promoting retail consumer credit as a means to capitalise on this access to resources. But the National 
Bank saw risks in these developments, and implemented several steps to cool down the retail consumer 
credit market. One of the main restricting regulations was the requirement to present an income 
certificate with any application for a loan. The drop in real incomes in 2015 led to a further decline in 
household credit. 
Are Belarusian banks financially sound? 
A characteristic of the Belarusian banking system during the last decade was that it granted loans 
aggressively, having secured a long-lasting credit boom (Figure 2.3). The start of the credit boom 
happened in 2005, and it lasted until the currency crisis of 2011. Relaxed access to external capital is a 
major explanation for this boom, as the growth in credit substantially outpaced the growth of deposits 
(Figure 2.3). Furthermore, intensification of directed lending and soft monetary policy also contributed to 
this credit boom. However, these factors were less influential, as they exerted only a temporal influence. 
Moreover, without the support of external finance, a domestically induced credit boom could not have 
survived for a long period, or would have led to high inflation/devaluation faster than it happened in fact. 
The major financial indicators of Belarusian banks were generally in a safe range during the credit boom, 
but started to deteriorate as the boom faded (Table 2.5). The downward trend in profitability, capital 
adequacy and other indicators is primarily due to an increasing share of non-performing loans in banks’ 
balance sheets. To a large extent, it is the outcome of the rapid credit expansion in the past which led to 
an accumulation of low-quality assets (Table 2.6). Declining profitability also means that banks can 
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hardly fix the situation by new loans as generally there is a systematic reduction of the pool of borrowers 
in a recessionary environment. 
Figure 2.3 / Total outstanding credit and total deposits in Belarus, 2000-2015, % of GDP 
 
Source: NBRB. 
Table 2.5 / Main financial indicators of Belarusian commercial banks, % 
 01.01.2009 01.01.2012 01.01.2014 01.01.2016 
Regulatory capital adequacy, % 21.8 24.7 15.5 18.7 
Leverage ratio (capital/assets) 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.12 
Share of non-performing assets in total assets 
exposed to credit risk, % 
1.7 4.2 4.45 6.8 
Return on assets (ROA), % 1.37 1.7 1.9 1.0 
Return on equity (ROE), % 9.6 14.9 13.8 8.4 
Share of liquid assets in total assets, % 23.2 34.7 27.2 32.1 
Source: NBRB. 
Table 2.6 / Characteristics of asset quality of Belarusian commercial banks, 2012-2016 
 Share of non-performing assets in 
claims on legal entities, % 
Share of non-performing assets in 













State-owned 2.3 4.0 9.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Foreign 1.9 5.6 7.7 2.0 1.9 3.9 
Private national 5.1 11.0 11.7 2.7 2.5 6.0 
Total 2.2 4.6 16.9 0.6 0.5 1.0 
Source: NBRB. 
Furthermore, the period of rapid credit growth was combined with a high level of dollarisation in both 
assets and liabilities (Table 2.7). Also there was a growing term mismatch in the banks’ balance sheets 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015




   Research Report 413  
 
long-term assets (to a large extent driven by directed lending) which was causing liquidity challenges. 
Also, some of the current challenges are the consequences of aggressive policy in the recent past. 
Table 2.7 / Currency positions by groups of banks 
 Share of forex loans in total 
outstanding loans, % 
Share of forex deposits in 
total deposits, % 




















State-owned 23.8 29.2 48.7 28.0 51.4 62.3 6.5 2.3 4.0 
Foreign 65.7 65.0 76.9 58.8 70.1 79.4 14.6 20.2 5.0 
Private national 33.4 59.3 46.2 43.3 70.0 63.8 5.9 -4.6 6.6 
Total 31.9 39.9 57.8 33.0 57.6 67.7 8.6 9.4 4.5 
*) The net currency position illustrates the sensitivity of banks to exchange rate fluctuations. It is calculated as the sum of 
the net positions in each foreign currency. In turn, the latter is the difference between the corresponding assets and 
liabilities. The net currency position is long (with a positive sign) when assets in foreign currencies exceed liabilities; the 
position is short (negative sign) when assets are less than liabilities.  
Source: NBRB. 
Aggregated statistics, nevertheless, tends to mask some hidden problems. For instance, the trend of 
growing non-performing loans (NPLs) became visible in the statistics only in 2016, although anecdotal 
evidence and some indirect indicators (special provisions, market lending conditions, etc.) had pointed to 
a worsening situation much earlier. Furthermore, given the large degree of heterogeneity in the 
behaviour of banks, it would be more insightful to try and trace banks’ performance on a more 
disaggregated level. 
According to the available statistics, foreign banks report the worst characteristics in terms of the effect 
of NPLs (Table 2.6). At the same time, given the practice of poorly screened directed lending, NPLs 
could be expected to weigh most heavily on state-owned banks. Thus the actual quality of assets of 
state-owned banks might be worse than shown in the official statistics (for instance, due to government 
guarantees provided, whose execution is nevertheless doubtful; and some accounting tricks). Moreover, 
the problem of non-performing loans might be more severe for the system as a whole than it appears 
from the official statistics. 
Another traditional source of vulnerability and potential shocks for the banking system, the 
macroeconomic currency risk, seems to have decreased during the last couple of years thanks to the 
change in monetary policy. On the other hand, dollarisation has been on the rise both on the asset and 
liability side of the banks’ balance sheets, reinforcing the transmission channel for currency-induced 
credit risk. Moreover, this trend was present in all groups of banks: foreign banks, which traditionally had 
a preference for forex in both assets and liabilities, and state-owned banks, which shifted to a forex-
oriented lending policy whereas previously they had been more likely to extend loans in national 
currency. From a macro perspective, the trend towards further dollarisation makes the economy more 
vulnerable to external shocks, while economic policies become less effective. 
As many post-Soviet and European countries, Belarus is facing the problem of ageing population. 
Similarly to other post-Soviet countries, Belarus experienced a demographic crisis after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, combining a drop in fertility with spiking mortality. While the demographic crisis in 
Belarus was less profound than in other countries in the region, there was a significant drop in life 
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expectancy in the 1990s: in 1999 the life expectancy of males reached its minimum over the past 
50 years of data – only 62.2 years (Figure 2.4). The life expectancy of females did not contract as much. 
As the economy rebounded, life expectancy started recovering as well: by 2013 the life expectancy 
reached 67.3 years for males and 77.9 years for females.87 
Figure 2.4 / Life expectancy at birth in Belarus 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
Fertility rates experienced a similar trend. In the 1990s the total fertility rate declined from 1.91 in 1990 to 
only 1.23 in 2003. But in the 2000s and later on fertility picked up, reaching 1.69 in 2014.88 The 
improving economic conditions and expectations as well as policies promoting fertility supported this 
revival.89 Despite the increase, the fertility rate is below the level needed for population replacement, let 
alone growth. 
Measured international migration rates in Belarus are insignificant, despite the widespread public 
perception that a lot of Belarusians left the country in the 1990s. Many Belarusians moved to Russia for 
better jobs and pay in the 2000s but preserved their principal residency in Belarus.90 According to official 
data on registered migration for 2013, 19,435 persons arrived in Belarus from abroad, while only 7,792 
left the country.91 
At present migration cannot be regarded as a remedy to the demographic problems of Belarus, at least 
under the strict current migration and labour laws: employers have to receive special permits for each 
migrant they want to hire, and have to prove that there is no Belarusian ready and able to assume that 
workplace. Migrants also have no access to social protection, despite the fact that since 2016 they have 
to pay social security contributions just as Belarusians. This is one of the reasons why Belarus does not 
appear to be very attractive to foreign workers. 
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Within the 20-year period between 1996 and 2016, the population of Berarus dropped by 6.7%.92 Given 
the low fertility rate, population projections are negative. The World Population Prospects forecast that 
by 2050 the Belarusian population will contract to 8,125 thousand people.93 
The demographic trends of the recent decades are also reflected in the stationary population pyramid 
with a very narrow base (Figure 2.5). Up until now the labour market of Belarus was not experiencing 
pressure from demographic challenges. People leaving the labour force for retirement represented the 
cohorts born during or after World War II, which were not numerous. By contrast, the cohorts entering 
the labour force were numerous due to a baby boom in the 1980s. However, over the coming years the 
situation will reverse as the trends will be exactly the opposite. 
Figure 2.5 / Population pyramid of Belarus, 2013 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
A small spike in the cohort of 0-4 years old is mostly driven by the cohorts of females aged 20-24 and 
25-29. However, these relatively large cohorts in childbearing age will be followed by significantly 
smaller cohorts born in the 1990s. Hence one can expect the number of newly born children to decrease 
again. 
Another important demographic trend is urbanisation – the internal migration from the rural areas to the 
cities. While only 55.9% of the population resided in cities in 1980, by 2014 this number had risen to 
76.8%.94 All the cities-regional centres in Belarus have increased their population. The population of 
Minsk, for example, grew 17% between 1990 and 2013 and accounts for over 20% of the total 
Belarusian population. 
The demographic trends pose important policy challenges as regards the labour market, the social 
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The labour market: flexible, but unprotected 
The labour market in Belarus has some specific and, to some extent, unique features: on the one hand, 
it is characterised by flexibility in terms of the duration and conditions of the employment contracts and, 
on the one hand, by excessive regulation generating rigidities. Moreover, the availability of employment 
opportunities has been an important part of the social contract in Belarus; however, this part of the 
contract is unravelling at present, as the economy faces the need for painful restructuring and 
adjustment. 
The principal declared objective of public labour market policies has been the access to jobs for 
everyone as well as rising personal income, in the first place through wage growth, in the absence of 
significant wage differentials. The main policy instrument to target the desired wage levels has been the 
wage scale regulating the salaries for every profession. Following this wage scale is not mandatory, and 
many state-owned and private enterprises only use it as a benchmark for salary formation. In this case 
the wage scale shapes the basic portion of the salary, while the rest is qualified as surcharge or wage 
bonus for work experience, good performance etc. However, given the extent of the role of the state in 
the economy, the wage scale still affects the wages for almost everyone.  
The effects of the policy of low wage differentiation are two-fold. On the one hand, this policy contributed 
to low income inequality, which is atypical even of a transition economy. On the other hand, this policy 
has created certain disincentives for the employees as it does not motivate sufficiently self-development 
and promotion. 
The government used the wage scale quite efficiently as a tool to increase wages even when the 
economic conditions were not conducive to such increases. As can be seen from Figure 1.10 in 
Chapter 1, real wages and labour productivity did not always go hand in hand. Election years were 
usually accompanied by observable effects of the political cycle: excessive wage growth which, in turn, 
stimulated demand and economic activity.95 However, as already discussed, in 2009-2010 this practice 
led to an overheating of the economy and a currency crisis. Despite this, real wages continued growing 
faster than labour productivity over 2012-2014, leading to another substantial exchange rate crash in 
2015. 2015 also became the first election year after 2000 when real wages actually declined. 
Another part of the problem has been the fact that the authorities, at least implicitly, used to set wage 
targets in US dollar equivalents and those targets were among the central objectives of socio-economic 
development. For example, the big goal of the 2005-2010 period was to reach an average wage 
equivalent of USD 500. For the year 2015, the goal was even more unrealistic: the equivalent of 
USD 1000.96 Of course, these goals made the government push for quick wage growth and the 
disproportional wage hikes were among the key reasons for macroeconomic destabilisation. 
The policy desire to raise wage levels was partly related to external pressure as Belarus is part of the 
single labour market of the Eurasian Economic Union (see Chapter 3). In this labour market workers 
may move almost freely: the labour market rights of the citizens of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus are 
the same in each market, and there are no special permits or other administrative difficulties 
accompanying the hiring of applicants from member countries of the Union. Access to the Russian 
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labour market was always particularly important as it has always been ready to absorb Belarusian 
applicants. This arrangement was beneficial for Belarus as labour demand was asymmetric: due to 
wage differentials (Russian wages being traditionally higher) not many Russians wanted to come and 
work in Belarus. This relieved the policy concern of the Belarusian authorities as regards unemployment 
as the jobless could always find employment in Russia. Plus, the remittances from the labour migrants 
were substantial: in the peak year 2012 inward remittances reached 1.5% of GDP.97 
After the almost three-fold devaluation in 2011 the situation regarding labour migration to Russia 
worsened. The dollar-denominated wage differentials between Belarus and Russia grew, and in several 
industries it surpassed the margin of two. Many Belarusian workers, particularly those working in 
manufacturing, education and healthcare, sought to find jobs in Russia.98 Thus the Belarusian 
government decided to counter the exodus by increasing wages in 2012-2014 which, however, fuelled 
inflationary pressure and macroeconomic instability. The economic crisis of 2015 hit both Russia and 
Belarus, forcing some of the labour migrants to return home, where they also have difficulties finding 
employment. 
There are two types of employment contracts in Belarus: permanent and fixed-term. Most of the 
employers prefer the fixed-term contract, with the usual duration of one year. This contract does not 
carry commitments for renewal of the employment after its expiration. It also allows dismissing an 
employee with only three-month severance payment if the occupied position is abolished. Since the 
independent union movement in Belarus is hardly developed due to political reasons, the fixed term 
contract has become widespread. 
Due to the flexibility of the labour market in terms of contracts, employment over the years has gradually 
shifted from less productive and low-paid jobs in agriculture and manufacturing to the emerging and 
rapidly growing services sector. Despite the growth in total employment from 4,444 thousand in 2000 to 
4,496 thousand in 2015, employment in manufacturing over the same period fell by almost 16% and 
employment in agriculture by almost 36% (Table 2.8). Thanks to this flexibility in the labour market, there 
has been a relatively frictionless redeployment of labour from less productive industries to more 
productive ones.99 
Table 2.8 / Employment and unemployment in Belarus, thousands of persons, 2005-2015 
Total employment 
Registered  





2000 4443.6 2.1 674.0 1249.3 
2005 4414.1 1.5 532.2 1213.5 
2010 4703.0 0.7 492.2 1182.9 
2014 4550.5 0.5 430.7 1102.4 
2015 4496.0 0.7 434.0 1051.0 
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The Belarusian official statistics only report registered unemployment figures, which are traditionally low, 
below 1% in recent years. Obviously registration does not reflect the true extent of unemployment, 
especially in Belarus, where unemployment insurance is extremely low (below 10 EUR per month in 
Minsk in 2015), and registered unemployed are often required to perform social works (such as 
sweeping the streets). In 2012 the Ministry of Labour started labour force surveys following the ILO 
methodology; however, these estimates are rarely published as unemployment is a politically sensitive 
topic. Some leaked estimates show that ILO unemployment is not high either: it was around 3.5% in 
2013.100 
In 2015, the Belarusian authorities introduced a rather unorthodox labour market instrument: a ‘tax on 
the unemployed’ according to which those who are not employed and not registered as unemployed 
should pay a levy. The tax is supposed to charge ‘free riders’ for the social services they receive from 
the state and counter shadow employment. Apart from its controversial nature, the timing of the 
introduction of this tax was rather inappropriate: in 2015 employment was negatively affected by the 
crisis and bankruptcies in many SOEs, and newly unemployed also faced the risk of being penalised by 
the new tax. 
Human capital in Belarus is relatively high. The Human Development Indicator of 0.798 puts Belarus in a 
high human development category, in 50th place out of the 188 countries101 and placed above the 
average for Europe and Central Asia. This favourable result is largely due to the level of educational 
attainment: almost half of the employed persons either have a university degree (27.4% in 2013) or have 
graduated from a post-school professional/vocational institution (22.5%). These shares have been 
increasing over time and this rising trend is expected to continue as the majority of school graduates 
continue their studies. Despite the high average educational attainment in the labour force, employers 
often cite the lack of skilled labour as a barrier to growth, claiming skills mismatches between what is 
provided by the education system and market demand.102 
Gender equality: the heritage of the Soviet Union will not last long 
The Soviet Union promoted gender equality in the workplace, and Belarus is still enjoying this legacy of 
the past. Female labour force participation is 62% among females aged 15-62, which corresponds to the 
OECD average. The Gender Equality Index produced by UNDP positions Belarus on 28th place out of 
152 countries. This result is driven by the relatively good performance in two indicators: high female 
labour force participation and low maternal mortality. Females are also well-represented in the corporate 
structures, with 44% of firms having female participation in ownership.103 
On average, females have higher educational attainment than males and the ratio of girls to boys in 
tertiary education reaches around 140%. However, educated females tend to dominate in relatively low-
paid sectors such as education, social services and health care. The rapidly growing services sector is 
also dominated by women, while males take the majority of jobs in manufacturing and construction. 
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Also, Belarus remains largely a traditional patriarchal society with the culture giving a woman the role of 
mother and housewife. This cultural role model is also promoted by government officials and the 
President in an effort to promote family values and increase fertility. Ironically, the preferential treatment 
of women in some social programmes also leads to their discrimination in the labour market. Thus the 
retirement age for women is five years earlier than for men, quoting the Minister of Labour, ‘to 
compensate for the hard work at home’. Women are also entitled to a three-year maternity leave. These 
policies lead to the reluctance of employers to hire women, as they face the risk of maternity leave(s) 
and early retirement. 
The gender wage gap in 2015 was around 24%104 and it tends to grow over time. There are several 
possible explanations to this. First, wages are growing more rapidly in the sectors where male 
employment dominates, such as manufacturing. Second, in areas where females are more numerous, 
the higher-paid positions also tend to be occupied by males so the gender wage gap actually increases 
(this is particularly true for social services where the gender gap is higher than average). Third, some 
gender-biased policies unintendedly lead to the discrimination of women in the labour market. 
The social contract in need of rethinking 
Economic development and growth in Belarus during the past two decades were pro-poor, delivering 
some benefits of growth to everyone, decreasing poverty and preventing high inequalities in the society. 
The ‘social contract’ (see Chapter 1) was quite peculiar: the government did not rely on targeted 
handouts to the vulnerable groups but instead sought to provide everyone with opportunities to find a 
job, offered a wide range of complimentary services (such as healthcare and education) and subsidised 
some prices and tariffs.  
Economic growth during the 2000s delivered benefits virtually to all Belarusians. The average real 
disposable income saw a 4-fold increase between 2000 and 2015 (Table 2.7). This rise in incomes was 
not accompanied by an increase in inequality (in part due to the wage controls), but resulted in a 
significant decrease in poverty rates. Absolute poverty contracted from 41.9% in 2000 to only 5.1% in 
2015. The share of food expenditure, an indirect measure of living standards, also shows significant 
improvement. 
Table 2.9 / Real incomes and poverty in Belarus, 2000-2015 
Real disposable income, 
2000 = 100 
Absolute poverty rate, % of 
population 
Share of food in household 
expenditures, % 
1995 38.4 60.1 
2000 100.0 41.9 58.0 
2005 173.2 12.7 42.4 
2010 302.1 5.2 36.8 
2014 426.0 4.8 39.2 
2015 400.9 5.1 39.1 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Belarus. 
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At the same time attention should be drawn to another peculiarity of the social security system: Belarus 
is a socially-oriented state without unemployment insurance or unemployment benefits. Technically 
unemployment benefits for the registered unemployed do exist, but they are extremely low (around 
EUR 10 per month) and do not depend on the previous wage level. Moreover, to obtain the benefit the 
registered unemployed often have to participate in social or public works for free.  
Healthcare in Belarus is complimentary, accessible and of adequate quality. There is no wide-spread 
health insurance system, mostly because until recently there was no need for it as most of the health 
services were offered for free. The World Health Organisation recently placed Belarus among the top 
countries in terms of access to healthcare and praised its achievements in lowering infant mortality. 
Primary and secondary education in Belarus is also complimentary. Literacy levels are high as the gross 
enrolment ratio for primary education is 99%.105 The transition rates into different forms of tertiary 
education are also high – over 89% of school graduates continue their education. Tertiary education is 
also subsidised but is not offered for free; however, tuition fees are relatively low, usually ranging 
between USD 500 and 1500 per year. 
The government subsidises a number of services with the objective to make them accessible to lower-
income people. The tariffs on utilities, public transport, culture, and many other services are subsidised 
as they do not cover costs. Up until 2011 the government subsidised the interest rates for loans to buy 
real estate. These subsidies were targeted to those with relatively low incomes and the need to improve 
their housing conditions. These subsidies acted as a replacement for the non-existent mortgage lending, 
allowing many to buy accessible apartments while (considering the inflation rates) paying negative real 
interest rates on the loan. As a result, Belarus has one of the best housing space indicators among the 
CIS countries, with 25.7 sq m per inhabitant compared to 23.4 in Russia.106 
However, as the economy slowed down after 2011, the government gradually decreased the social 
support, mainly by cutting down on subsidies, to some extent undercutting some of the building blocks of 
the social contract. There is an obvious need to reconsider the nature of the social policy package as the 
economy may be entering a prolonged period of lower growth. So far the shortage of funding has led to 
the retraction of social support here and there, with no safety net emerging to replace the ‘subsidies for 
everyone’ approach. The major challenge today is to create a new social contract and establish a new 
safety net instead of the old one. 
The subsidies for real estate lending have been significantly cut: only large families now have access to 
it. At present there is no alternative mechanism to acquire housing as mortgage lending still does not 
work. Many of the advanced health services are no longer free, but there is no health insurance for 
those who want to mitigate health risks. The level of subsidies for tuition is declining, but there is no 
institution providing loans for education. Unemployment benefits are very low, but now the state cannot 
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However, the crisis actually also presents an opportunity to revise the whole set of social policies and 
increase their efficiency. Subsidisation policies are obviously not efficient as they provide support for 
everyone instead of targeting those in need. Moreover, people with higher income and consumption 
levels de facto get more benefits from subsidies. Hence it might be beneficial to move from the 
subsidies-based social support system to a system of targeted means-tested welfare. 
The process of transformation of the social system speeded up in 2015-2016 under the pressures of 
economic hardship and international creditors. Until then, heating tariffs for the population were heavily 
subsidised in Belarus, with the tariffs covering only 10-20% of total costs. Other utility tariffs are heavily 
subsidised as well. These subsidies are only partially covered by the budget and a significant part of the 
burden falls on the enterprises which have to pay higher tariffs. In 2015 and 2016, utility tariffs were 
gradually increased; however, estimates show that the relative burden of higher tariffs will mostly fall on 
low-income groups and retirees.107 In particular, if heating tariffs were to be increased to 100% of the 
costs, households from the lowest income quintile will have to spend over 16% of their income on 
heating.108 However, the government still has not introduced the plans of targeted social assistance in 
utility tariffs, despite talks about plans to introduce it. 
The demographic changes and population ageing also pose important policy challenges, in particular, to 
the pension system. As the proportion of the working-age population in Belarus is projected to decrease, 
the dependency ratio (the number of persons of retirement age per 100 persons of working age) would 
increase from 40% at present to over 60% by 2036 despite the expected increase in the retirement age 
(Figure 2.6).109 
Figure 2.6 / Dependency rate*) and population ageing in Belarus, 2014-2036 
 
*) Number of persons of retirement age per 100 persons of working age. 
Source: Bornukova et al. (2015). 
The pension system in Belarus is a standard one-pillar pay-as-you-go scheme: the current working-age 
population pays social security contributions that finance current pension expenditure. At present 
Belarus has the lowest retirement age in Europe: 55 years for females and 60 years for males. The 
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retirement age (as well as the pension system in general) did not change from that in Soviet times. The 
contribution rate of 29%, on the other hand, is among the highest in Eastern Europe. The pension 
system is quite generous: in 2013 the average pension benefit exceeded the poverty level 2.54 times, 
and constituted 38% of an average wage.110 
Up until 2013 the Pension Fund was operating at a small surplus, benefiting from the favourable 
demographic conditions as discussed above. But after 2013 the situation started to change, as the 
largest cohorts started entering retirement. Several independent studies have estimated that if policies 
do not change the Pension Fund may incur significant deficits in the future, reaching up to 9% of GDP by 
2050.111 
In response to the demographic challenges, the government has decided to increase the retirement age 
by three years starting from 2017. The increase will take place over six years (until 2022) in half-year 
increments. The increase in the retirement age is the only parametric reform at hand: the contribution 
rate is already quite high, while the replacement rate is low. However, the proposed raising of the 
retirement age will not be sufficient for the Pension Fund to break even beyond 2022; hence further 
increases in the retirement age can be expected in the future. A more profound pension reform would 
entail a transition to a fully-funded pension system and this will also need to happen at some future 
point. 
The healthcare system will have to prepare to address a greater burden of chronic and degenerative 
diseases. Fewer children and further urbanisation also mean that the school structure will have to be 
optimised, especially in the rural areas, where the number of pupils in a class is usually very low.112 
In summary, the previously existing social contract in Belarus is probably in a process of unravelling or 
transformation. In an effort to cut public expenditure, the state is withdrawing or reducing many types of 
social support, which mainly came in the form of subsidies. On the other hand, the crisis opens up a way 
to make the social welfare system more efficient, means-tested and evidence-based. In aggregate, the 
transition from subsidies to targeted means-tested support might have positive welfare effects. At the 
same time, there is a dire need for the fast introduction of adequate new safety nets replacing the 
previous subsidies which are being withdrawn. The most urgent tasks in this area are the 
comprehensive overhaul of unemployment insurance providing adequate coverage of the risk of job loss 
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3. Trade and international economic relations 
BY AMAT ADAROV, PETER HAVLIK, GÁBOR HUNYA AND OLGA PINDYUK 
TRADE IN GOODS 
Recent developments 
Historically Russia has been the most significant trading partner of Belarus (Figures 3.1 and 3.2), both in 
terms of exports – over a half of total, and imports – over a third of total. The EU-28 has also been 
prominent as a destination for exports (10-year average share amounts to 39% of total exports), as well 
as a significant origin of imports (22%). Asymmetries in the geographic composition of Belarus’ trade 
have been accompanied by disproportions in their industrial composition. While exports to Russia are 
relatively diverse, comprising, besides commodities and agricultural/food products, also transport 
equipment and machinery, imports are dominated by petroleum products. By contrast, exports from 
Belarus to the EU are mostly comprised of mineral fuels, while imports are formed by more advanced 
goods, including chemical products, machinery and transport equipment. 
Figure 3.1 / Top 20 trading partners of Belarus, average 2005-2014 
Exports, % of total Imports, % of total 
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Figure 3.2 / Share of Russia and EU-28 in total trade of Belarus, 2005-2015, % 
Share in total exports Share in total imports 
 
Source: wiiw calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
The dynamics of Belarus’ trade flows has been largely following the business cycle of Russia and that of 
Belarus itself. While the overall trade balance has been persistently in the negative zone, Belarus 
traditionally recorded a trade surplus with the EU (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).  
Figure 3.3 / Foreign trade of Belarus, 
2005-2015, billion USD 
 
Source: UN Comtrade. 
Figure 3.4 / Foreign trade of Belarus with the 
EU, 2005-2015, million EUR 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext. 
Trade with Russia was already largely liberalised prior to the inception of the Eurasian Customs Union 
(see below) and Eurasian integration did not have much impact on trade volumes. Yet, as a result of the 
global economic and financial crisis as well as trade diversion effects pertaining to the customs union, 
the share of Russia in total exports has exceeded that of the EU in recent years (in general, there is a 
marked negative relation between the two) (Figure 3.2). High dependence on the Russian market 
intensified by the Eurasian integration represents a double-edged sword for the Belarusian economy. 
Close integration with Russia served Belarus well during the 2000s when high and rising oil prices 
boosted growth in Russia, and Belarus benefited from its robust import demand. However, as Russia 
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of Western sanctions and rising geopolitical risks, the economy of Belarus suffered a strong negative 
shock. 
As a result of the severe weakening of the Russian rouble in late 2014 (the currency lost half of its 
value), Russian producers gained a competitive edge vis-à-vis other partners in the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) squeezing Belarusian producers even in the domestic markets. In response, and unable 
to withstand pressures on foreign exchange reserves, Belarus also devalued sharply its currency, thus 
regaining price competitiveness, and attempted to move to a more flexible currency regime – consistent 
with the EAEU strategy to facilitate cross-country coordination of macroeconomic policies. 
According to the official statistics, Belarus’ total trade turnover in 2015 amounted to USD 56.8 billion 
(exports = USD 26.6 billion, imports = USD 30.1 billion)113 and declined by more than 25% relative to 
2014. Both nominal exports and imports declined by about a quarter over the year, and the trade 
balance remained negative. Yet, in real terms, whereas imports declined in 2015 by 11.3% relative to 
2014, exports actually increased by 2.4% owing to terms-of-trade adjustments (export prices dropped by 
27.8%, import prices declined by 15.6%)114. 
The trade balance with CIS countries turned negative in 2015 (– USD 3.1 billion) and that with non-CIS 
countries was positive (+ USD 0.8 billion), due to import contraction outpacing reduction of exports in 
nominal terms. Trade with Russia also declined significantly: exports by 31.6%, imports by 23.4%, the 
overall trade balance being negative. In contrast, trade with the EU remained in surplus (EUR 2 billion in 
2015). 
Composition of trade flows and international competitiveness of Belarusian 
industries 
Belarus’ exports are mostly concentrated in the extractive sectors, agriculture/food processing and some 
manufacturing sectors (see Annex Table 3). HS industry 27 (Mineral fuels) has traditionally dominated 
both exports and imports as the key commodity group, constituting over a third of the country’s total 
trade with a wide gap from other products. Belarus inherited large oil refineries from the Soviet Union 
and processes crude oil coming from Russia into refined fuels, gasoline, etc., to be further exported to 
the EU. While fertilisers rank second in exports, some more advanced industries – machinery and 
transportation equipment – are also in the top 5 most important products both in terms of export and 
import shares. 
Over time, the share of primary commodities in Belarusian exports has been gradually increasing and 
squeezing the share of manufacturing exports that could only find a market niche predominantly in the 
CIS region. The global competitiveness of Belarusian industries (as measured by the widely used index 
of revealed comparative advantage, see Figure 3.5) is mostly concentrated in agricultural and food 
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Figure 3.5 / International competitiveness of Belarusian industries: revealed comparative 
advantage index115 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the UN Comtrade data. 
The textiles and stone/glass commodity groups also appear to be rather competitive, although this is 
mostly the result of exports to Russia and the rest of the CIS. Belarus can boast a relatively more 
diversified industrial structure within the EAEU with much of the manufacturing capacity retained from 
the Soviet era. However, over the course of the recent decade, the competitiveness of the relatively 
more advanced sectors has been deteriorating despite protectionist measures imposed under the EAEU 
framework, as well as targeted state interventions to support high value added sectors. In this respect, 
Belarus is a case in point against the ‘infant industry’ argument, particularly relevant in the context of the 
EAEU bonding countries with similar development bottlenecks associated with insufficient modernisation 
of industries, weak infrastructure and institutions. Essentially, the dichotomy in the specialisation 
patterns of Belarusian trade with Russia on the one hand and the EU on the other hand did not change 
much during the last decade.116 
TRADE IN SERVICES 
Services trade in Belarus has been accounting for an increasing share in total foreign trade: according to 
NBRB data, during 2005-2015, the share of services in total exports increased by almost 7 p.p. to 
20.2%; as regards imports, the share of services in total imports increased by 6.6 p.p. to 13.3%. Both 
exports and imports of services have been growing steadily during the whole period with a drop in trade 
only taking place in the crisis year of 2009 and more recently in 2015 (Figure 3.6). Services imports have 
outpaced exports in terms of their growth rate, but in value terms, exports are still about 50% larger than 
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  The RCA index, based on Balassa (1986), measures the comparative advantage of country c in industry i in year t, and 
is constructed as follows:  =
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, where x(i) is the value of exports of industry i, and X is the total value of 
exports from country c or from the world (W). A country reveals a comparative advantage in a particular industry i if its 
RCA index in that industry is greater than unity. (Balassa, 1986.) 
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  See Havlik et al. (2012) and Havlik (2007).  
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imports (see Annex Table 1). The positive balance in services trade contributes significantly to 
decreasing the current account deficit that the country has been running since 2006.  
Figure 3.6 / Dynamics of Belarus’ total trade in services, 2005-2015, index of nominal 
change, %, 2005 = 100 
 
Source: National Bank of Belarus. 
In terms of their composition, services exports are dominated by the transports sector, with freight 
transportation via railway, motor transport and pipelines being the key modes of transport. The 
importance of transportation has however decreased over time, and its share in total services exports 
fell from 64.6% in 2008 to 47.2% in 2014 (see Figure 3.7a). Instead, the country has increased its 
relative specialisation in construction services – with the exports share growing from about 2% in 2008 
to more than 15% in 2014. Also, the ICT and travel sectors increased their shares in total services 
exports to double-digit levels in 2014. 
Construction services have become quite significant also on the import side; the sector accounted for 
the highest share in services imports in 2014 – 26.6% (Figure 3.7b). The two other top sectors in terms 
of import shares are transport and travel, their shares however decreased noticeably during 2008-2014 
– by 18.5 p.p. to 26.5% and by 5.9 p.p. to 20.2%, respectively. Imports of financial services and charges 
for intellectual property slightly grew in terms of shares, but the sectors are still accounting for rather 
small shares in total services imports. 
Data on the geographic structure of Belarus’ services trade are rather scarce, but the available data 
point to a lower importance of the EAEU as a source of or destination for the country’s services trade as 
compared to goods trade. Available data from the UN Services Trade database117 show that in 2011 the 
EU accounted for the bulk of Belarus’ exports and imports of services, with the neighbouring countries 
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Source: National Bank of Belarus. 
Figure 3.8 / Shares of Russia and Ukraine in Belarus' trade in services, %, 2005-2015 
Exports Imports 
 
Source: National Bank of Belarus. 
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Figure 3.8 shows the dynamics Belarus’ trade in services with Russia (Ukraine is also shown for 
comparison). Russia has been accounting for about 25-30% of both exports and imports of services 
during 2005-2015, and these shares did not change much over time. In 2015, Russia accounted for 
95.2% of Belarus’ services exports directed to the EAEU, for imports the figure was 97.6%. 
Ukraine is a relatively minor market for Belarus’ services exporters, accounting for less than 5% of 
exports. The situation was different with respect to imports of services, where Ukraine’s share exceeded 
16% in 2005, but it was steadily declining and was below 5% in 2015. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The Belarus economy has been based on state ownership and over-regulated conditions for private 
investors. But since 2007 the authorities have undertaken some liberalisation measures and have given 
space for the development of the private sector. This was also the starting point when foreign investors 
were provided with basic freedom and security standards. 2008 marked the beginning of a new 
privatisation phase; investment incentives were introduced and the network of free economic zones 
expanded.118 The new privatisation programme targeted foreign investors and the golden share rule was 
removed so that private investors could get control over former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Economic difficulties and deepening recession have deterred FDI in the past two years despite 
increasing government efforts.  
The FDI statistics methodology improved after 2007 and data are now available based on the IMF 
Balance of Payments Manual Revision 6 (BPM6) from 2008 onwards119 (Table 3.1; for longer time series 
and outward FDI see Annex Table 4). 
Table 3.1 / FDI inflow and inward FDI stock in Belarus, 2008-2015 
FDI inflow 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EUR million 1544 1321 1041 2787 1110 1690 1418 1444 
EUR per capita 162 139 110 294 117 179 150 152 
in % of GDP 3.6 3.8 2.5 7.6 2.3 3.1 2.4 3.0 
in % of GFCF 10.9 10.7 6.4 19.8 6.7 8.2 7.1 10.4 
Inward FDI stock 
EUR million 4778 5952 7479 10048 11011 12120 14617 16440 
EUR per capita 502 627 789 1062 1164 1280 1542 1731 
in % of GDP 11.2 17.3 18.2 27.2 22.4 22.1 24.8 33.7 
Note: BPM6, directional principle. 
Source: wiiw FDI Database relying on national sources. 
FDI inflow in Belarus was marginal before 2007, but since 2008 annual inflows have been fairly stable, 
amounting to about EUR 1.5 billion per year. Lower inflows were reported in 2010 and 2012 but were 
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  UNCTAD (2009). 
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levelled out by higher sums in 2011. After controlling for the size of the country, Belarus has received 
more FDI than Moldova and Ukraine but less than the new EU Member States. The inflow of about 
EUR 160 per capita in Belarus is three times higher than in Moldova and two times higher than in 
Ukraine; but it is lower than in its Western neighbours Lithuania (EUR 185) and Poland (EUR 200). 
However, the FDI inflow per GDP or per GFCF has been higher in Belarus than in Lithuania or Poland.  
Due to the relatively short history of FDI, FDI stocks have reached lower levels than in countries with a 
longer FDI history. The FDI stock per capita in Belarus (EUR 1,751 in 2015) amounted to less than 40% 
of the Polish and Lithuanian level while the difference in terms of FDI stock per GDP is only 15%. The 
poorer Southern peers, Moldova and Ukraine, have much higher FDI stocks per GDP than Belarus. One 
may conclude that the dependence of the Belarus economy on FDI is still smaller than in the case of its 
neighbours. 
Table 3.2 / FDI inward stock by country of origin, 2009 and 2014 
2009 2014 2009 2014 
EUR mn EUR mn % of total % of total 
1 Russia 3455.6 8359.9 58.1 57.2 
2 Cyprus 503.0 2322.3 8.5 15.9 
3 Austria 147.4 507.4 2.5 3.5 
4 Netherlands 153.3 363.3 2.6 2.5 
5 Germany 141.7 250.7 2.4 1.7 
6 United Kingdom 120.1 241.9 2.0 1.7 
7 Switzerland 39.8 228.1 0.7 1.6 
8 Iran 34.4 205.4 0.6 1.4 
9 Italy 12.1 169.0 0.2 1.2 
10 China 1.9 139.0 0.0 1.0 
11 Estonia 81.7 136.8 1.4 0.9 
12 Latvia 67.0 119.1 1.1 0.8 
13 United States 86.6 116.9 1.5 0.8 
14 Poland 40.5 116.1 0.7 0.8 
15 Lithuania 46.4 99.6 0.8 0.7 
16 Finland 19.3 85.7 0.3 0.6 
17 Lebanon 39.3 77.0 0.7 0.5 
18 Ukraine 31.9 66.6 0.5 0.5 
Other 930.1 1011.9 15.6 6.9 
Note: Countries with at least 0.5% of FDI stock, BPM6, directional principle. 
Source: wiiw FDI Database relying on national sources. 
FDI in Belarus is mainly of Russian origin. FDI from this country amounted to 57-58% of the stocks in 
both 2009 and 2014 (the earliest and latest years for which data are available, respectively). In addition, 
FDI from Cyprus is also in all likelihood of Russian origin, thus the direct and indirect FDI dependence 
on Russia is probably greater. The concentration of flows is even higher in outward FDI: 80% of the 
EUR 521 million outward FDI stock is located in Russia. The Russian connection constitutes the most 
import difference between Belarus and its peers. Neither Ukraine nor Moldova, not to mention the EU 
members, have any similar rate of Russian FDI flows and stocks.  
The second most important investor by a large distance to Russia is Austria, which accounts for only 
3.5% of the FDI stocks. One of the largest investment projects in the country is the Telekom Austria 
Group’s acquisition of the local mobile telecom provider Velcom in November 2007. There are also other 
greenfield projects producing mainly for the local market (see Annex Table 4). 
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Some Western companies are finding their way to Belarus also through Russia.120 Two major franchise 
chains, McDonald’s and TGI Friday’s, opened restaurants through their Russian franchise partner. The 
owner of the TGI Friday’s franchise, the Russian company ‘Rosinter Restaurants Holding’, also owns the 
KFC franchise in Belarus. The franchise of Burger King in Russia called ‘Burger Rus’ operates the 
Burger King restaurants in Belarus. 
A significant part of FDI has taken place in the framework of large privatisation transactions; joint 
ventures with state-owned enterprises and greenfield investments are rare. The sale of a 50% stake of 
the national gas transportation company Beltransgaz to the Russian Gazprom brought USD 2.5 billion to 
the FDI stock in four annual instalments through February 2010.  
A major part of Belarus’ industry is still state-owned. In 2016 the government announced public sales 
and tenders for shares in 60 state-owned companies. The list published by the State Property 
Committee includes 56 open joint stock companies and four enterprises as asset complexes. None of 
the economy’s ‘white elephant’ enterprises are on the list and most such companies require financial 
support.121 
Greenfield investment projects 
The genuine foreign investment enterprises are those that start as greenfield investment projects. The 
low number of such projects (Table 3.3) is telling proof of the difficult business conditions in the country. 
According to the statistics, 2008-2013 were the years when Belarus was more attractive to foreign 
greenfield investment projects than before or thereafter. The number of projects fell in 2014-2015 when 
also the overall economic performance of the country deteriorated. The amount of pledged investments 
has fluctuated with no definite pattern (these data are also not very reliable as they are to a large extent 
estimated). 
Table 3.3 / Greenfield FDI projects in Belarus  
 
Projects Capex, million EUR Jobs created 
2015 11 688.2 3191 
2014 7 263.3 1064 
2013 22 808.7 3793 
2012 16 521.9 1631 
2011 29 874.9 3304 
2010 36 1511.3 4872 
2009 22 945.2 4905 
2008 28 846.7 5054 
2007 16 332.2 1592 
2006 15 708.7 1566 
2005 11 681.7 3624 
2004 10 192.1 466 
2003 15 755.1 1750 
Total 238 9130.2 36812 
Capex = investment capital pledged. 
Note: Capex and job data include estimated values. 
Source: fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2016. 
 
120
  http://belarusdigest.com/story/investment-climate-belarus-room-growth-22914 
121
  http://www.financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/belarus/belarus-kick-starts-privatization-as-economy-stumbles/ 
84
 
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
   Research Report 413  
 
As to the greenfield investing countries, there has been some diversification in recent years away from 
the Russian dominance. More projects have been initiated by investors from Germany, the United 
States, Poland, China and Hong Kong (HK), Lithuania and Austria (Figures 3.9 and 3.10).  
Figure 3.9 / Number of greenfield FDI projects by main investing countries 
 
Source: fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2016. 
Figure 3.10 / Capital investment pledged in greenfield FDI projects by main investing 
country, million EUR 
 
Source: fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2016. 
Manufacturing as well as sales and marketing are the most important business activities of greenfield 
investments. Modern services such as business services and five other categories (the top segments of 
the bars in Figures 3.11 and 3.12) comprise also important categories. These include domestic market 
telecom services as well as export-oriented IT development companies. Such ventures, which are less 
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and show up in statistics by project number or employment. 2014 and 2015 were poor years in terms of 
greenfield FDI, especially in the services sectors, which probably suggests that potential investors have 
been deterred by the deteriorating economic situation in the country. A new feature for both Russia and 
Belarus is the growing interest of Chinese investors at least in terms of investment intentions if not in 
terms of completed and operational projects. 
Figure 3.11 / Number of greenfield FDI projects by business activity 
 
Source: fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2016. 
Figure 3.12 / Capital investment pledged in greenfield FDI projects by business activity, 
million EUR 
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Specific features of Belarus’ FDI policy 
A peculiarity of the FDI practice in Belarus is that state-owned companies usually form joint ventures 
(JVs) with foreign investors. As of 1 January 2015, there were 7,099 registered companies with foreign 
capital in the country of which 4,052 were JVs, 3,018 were foreign enterprises and 29 others.122 The total 
contribution of foreign investors in the statutory capital of enterprises with foreign capital amounted to 
USD 2,648.0 million (USD 1,267.8 million in joint ventures, USD 1,377.0 million in foreign enterprises 
and USD 3.2 million in others). Thus about the half of the registered foreign capital was in JVs. This FDI 
entry mode used to be favoured in transition economies in the first years of economic and political 
transformation, when the legal framework was in the course of being established and a dominant share 
of the economy was still under state ownership. JV is a somewhat vague concept and does not 
represent a specific corporate form. It is supported by the authorities in Belarus and China where one of 
the participants in the JV is the local government or an SOE.  
A recent example of a joint venture entry is in car production. Chevrolet (Opel) will be assembled in 
Belarus by General Motors and Unison which itself was established as a Belarusian-British joint 
project.123 Unison has been assembling Peugeot and Citroën as well as Chinese cars. Later the 
automaker Iran Khodro joined the JV whose small transporters were assembled in the factory. Further 
partners in the JV are the Belarus government and the Russian company Fenox Lada. General Motors 
announced in June 2015 its intention to transfer part of its Russian production capacity to Belarus after 
demand for Opel cars fell in Russia.124 
Most of the greenfield FDI projects are located in special economic zones. Three such forms exist in 
Belarus: six free economic zones (FEZ), a Chinese-Belarus industrial park and the Belarusian High-
Technology Park. Special zones can be useful vehicles of FDI policy especially in countries with risky 
business environment and vague property rights. In these circumstances, proper conditions for 
investments can be established at least in a limited geographic area. The authorities can also attach 
special rights and incentives to such zones which is the case in Poland and also in Belarus. 
The FEZ legislation provides companies settling in their territories with a number of incentives and 
special regulations.125 They attract mainly export processing firms and storage facilities. Companies set 
up in the FEZ are exempted from profit tax for five years and pay half of the statutory rate for another 
five years. They enjoy a 50% discount on VAT on import-substituting goods manufactured within the 
FEZ. They are also exempted from a number of smaller taxes as well as from customs duties on raw 
materials and equipment. By 2014 close to 270 foreign businesses had taken advantage of these 
opportunities.126 
The Chinese-Belarus industrial park ‘Great Stone’ is a recently established territorial entity of 
91,5 sq. km with a special legal status for the provision of comfortable conditions for doing business.127 
 
122





  http://wardsauto.com/industry/general-motors-shifts-russian-production-belarus 
125
  http://www.belarus.by/en/invest/investment-climate/free-economic-zones 
126
  Ibid. 
127
  http://www.economy.gov.by/en/investors/China-Belarus-Industrial-Park 
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According to the master plan developed by Belarusian and Chinese institutions, production and living 
areas, offices and shopping malls, financial and research centres are to be located on the territory of the 
Park. Any company, regardless of the country of capital origin, can act as a resident of the industrial 
park. 
The High-Technology Park is not confined to territory but provides a special status for high-tech 
companies. Eligible companies can be located anywhere in Belarus. The first residents were registered 
in 2006; by mid-2016, 152 companies had become Park residents. Half of these are foreign companies 
or joint ventures employing local IT specialists at relatively low (by international standards) wages. 
Technology companies that become ‘residents of the High-Technology Park’ are free from all taxes, 
including VAT, profit tax, and customs duties.128 Individual income tax is fixed at 9% for the employees of 
resident companies. All these favourable conditions are to be effective at least until 2020. The IT 
industry is mostly export-oriented, exporting to the United States, the EU and Russia. In 2015 the 
exports of High-Tech Park residents reached USD 800 million, or 12% of total services export of 
Belarus.129 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION 
Trade regime under the Eurasian Economic Union framework 
Traditionally, external economic developments of Belarus have been closely associated with its strong 
economic linkages and relations with Russia and, more recently, their evolution in the context of the 
Russia-led Eurasian integration project. Eurasian economic integration has been progressing very fast 
formally, starting from the formation in 2010 of the Eurasian Customs Union by Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Only two years later the bloc was replaced by the Eurasian Customs Union–Single 
Economic Space, and in 2015 by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The latter also expanded 
geographically and now includes, besides the three founding members, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 
While the customs union arrangement dealt only with the liberalisation of mutual trade in goods via 
elimination of tariffs and introduction of a common external tariff (CET), the EAEU will seek to bring 
integration to a qualitatively new state reaching beyond trade-related matters, and also facilitating the 
so-called ‘four freedoms’ – a common market for goods, services, capital and labour, as well as 
coordination of economic policies, which is envisioned to be accomplished by 2025 (for details on the 




  http://www.belarus.by/en/invest/investment-climate/high-technology-park 
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  http://www.park.by/post-1204/ 
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BOX 3.1 / EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN BRIEF 
Eurasian economic integration remains the most successful attempt so far to reintegrate the economies of the 
post-Soviet space. After repeated fruitless efforts to facilitate multilateral economic cooperation within a 
broader pool of countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia were the only ones that managed to reach a consensus and establish a customs union in 2010 
(Eurasian Customs Union, EACU). 
As with other customs unions, at the core of the Eurasian Customs Union were the following proposed key 
arrangements: (1) free movement of goods across the member states, (2) a common customs territory for the 
member states, (3) unified commodity classification, (4) a common external tariff applied to non-member 
trading partners, and (5) harmonised non-tariff measures and procedures. The common external tariff (CET) 
to be applied by each member state to imports from non-bloc trading partners followed predominantly the 
existing structure of Russian import duties, with a range of temporary exclusions negotiated and granted to the 
member states on certain ‘sensitive’ products. In 2012, the three member states moved on with the integration 
process by establishing the Eurasian Customs Union–Single Economic Space (EACU-SES), which declared 
as its ultimate objective the achievement of a common market not only for goods, but also for services, capital 
and labour. The launch of the new format was also accompanied by the formation of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission (EEC), a supranational organisation explicitly charged with oversight of the integration process 
and regulatory competencies in certain areas, including customs, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
and technical regulations.130 
With the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 2015, the member states crafted 
further plans to deepen economic ties by implementing a framework to coordinate and harmonise economic 
policies and by restating their commitment to facilitate the free movement of goods and factors of production. 
The multitude of regulations and intentions were meticulously summarised in the Treaty on the Eurasian 
Economic Union – a document comprising over a thousand articles, grouped into four sections, proposing 
multiple directions along which integration should proceed, including: trade, technical regulation, SPS 
measures, consumer protection, macroeconomic policy, financial markets, taxes, competition and natural 
monopolies, energy, transport, procurement and migration.131 While in many respects the provisions reiterate 
the previously stated goals and regulations, among the notable features the union will attempt to eliminate the 
remaining barriers to mutual trade in goods (mostly related to discrepancies in technical requirements and 
SPS regulations). 
The treaty also provides a framework for a common energy market (oil, gas, electricity), which has been one 
of the most controversial matters within the bloc, although the common market is expected to be achieved 
only by 2025. The member states will have to implement national treatment in the provision of services and 
equal access to the labour market across the union. The treaty also proclaims the need for coordination of 
economic policies, which should potentially lead to closer financial integration. The intention is to establish a 
common supranational authority to oversee financial markets (envisaged for 2025). 
Source: Adarov (2015b). 
 
130
  See the website of the EEC: www.eurasiancommission.org/en 
131
  The document is accessible at https://docs.eaeunion.org/ru-ru/Pages/DisplayDocument.aspx?s=bef9c798-3978-42f3-
9ef2-d0fb3d53b75f&w=632c7868-4ee2-4b21-bc64-1995328e6ef3&l=540294ae-c3c9-4511-9bf8-
aaf5d6e0d169&EntityID=3610 
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The EAEU represents a relatively large market with a population of more than 180 million and an 
aggregate output of USD 2 trillion132, although it is less than 20% of the total GDP of the EU (in PPP 
terms). Importantly, the composition of the Eurasian market is highly asymmetric: over 80% of its total 
GDP is attributed to Russia, whereas the economy of Belarus constitutes only a small fraction of the 
EAEU — less than 4% (see Figure 3.13). Therefore, merely from the perspective of access to the much 
larger market of Russia, Belarus appears to be a beneficiary of the Eurasian integration endeavour, 
especially in the light of its low competitiveness in other markets and strong traditional trade and value-
added linkages to Russia in a number of industries (not taking into account the long-run structural 
consequences of such dependence). 
Figure 3.13 / Composition of the EAEU market, GDP shares at PPP, 2014 
 
Source: Calculations based on IMF WEO data. 
The customs-related arrangements of the EAEU provide relatively strong protection for the domestic 
producers in Belarus. The common external tariff (CET) introduced in 2010 in the Eurasian Customs 
Union was largely based on the Russian import duty structure in line with its WTO commitments 
(Figure 3.14). The import tariff structure of Belarus, however, was already rather similar to that of 
Russia, and the adoption of the CET did not induce major changes in its tariff structure (as opposed to 
Kazakhstan, which had a more liberal trade regime prior to joining the EACU, see Figure 3.15). Besides 
this, tariff rate quotas (caps on the maximum quantity of goods that can be imported under reduced tariff 
rates, but not limiting the overall quantity of imports) introduced by Belarus on the imports of certain 
meat products, and a range of non-tariff measures (sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical 
regulations, etc.) also shield the domestic market from non-EAEU competitors. 
As regards trade-related matters, besides the EAEU, Belarus is also a member of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA). So far, the CISFTA has entered into force for Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, bilateral free trade agreements exist 
between Belarus and other CIS members, as well as Serbia. However, in comparison with the regulatory 
implications and trade flows within the EAEU, these arrangements have only a marginal impact on the 
external trade of Belarus. 
 
132
  At current USD, as of 2014 (World Bank’s WDI); in terms of PPP, the combined GDP of the EAEU amounts to 4.4 trillion 
current international USD. 
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Figure 3.14 / Import tariff structure of Belarus, 2014, % Figure 3.15 / Average applied 
import tariff rate change after CET 
implementation, % 
Note: MFN applied rates with ad valorem equivalents based on the 
UNCTAD method, mean and maximum over the sector based on  
HS 6-digit product line tariff data aggregated to broad industry groups for 
readability (corresponding 2-digit HS codes next to industry labels). 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank WITS data. Source: World Bank’s WDI. 
WTO membership, non-tariff barriers and other trade-related challenges for 
Belarus 
Concurrent membership of the EAEU members in the WTO represents another new challenge for the 
bloc.133 Belarus remains the only country within the bloc that is not a WTO member, and among the very 
few countries in the world still not in the WTO. At the same time, it has to indirectly adhere to WTO rules 
via commitments of its EAEU partners. Prior to 2015, Russia was the only country of the Eurasian bloc 
that was also a WTO member (having joined in 2012) and thus its obligations were internalised in the 
regulations of the Eurasian Customs Union. In contrast to earlier Eurasian integration frameworks 
(EACU, EACU-SES), the situation in the newly formed EAEU is rather different: the newly admitted 
members of the bloc had already been WTO members for a long time (Armenia joined the WTO in 2003 
and Kyrgyzstan already in 1998). With Kazakhstan completing its accession negotiations in 2015, 
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The fact that each of the EAEU members joined the WTO independently and under rather different 
terms represents a regulatory challenge for the harmonisation of EAEU trade-related rules – not to 
mention numerous sensitive political issues. The exemptions and control over rules of origin are thus 
likely to inhibit mutual trade and prompt the re-establishment of some degree of internal border controls. 
Belarus itself still appears to be rather far from satisfying the original demands expressed by the WTO 
related to agricultural subsidies and the high level of government involvement in the economy. 
Accession negotiations have been dragging on for years with the Working Party on the accession of 
Belarus established in 1993.134 
Although the EAEU member countries declared their commitment to an economic union arrangement, 
barriers still exist even with regard to trade in goods. The Eurasian Economic Commission, the supra-
national body governing the Eurasian integration, itself identified 603 barriers, exclusions and various 
restrictions to trade in goods and services, and the movement of labour and capital.135 The elimination of 
the existing non-tariff barriers that are still significant in the EAEU (by some accounts they might add up 
to 15-30% to the costs of exports within the EAEU) may provide an important remedy to the currently 
stagnating intra-bloc trade, particularly important for Belarus given its significant exposure to Russia.136 
The intentions spelled out in the Treaty on the EAEU – the cornerstone regulatory document of the union 
– and repeatedly proclaimed by the officials of the member states and the Eurasian Economic 
Commission no doubt provide a pathway for deeper and multifaceted integration. However, the ability of 
the member states to fully commit and implement them effectively raises concerns. The issues in this 
regard were reiterated at the recent summit of the heads of the EAEU member states held in Astana in 
May 2016, noting the falling trade turnover, barriers to mutual trade, repeated trade-related disputes, 
and other impediments. 
Related to this, the unilateral introduction of an embargo by Russia on selected European (including 
Ukrainian) agro-food imports as a response to Western sanctions undermines the credibility of the 
Eurasian integration and the EEC, which is supposed to be the ultimate authority in the design and 
implementation of joint trade-related policies of the bloc. In the light of the imperfect track record of 
compliance and trade disputes within the Eurasian bloc, this hardly looks surprising. The disputes 
between Russia and Belarus have been especially notorious: to mention some of the earlier disputes, 
the ‘solvents scheme’ dispute in 2012137, or the politically charged bans imposed by Russia on milk and 
dairy products imported from Belarus in 2009. More recently, in 2014 and 2015, meat and seafood 
product bans were imposed by Russia on imports from Belarus following accusations of re-exports of 
sanctioned western food products, which also led to customs border checks by the Russian authorities, 
effectively hindering mutual trade flows. As a related matter, the import substitution agenda that has 
been cultivated recently in Russia may also hurt Belarusian producers not only via market share losses, 
but also by preventing the formation of cross-border production chains, usually viewed as an essential 
aspect of economic integration. 
 
134
  See more at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_belarus_e.htm. For some earlier background analysis of Belarus’ 
stance towards WTO and related challenges see: Kurilionak et al. (2007). 
135
  A detailed account of non-tariff barriers to movement of goods, services, and factors of production is available in EEC 
(2015). 
136
  See also Pelipas et al. (2014). 
137
  Russia exposed the scheme used by Belarus to export gasoline and other processed oil products refined from imported 
Russian crude oil, disguised as ‘solvents’, to avoid paying customs duties to Russia. 
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For Belarus, one of the important aspects of Eurasian integration is also related to the imports of fuels. 
Negotiations over the ‘fair’ price for oil and gas purchased from Russia have long been a point of 
discontent in the bilateral relations and subject to political bargaining.138 The much hoped-for by Belarus 
common Eurasian petroleum market is expected to be launched in 2024 at best, and at the moment the 
overall strategy regarding energy market integration is also subject to intense debates between the 
EAEU members, all either directly or indirectly dependent upon external trade in energy commodities, 
with a lack of consensus on such issues as price setting mechanism, oil standards and infrastructure. 
Overall, there are vast asymmetries in Belarus’ foreign trade both in terms of industrial composition of 
trade (dominated by mineral products) and geographic orientation (heavily concentrated on the Russian 
market). While some headway has been made in easing existing barriers to trade under the EAEU 
framework, many issues still persist and are even more difficult to address nowadays given the 
deteriorating macroeconomic outlook of Russia spilling over to Belarus, as well as deep-rooted structural 
issues in Belarus that hinder the transformation of the economy into a more competitive state. 
Trade relations with the EU 
Traditionally, Belarus’ relations with the EU have been strained and the EU criticised Belarus’ human 
rights record and, generally, the slow progress in economic reforms. The ratification of an EU-Belarus 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (negotiated in 1995) has been frozen since 1997 in response 
to the political situation in the country: the violations of electoral standards and crackdowns on civil 
society, political opposition and independent media.139 Despite occasional EU sanctions, Belarus has 
been included in the EU Eastern Partnership initiative (together with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine). President A. Lukashenka has managed relatively successfully to manoeuvre 
between Russia and the EU (e.g. by not recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia independence, the 
Russian annexation of Crimea, etc.), most recently offering mediation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 
Minsk, etc. As a sign of a possible shift in attitude, the EU partly lifted the existing sanctions on Belarus – 
despite hardly any visible change in Belarus’ internal policies which had led to their imposition in the first 
place. 
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4. The current macroeconomic environment: 
policy dilemmas 
BY DZMITRY KRUK 
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND QUASI-FISCAL OPERATIONS IN THE 
BELARUSIAN ECONOMY 
The Belarusian economy is a special case among all transition economies both for its institutional 
framework (domination of state property, direct government intervention into the economy and its 
individual sectors, see Chapter 1) and its specific policies (discussed later in this chapter). These two 
foundations are bonded through a system of quasi-fiscal activities (QFA) including the practice of soft 
budget constraints (SBC) on state-owned firms and banks. The prevalence of QFAs is backed by the 
obscurity of the system of economic management and the absence of proper accountability. Moreover, 
evaluating the effect of quasi-fiscal activities is also problematic and much depends on the mechanisms 
and instruments used. A number of research and policy studies focus on selected areas of the 
QFA-SBC system in Belarus: for instance, QFA in the energy sector140, SBC for agriculture141 and 
manufacturing142 or selected instruments of it such as directed lending143. One study that tried to address 
and assess the effect of QFA-SBC more systematically was performed by the World Bank144. But even 
this study mostly seeks to trace the effects of QFA on budget performance and does not provide 
evidence about the economy-wide scope and effects of QFA-SBC system. 
The QFA-SBC system is extremely important for understanding the Belarusian economy as the scope of 
its effects and impact covers the economy thoroughly, from micro-level incentives to macro indicators, 
from the supply to the demand side of the economy. On the supply side, it seeks to provide a relocation 
of resources as desired by the authorities and to secure support to selected industries/enterprises. In 
this respect, QFA may be treated as an instrument for pursuing institutional objectives and priorities. On 
the demand side, the intensity of QFA and SBC affect the pattern of capital investments (and final 
consumption to a smaller extent). Through this, one may treat such operations as the part of the policy 
mix that may directly influence the business cycle. 
According to the IMF classification of QFA145, two functional groups of QFA instruments are actively 




  Tochitskaya (2007). 
141
  World Bank (2009). 
142
  World Bank (2010). 
143
  Kruk and Haiduk (2013). 
144
  World Bank (2011). 
145
  IMF (2007), Box 19, p. 80. 
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During the last two decades operations related to the financial system were mainly represented by 
directed (subsidised) lending (see Chapter 1 for more details). By the beginning of 2016, the amount of 
outstanding directed loans reached roughly 18% of GDP or 40% of banks’ assets.147 
More recently, a number of additional financial QFA have proliferated: the provision of implicit 
government guarantees and rescue (bail-out) operations for state-owned enterprises.148 In the past, 
government guarantees were mostly an optional supplement to directed lending. However, in recent 
years there has been a general trend of restricting new open directed loans (both in terms of volume and 
lending conditions). Instead, the practice of providing government guarantees for bank credit extended 
to SOEs has become more wide-spread, partially as a compensating measure for cuts in directed 
lending. Hence, in recent years government guarantees have become an important component of the 
QFA system, in some cases not supplementing (as before), but substituting directed lending. At present, 
the amount of outstanding central government credit guarantees has reached roughly 10% of GDP 
(Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 / Credit guarantees by the central government, 2007-2016 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
146
  Historically, instruments related to exchange rate and trade operations were employed as well (for instance, non-tariff 
barriers and multiple exchange rates). However, the usage of these instruments was quite weak in terms of intensity 
and regularity. Moreover, in recent years (after the currency crisis of 2011, and especially that of 2014) these 
instruments were basically abandoned by the authorities in their efforts to enhance transparency in exchange rate 
issues. 
147
  Murin (2016). 
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Apart from the central government, local governments are extending similar credit guarantees to 
SOEs.149 The amount of outstanding guarantees by local authorities in 2015 and 2016 is estimated to be 
in the range of 3.5-4.0% of GDP (or 8-9% of banks’ credit portfolio150). So, the total amount of 
outstanding guarantees151 by both the central and local governments has reached roughly 14% of GDP. 
Overall, QFA related to the financial system (represented by directed lending and government 
guarantees) have become instruments for sheltering a large spectrum of beneficiaries under soft budget 
constraints. Hence, it has formed the most substantial part of the ‘quasi-fiscal overhang’ for the 
economy.152 
Operations related to the commercial enterprise sector are mainly represented by ‘charging less than 
commercial prices’.153 The purpose and the practice of using this instrument depend on the sector where 
it is applied. There are two major sectors through which such quasi-fiscal impulses are induced and later 
on are extended throughout the economy – energy and agriculture (see Box 4.1). 
BOX 4.1 / SUBSIDIES AND QUASI-FISCAL OPERATIONS IN THE SECTORS OF ENERGY 
AND AGRICULTURE 
Energy. Energy production and distribution has traditionally been a sector through which the government 
provides subsidies to economy-wide beneficiaries. In the 1990s this practice was common for many post-
Soviet countries154, given the access to relatively cheap energy thanks to either political agreements with 
Russia, or the availability of own energy resources. In the majority of non-energy-rich CIS countries, the scope 
of quasi-fiscal activities was contracting throughout the 2000s, as the sources for such subsidies were drying 
out. Belarus, in contrast, stuck to the policy of energy subsidies as a factor of its competitiveness. Hence, the 
authorities engaged in intense political and economic manoeuvring to secure an ‘energy grant’ from Russia 
(either direct reductions of the market price and/or some additional preferences in terms and the conditions of 
gas and oil purchases). Thus, the Belarusian bilateral agreements with Russia, membership in the Unions 
(Customs and later Eurasian Economic Union), the agreement to sell its gas pipeline to Russian Gazprom, 
etc. all were justified to a large extent by the desire to secure ‘energy grants’. 
As regards quasi-fiscal activity, the ‘energy grant’ from Russia (Figure 4.2) should be divided between gas and 
oil grants. The ‘gas grant’ may be treated as a direct source of subsequent quasi-fiscal operations in the 
domestic energy sector. As for the ‘oil grant’, the situation was more complex and unstable over the years. 
Partially it was also used directly as a source of economy-wide quasi-fiscal operations, but partially it was 
absorbed either by individual firms or the budget, without being further transmitted to the economy. 
 
149
  The ‘division of labour’ between central and local governments is set depending on the status and size of the enterprise-
beneficiary of a guarantee.  
150
  Data on guarantees provided by local governments are available only since 2015. 
151
  Domestic and foreign guarantees by the central government (Figure 4.1) and domestic guarantees by local 
governments. 
152
  Individual assessments of outstanding directed lending and government guarantees cannot be summed up as these two 
activities overlap.  
153
  According to IMF (2007). 
154
  Petri, Taube and Tsyvinski (2002). 
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The policy objective of carrying out quasi-fiscal operations in the energy sector was to make firms more 
competitive, hence triggering positive externalities in the economy. Moreover, the government could vary 
subsidies for individual sectors, according to either long-term or short-term priorities. Furthermore, the QFA in 
energy have become a powerful tool for direct redistribution of wealth between firms and households, through 
cross-subsidised utilities tariffs: in Belarus, energy tariffs for households have traditionally been lower than 
those for firms.155 
There are three main QFA instruments in energy: tariffs below cost recovery level; non-payments and arrears 
to energy companies; and excessive losses and theft (the latter are of lesser significance).156 The intensity of 
these QFA operations mainly depends on the size of the input ‘energy grant’ from Russia, the current policy 
priorities within the sector and at the macro level in general. During the two last decades, the total volume of 
energy sector QFA was quite close to the level of the gas ‘energy grant’ from Russia. For instance, the 
estimates of these QFA in the mid-2000s vary between 3.7% and 4.7% of GDP.157 
The combination of different QFA instruments varied mainly depending on the general macroeconomic 
situation. Reduced tariffs traditionally have been the most influential tool providing implicit subsidies up to 
3.6% of GDP.158 The accumulated firm energy arrears by the mid-2000s amounted to some 3.5% of GDP.159 
However, after 2006 energy arrears declined and in 2013-2014 fell to a historic minimum of 0.13-0.14% of 
 
155
  Some convergence in tariffs was achieved in 2016 because of a noticeable increase in utility tariffs for households. 
Nevertheless, the tariffs for households and legal entities still differ. At the same time, the tariff system assumes a 
number of reductions for firms, depending on the type of their activity.  
156
  Tochitskaya (2007). 
157
  Ibid. 
158
  Ibid. 
159
  Ibid. 
Figure 4.2 / ‘Energy grant’ from Russia, % of GDP 
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GDP. With the recession and some increase in tariffs, energy arrears rose again, reaching 1.1% of GDP by 
the end of the first half of 2016.160 
Agriculture. Agriculture is sometimes referred to as the ‘black hole’ of the Belarusian economy. By different 
estimates Belarus is a clear-cut leader in direct and implicit fiscal support to agriculture in comparison both to 
neighbouring emerging markets and to developed EU countries.161 The level of direct fiscal support has been 
fluctuating between 3.5% and 4.5% of GDP.162 When some secondary fiscal tools (tax credit, tax benefits, tax 
arrears) are taken into account, the level of fiscal support rises to some 5-5.5% of GDP.163 Furthermore, 
agriculture is among the main beneficiaries of subsidies through directed lending QFA.164 
The massive subsidies for agriculture are not fully absorbed by the industry itself, and a large fraction is further 
transmitted to the economy through price regulations. Price regulations tend to secure purchasing prices for 
agricultural products which are lower than in neighbouring countries.165 This price gap forms an important 
advantage for food producers, which can rely on actually reduced prices on intermediary inputs. Further, the 
government sets minimum export prices for agricultural goods and foodstuffs in order to avoid obtaining gains 
from reduced agricultural inputs outside the country. Alongside that, it keeps the right to regulate domestic 
consumer prices for foodstuffs.166 
Distorted prices actually trim down the profit margin of agricultural firms which de facto operate around break-
even point. Ultimately, similarly to tariffs in the energy sector, this mechanism operates as an instrument for 
wealth transfer to households. 
One of the most important features of Belarusian QFA practices is that instruments in different spheres 
do not exist independently of each other. On the contrary, instruments are designed and managed in a 
way to provide systemic interactions and trigger expected positive externalities for the economy. In this 
manner the authorities intend(ed) to secure strengthening growth and shaping it according to the desired 
trajectory and political/social priorities. 
However, reality turned out to be different and the success in triggering positive externalities has been 
doubtful. There is no evidence that QFA mechanisms in Belarus have been successful in generating 
social returns exceeding the corresponding injections. But there is plenty of evidence of adverse 
structural effects associated with numerous distortions: capital and labour misallocations, distorted 
 
160
  Own assessment based on Belstat data on overdue payments. 
161
  World Bank (2009). 
162
  World Bank (2011, 2009). 
163
  World Bank (2011) provides corresponding estimates for 2005-2009. As the instruments of direct fiscal support of 
agriculture have not been changed significantly, one can expect that the current level of direct fiscal support has 
remained roughly the same. 
164
  According to the approach by Kruk and Haiduk (2013) the share of agriculture in directed loans outstanding is roughly 
50%. But in this study directed loans to manufacturing are ignored, which means that the actual share of agricultural 
borrowers in the stock of directed loans is lower than 50%. In recent years (when the statistics on newly granted 
directed loans have become more transparent), the share of agriculture in the flow of new directed loans was roughly 
40%. 
165
  Tochitskaya and Kruk (2010). However, in recent years Russian producers (especially those of dairy products) try to 
lobby a compulsory coordination of purchasing prices for raw agricultural goods within the Eurasian Union. 
166
  Current legislation stipulates a limit of 90 days of price regulation throughout the year.  
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incentives, misleading price signals, underinvestment, discouraged savings, and extra losses in financial 
intermediation.167 
Overall, the QFA system (see Table 4.1 for a simplified snapshot) has become very complex and 
ambiguous in terms of long-term economic effects. Despite this, for a long time it has been treated as an 
indispensable cornerstone of the Belarusian economy. Most probably, both the beliefs that it can 
nevertheless secure long-term growth and its political acceptability have been the justification for its 
existence. 
Table 4.1 / Specific subsidies and related quasi-fiscal operations in Belarus: a summary 
 
General 
(through directed lending) 
Sectoral (QFA) 
Energy  Agriculture 
Intended purpose To trigger positive externalities and/or provide liquidity 
for subsequent transmission of positive impulses to the economy 
Financial sources  Budget (compensation of interest rates, 
provision of funds for new loans, bank 
recapitalisation) 
Households and firms through wealth 
transfers due to inflation tax 











Losses in efficiency due to resource 
misallocation 
Underinvestment and distorted incentives 
of firms 
Losses in financial intermediation and 
discouraging savings168 
Rising energy costs 
Misleading price signals 
Lack of incentives to increase 
energy efficiency 
Promotion of food exports 
Financially fragile agriculture 




Exchange rate overhang 
Current account deficit 
Price overhang 
Output sensitivity to changes 
in the size of the ‘energy 
grant’  
Food market sensitivity to 
sudden shocks (XR 
depreciation, changes in 
global prices, etc.) 
Source: Author’s synopsis. 
The QFA-SBC system de facto gained a dominating status in the hierarchy of Belarusian economic 
policies. The macroeconomic policy mix (i.e. ‘conventional’ monetary and fiscal instruments) was in 
effect subordinated to the QFA-SBC design. In the case of conflicting objectives169, the authorities (at 
least before 2015) would sacrifice macroeconomic stability rather than revise the QFA-SBC system 
itself. This has had serious implications for macroeconomic and price stability in the country. 
Some signs of an intended downsizing of the QFA-SBC system appeared in 2015-2016. However, it is 
not clear whether these new policies will be continued; moreover, most of the elements of the QFA-SBC 
system are still in place. 
 
167
  Kruk and Haiduk (2013); Tochitskaya (2007); Petre, Taube and Tsyvinski (2002). 
168
  Kruk and Haiduk (2013); Fry (1995). 
169
  Miksjuk, Pranovich, and Ouliaris (2015). 
100
 
THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: POLICY DILEMMAS 
   Research Report 413  
 
CHANGING MACROECONOMIC POLICY OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS 
The recent evolution in the macroeconomic policy mix in Belarus mirrors the deep-seated changes in 
economic fundamentals during the past decade or so. 
The period of 2003-2008, featuring an average growth rate of 9.5%, is often characterised as the ‘golden 
age’ or ‘fat years’ of Belarus. In the expansionary environment that prevailed for quite some time, the 
authorities were not so much concerned with growth-supporting policies but rather with those fine-tuning 
the desired trajectory. QFA-SBC instruments were actively put in place in order to secure this trajectory. 
In turn, monetary, fiscal and some other specific policy tools were considered as additional support for 
the desired characteristics of the growth path. For instance, the authorities paid much attention to the 
structure of domestic demand, i.e. the relationship between consumer and investment demand, and that 
between domestic and foreign demand. 
Exchange rate stability and disinflation were considered as other important attributes of the desired 
growth path given the fact that Belarus had experienced a couple of waves of hyperinflation in the 
1990s. This was one of the reasons why Belarus opted for an exchange rate peg as an effective tool for 
enhancing more nominal stability. In addition, some positive external shocks – increasing prices for 
commodities (e.g. oil and potash), strong rebound in Russia’s import demand, improving terms of trade – 
facilitated the introduction of the peg. 
This background determined in 2003-2007 a policy mix combining: (i) exchange rate peg; (ii) monetary 
stimulation; (iii) direct wage stimulation (see Chapter 2); and (iv) fiscal stimuli (directed at the stimulation 
of both consumer and investment demand). The combination of these instruments and their intensity 
was changing over the years. 
It is sometimes claimed that it was this policy mix that triggered the path of high growth. However, the 
causation was likely the opposite: the favourable growth environment created an environment conducive 
to pursuing such policies. 
Importantly, this constellation was not without its problems even during the period of high growth. While 
GDP grew robustly, this was not driven by productivity gains whereas capital accumulation played a 
prominent role.170 Low productivity entailed a deterioration in international competitiveness after 
2005-2006 as evidenced by different measures such as the share in foreign markets, revealed 
comparative advantages, index of export specialisation or export basket diversification.171 Consequently, 
the current account balance worsened considerably after 2006 (Annex Table 1). 
Further negative changes in the macro environment started emerging after 2007. A number of empirical 
studies172 suggest a persistent tendency towards a declining rate of trend output growth in Belarus 
 
170
  Kruk and Bornukova (2014). 
171
  Kruk (2009); Kruk, Tochitskaya and Shymanovich (2009). 
172
  Kruk and Bornukova (2014); Mironchik, Sudnik, and Katcherskaya (2016). 
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(Figure 4.3).173 Concomitantly, the terms of trade deteriorated considerably during the global financial 
crisis. 
Figure 4.3 / Trend GDP growth rate, % per annum 
 
Source: Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Note: The estimation is produced using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Nevertheless, the exchange rate peg was still considered as an indispensable guarantee of price 
stability. Furthermore, the government started actively pursuing demand stimulation policies with a view 
to achieving its output growth targets. In effect, after 2007 the authorities apparently switched to a 
different policy regime and assigned the macroeconomic policy mix with a more proactive role by 
seeking to boost economic growth through policy tools. However, due to the built-in inconsistencies in 
the policy mix, these proactive policies turned out to be a source of instability. The rapid accumulation of 
macroeconomic imbalances resulted in a series of currency crises: in 2009, 2011 and 2014-2015.  
Figure 4.4 / Base wage rate and real wages in the Belarusian economy, % change and index, 
2006-2015 
 
Source: Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Note: The ‘base wage rate’ is the notion for ‘1st category wage rate’, which is set by the government (see Chapter 2). 
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  The majority of statistical filters suggest that by 2015 potential growth has faded, having achieved zero level. Alongside 
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The year 2010 highlights the growing inconsistency of the policy mix: the sharp growth in wages 
(Figure 4.4) coupled with radical monetary softening (Figure 4.5) did produce a cyclical output upturn: 
GDP bounced back, increasing by 7.7% that year.  
Figure 4.5 / Dynamics of monetary aggregates in real terms (CPI-deflated), percentage 
change over the year (at year end), %, 2001-2015   
 
Source: NBRB; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
This output rebound, however, was achieved at the expense of mounting macroeconomic imbalances. 
First, the gap between wages and productivity rose (Figure 4.6), leading to deteriorating competitiveness 
in foreign trade. Second, the periods of active monetary interventions resulted in a price overhang174 
and, respectively, high inflation. Coupled with the exchange rate peg this caused a steady appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate and a mounting external imbalance (Annex Table 1). A significant gap 
emerged between the actual and the equilibrium real effective exchange rate (Figure 4.7).  
Figure 4.6 / Real wages and real unit labour cost, index and % of GDP, 2006-2015  
 
Source: Belstat; author’s calculations. 
 
174












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real wages, 2009=100 (left axis)
Share of labour compensation in GDP (real unit labour cost), % (right axis)
 THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: POLICY DILEMMAS  103 
 Research Report 413  
 
Figure 4.7 / Gap between actual and equilibrium real effective exchange rate, % of actual 
level, 2010-2015 
 
Source: NBRB; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Note: The estimations are based on Zaretski, Kruk and Kirchner (2011). 
Trying to mitigate the chronic pressure in the currency market, the authorities resorted to active external 
borrowings; this happened against the background of a considerable gap between the equilibrium 
exchange rate and the actual one. Moreover, when possible, the government tried to avoid sovereign 
borrowing, but rather promoted borrowing by business entities. This was done through 
‘recommendations’ to banks and SOEs. Therefore, there was a sharp rise in in external borrowings after 
2008 (Figure 4.8). At the same time, the authorities introduced episodically some temporary restrictions 
on foreign exchange transaction and more capital controls.  
Figure 4.8 / Gross external and public debt of Belarus, 2001-2016 (as of 1 January), % of 
GDP. 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Given the initially low level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, foreign borrowing was considered by the authorities 
as an effective tool for achieving their policy objectives including the defence of the currency peg. 



















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
External public debt, % of GDP Domestic public debt in foreign currency, % of GDP
Gross external debt, % of GDP
104
 
THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: POLICY DILEMMAS 
   Research Report 413  
 
bodies and state-owned banks. The terms ‘financing gap’ and ‘financing deficit’ (i.e. the difference 
between the planned amount of borrowings associated with the projected deficit of the current account, 
on the one hand, and the actual amount of funds available for borrowing, on the other hand) were widely 
circulated in the economic policy agenda.  
Thanks to intensive foreign borrowings175 the authorities managed to mask the underlying 
macroeconomic imbalances in 2009-2011. However, the drying out of external funding sources served 
as a trigger for the currency crisis of 2011. In terms of the extent of nominal exchange rate adjustment, 
this currency crisis was the most severe: the Belarusian rouble depreciated roughly by a margin of three; 
over the period 2011-2012, CPI more than doubled (Annex Table 1).  
At the same time, the rapid crisis-driven macroeconomic adjustment contributed to rebalancing the 
economy: there was a significant downward adjustment in real wages (Figure 4.6) which contributed to a 
notable contraction in the current account deficit. From this perspective, in principle the crisis provided 
important lessons for possible reconsideration of the macroeconomic policy design. In late 2011-2012, 
the options of abandoning demand stimulation practices and the exchange rate peg were considered by 
the government. At that point probably for the first time the government acknowledged that the 
weakening growth could not be offset by excessive demand stimulation policies. 
But despite such debates, the macroeconomic policy setup did not change considerably. While arguing 
about the necessity of more flexibility of the exchange rate, actually a return to a currency peg to a single 
currency (the US dollar) took place. The demand stimulation policies persisted, although their intensity 
weakened somehow: some monetary stimuli were abandoned (Figure 4.5) alongside with the reduction 
of new directed lending inflows (Chapter 1, Figure 1.7). But de facto, the old policy setup was fully 
restored by late 2012. 
There were probably two main reasons for ignoring the lessons of the 2011 currency crisis in its 
immediate aftermath. First, the authorities were anxious about the social and political consequences and 
sought options of rapid recovery in real disposable income. The practice of wage policy since the early 
2000s assumed setting (implicit) wage targets in US dollars. On the one hand, the government justified 
this practice by the dollarised macro environment. On the other hand, this practice contributed to 
progressing real dollarisation itself. Finally, this contributed to the reincarnation of both an active wage 
policy and the exchange rate peg to the US dollar.  
Second, the authorities probably believed that they had uncovered a new tool that could play 
simultaneously the role of a growth driver and liquidity supporter. In 2012, thanks to a new phase under 
the Eurasian integration framework, Belarus was awarded a new contract with Russia for the supply of 
natural gas, which assumed roughly a 40% price discount. Some improvements also took place in the 
terms and conditions of oil trade. Moreover, in late 2011 and throughout 2012, Belarus enjoyed a 
specific scheme of trade in ‘thinners and solvents’ (see Chapter 2), which secured extra currency 
revenues on the net basis thus providing a positive push on output. In hindsight, this understanding of 
 
175
  Apart from borrowing mirrored in the debt statistics, a large amount of forex funds in 2010 (about USD 3.7 billion, or 
about 7.5% of GDP) were rechannelled to international reserves from the holdings of commercial banks (mainly 
subsidiaries of Russian banks) through currency swaps. Although these funds were not reported as debt according to 
statistical methodology, de-facto they can be treated as debt. 
 THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: POLICY DILEMMAS  105 
 Research Report 413  
 
the situation was unjustified: cheaper energy did not help in strengthening growth while the extra 
currency revenues were not sufficient to cover the financing needs. 
The 2011 currency crisis gave rise to new threats to macroeconomic instability such as high and volatile 
inflation expectations176 and a sharp increase in dollarisation.177 By instigating macroeconomic instability, 
the crisis likely contributed to a further reduction in trend output growth. However, the authorities were 
not prepared to address these threats through structural reforms, preferring to consider the exchange 
rate peg as a buffer against them.  
So, during the period 2013-2014, the policy setup survived again, but its internal inconsistencies became 
more evident.178 For instance, more emphasis on demand stimulation now led not only to price overhang 
and delayed impact on the real exchange rate, but also to direct pressure on prices and the exchange 
rate through less demand for national currency and more for hard currency.  
These inconsistencies further reduced the effectiveness of the policy efforts to boost output. The 
contribution to output growth by domestic demand and net exports became roughly equal with opposite 
signs. The appreciation of the real effective exchange rate through 2013 and 2014 led to a widening of 
the current account deficit while the attempts to stimulate growth through more domestic demand were 
offset by a further worsening of net exports. Ultimately, there was only meagre GDP growth in 2013 and 
2014 – in the range of 1-2 per cent annually.  
During these last two years of the ‘traditional’ policy setup it was becoming increasingly difficult to justify 
it. It was problematic to put forward reasonable explanation for the accumulating distortions and 
imbalances. Furthermore, the increasing dollarisation and resurgent inflation undermined the confidence 
in the currency peg which de facto was no longer perceived as a credible nominal anchor. The currency 
crisis of 2014-2015 made an exit from the traditional policy setup inevitable. 
2015: A TURNING POINT? 
Institutional changes and shrinking quasi-fiscal activities: illusory or real? 
Numerous macroeconomic challenges became evident at the turn of 2014-2015 (even before the 
currency crisis) when the effects of the lasting weakening of growth were coupled with external shocks 
and drying-out of the sources of foreign funding.  
Poor progress in institutional and structural reforms was largely responsible for the weakening of growth. 
In the years preceding the crisis (2012-2014) the government had actually recognised the necessity of at 
least some selective reforms. A number of programmes and action plans adopted in this period declared 
the intention for institutional reforms such as state property management, SOE management by 
independent boards, improvement of the mechanisms of state support and lending within the framework 
of state programmes, motivation of and incentives for SOE managers, and facilitating the development 
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  Kruk (2016). 
177
  Kruk (2015). 
178
  Miksjuk, Pranovich, and Ouliaris (2015). 
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of investment funds. In 2014 the government opened a dialogue with the World Bank on the 
development of a roadmap for structural reforms in Belarus. This formed an environment of expectation 
of such reforms in the near future. In some cases, the authorities explicitly proclaimed the year 2015 as 
the preparatory stage for deep reforms, announcing the start of reforms themselves in 2016 (associated 
with a new electoral cycle). But in reality, even what was called ‘preparatory measures’ were limited in 
practice.  
By the end of 2015, it became clear that there was no political will to introduce the expected reforms. 
After the presidential elections, Mr. Lukashenka circulated a personal public address stating that no 
dramatic changes would be taking place in the operation of the national economy. At the same time, 
some measures that were probably inevitable, such as raising transport fares and utility tariffs, and an 
increase in the pension age, were presented by the authorities as structural reforms. Moreover, some 
promising legal acts were adopted (for instance, the strategy of reforms in the system of state 
finance179); however, up until now they have remained mainly declarative. By 2016, this ambiguity 
allowed authorities arguing that deep reforms in Belarus had been started and were ongoing, but without 
using the term ‘structural reforms’ for that process.  
Some evidence in support of this statement is the progress in reducing the scope and size of the QFA-
SBC system, in particular, directed lending, throughout 2014-2015 which was probably the biggest policy 
change in the last couple of years.  
However, the outcomes of this intention were ambiguous: while directed lending by commercial banks 
was reduced (both in nominal and real terms, mainly due to housing loans that almost halved even in 
nominal terms) the lending activity of the Development Bank partially compensated the latter. In 2015, 
the aggregate (commercial banks plus Development Bank) amount of directed loans granted remained 
roughly unchanged in nominal terms from the year 2014, although it did drop in real terms. But, what is 
probably more important, the stock of outstanding directed loans remained roughly unchanged 
throughout 2014-2015. The procedures for granting and obtaining such loans changed very little 
(although some novelties were announced, including a competitive basis for funds allocation): for the 
time being, funds are still simply granted to borrowers from the list approved by the government.  
So, on the one hand, there are signs of willingness to reduce, if not dismantle the QFA-SBC system. On 
the other hand, these signs are too weak and leave doubts in respect to the future outcomes. Actually, 
this trade-off mirrors a more systemic challenge that the government is faced with: while the scope of 
accumulated distortions due to the QFA-SBC system is too high, a rapid exit from it will be painful. So, 
even in the case of strong political will for change, its speed might be restrained by concomitant 
concerns. And if the will for QFA-SBC dismantlement is not strong enough, the ‘reform’ period may take 
ages.  
The outcomes of the attempts to restrict directed lending for a number of woodworking and machine-
building SOEs provide evidence of this challenge. The relatively modest restrictions in directed lending 
coincided with shrinking foreign demand for these industries’ products, and this resulted in a marked 
deterioration in the financial state of the affected SOEs in 2015. Many of them could hardly service their 
 
179
  At the year end of 2015, the government adopted a corresponding Resolution. However, the document contains no 
direct action measures, and mainly postulates objectives of future activities without mentioning any measures that could 
help achieve the declared objectives. 
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debts, even those granted at preferential rates. The government responded by another unconventional 
intervention: the Ministry of Finance de facto purchased from the respective banks the debts of some 
machine-building and woodworking companies in exchange for state bonds, and the original debts of the 
state-owned enterprises were restructured and extended. The ministry used the scheme to purchase 
and restructure more than USD 1.5 billion worth of enterprise debt. 180  
Through this step the ministry addressed two challenges: (a) it supported large manufacturers and 
helped maintain the number of jobs (which is almost identical to the purposes of directed lending) and 
(b) bailed out the affected banks helping them get rid of low-quality assets. So, while formally restricting 
directed lending, the government introduced a new tool of granting soft budget constraints. Hence the 
measures that were initially considered effective did not hit the actual target, preserving the environment 
of soft budget constraints under which the state-owned sector operates.  
In the case of smaller SOEs, the restrictions in directed lending became even more painful, since the 
authorities were unable to provide sufficient support for all SOEs. Hence many companies initiated 
bankruptcy procedures on their own or had their lenders do it. In 2015, the number of bankruptcy cases 
filed with economic courts increased by 25% year on year. At the end of the year, the list of companies 
under bankruptcy procedures included several large manufacturing SOEs, which had been subject to a 
bankruptcy ‘taboo’ in previous years. This evidence strengthened voices (especially in the sphere of 
SOEs’ management) against attempts to reform the QFA-SBC system.  
The attempt of retuning QFA also affects the future macroeconomic development. If the government 
restricts its quasi-fiscal injections, it directly questions the viability of SOEs. The expected upshots are 
losses in output in the SOEs and a deterioration in the banks’ financial stance due to the increase in 
non-performing loans (NPLs). If the authorities shift the responsibility for corresponding QFA from the 
state-owned banks to the government itself, this may buy some time but will just postpone the challenge 
for the future. Essentially the government would put its own future solvency at risk. The effectiveness of 
this policy will depend on whether beneficiaries will be able to restore their capacity to pay in the future 
and hence pay back their debt to the government. If not, the government will have to take all the 
responsibility (in financial and moral respect) as quasi-fiscal liabilities would transform into open public 
debt.  
So, having a large inheritance of QFA overhang leaves no chance for easy solutions. The government 
has to balance between output losses, accumulation of NPLs and public debt. Thus, the future 
perspective has become the hostage of past mistakes.  
Finally, the trade-offs in transforming the QFA-SBC system generate similar challenges for 
macroeconomic policy design. On the one hand, there is a broad public request for macroeconomic and 
financial stability, given the fresh memory of extremely high inflation, depreciation and other financial 
turbulences. On the other hand, fiscal and monetary restrictions may propagate output losses 
associated with adjustments in the QFA-SBC system.  
So, the same diagnosis of the current stance of the economy may lead to different recommendations in 
respect to the macroeconomic policy mix. One may argue that, while exiting the QFA-SBC system is 
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  The debts restructured were mainly nominated in foreign currency. 
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inevitably painful, it is worth paying this price in order to get rid of the associated distortions. However, it 
can be challenged by the opposite vision – that changes in the QFA-SBC system and in the 
macroeconomic policy mix should be cautious and taken by small steps to minimise output losses. In 
2015-2016, Belarus seems to be still in a limbo, having got stuck in this trade-off.  
Towards a new macroeconomic policy model 
At the turn of 2014, it became evident that the currency peg could no longer be sustained. The 
authorities took a range of administrative measures to address the new currency crisis, including 
currency restrictions, direct price controls, and new taxes and charges on foreign exchange transactions. 
However, drawing on the experience of the financial crisis of 2011, they realised that if such measures 
were protracted, financial contagion would spread. So a couple of days after introducing administrative 
controls, the NBRB announced a complete overhaul of the country’s monetary policy. In the first place, 
the currency peg was abandoned and a floating exchange rate regime was adopted. At par with the 
change in the exchange rate regime, monetary targeting was announced as the NBRB policy framework 
with rather restrictive targets for 2015. In turn, the government declared its intention to abolish or curb 
some of the demand stimulation tools. These radical policy changes were vindicated by a concern that 
the currency crisis might escalate into a full-fledged financial crisis, especially given the thin international 
reserves (Figure 4.9).  
Figure 4.9 / Evolution of international reserves, 2008-2016 (beginning of the year) 
 
Source: NBRB; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Ever since, the macroeconomic policy setup in Belarus could be summarised as follows: (i) floating 
exchange rate framework; (ii) monetary targeting with tight intermediary goals; (iii) fiscal policy 
tightening; and (iv) less intensive usage of unconventional demand stimulation tools (QFA-SBC 
mechanisms, wage stimulation, etc.). The need for such a major policy shift had been building during 
quite a long period preceding the latest crisis; the latter was merely the trigger (‘regime switcher’) of the 
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The floating exchange rate framework helped restore external equilibrium very rapidly. In 2015, even 
against the background of substantial negative external real shocks,181 this helped in bringing the current 
account deficit to acceptable levels (-3.8% of GDP182), mostly due to large downward adjustments in 
imports.  
The floating exchange rate so far also confirmed its effectiveness as a shock-absorber. Under the policy 
model of 2003-2014, real wages had been more volatile, and shocks in the real exchange rate triggered 
co-directed adjustments in real wages (Figure 4.10)183 which is in line with theoretical conclusions.184 In 
the case of Belarus this was amplified by the dollarisation and the high pass-through from exchange rate 
to prices which was reinforced by the pegged exchange rate regime.185 During the currency crisis of 
2014-2015, this relationship seems to have weakened which may be partly related to the shift away from 
the peg.  
Figure 4.10 / Dynamics of the real effective exchange rate and real wage, percentage change 
over the year, %, 2006-2016 
 
Source: NBRB; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
Note: CPI deflated series of real effective exchange rate distributed by the NBRB is used. 
On the other hand, there are a number of risks associated with a floating exchange rate framework. 
However, the majority of them are not pitfalls of the regime itself but the consequences of introducing it 
in a fragile and weak macro environment (see Box 4.2).  
 
181
  A sharp drop in import demand from Russia (due to the plunge in oil prices) and other CIS countries. 
182
  According to the BOP methodology, outflow of primary income captures incomes and profits of foreign investors, even if 
there were no actual outflow of these funds. In the latter case, they are mirrored as the inflow in the financial account as 
reinvested earnings. This effect is relevant for Belarus, as a larger part of foreign investors’ income is reinvested, and 
actually does not leave the country. From the view of macroeconomic policy, this effect may be interpreted as 
overestimating the current account deficit (and, respectively, the financial inflows). If netting this effect, the current 
account deficit in 2015 was roughly zero. 
183
  Moreover, rough causality analysis suggests one-way Granger causality from real effective exchange rate to real 
wages. 
184
  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995); Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005). 
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BOX 4.2 / FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: WHAT ARE THE RISKS FOR BELARUS? 
Among the downsides of the floating exchange rate regime – both on theoretical and/or empirical grounds – 
the following ones are probably most relevant for Belarus: (i) an effect equivalent to a sudden stop in financial 
flows186; and (ii) the currency-induced credit risk187.  
The introduction of a floating exchange rate after the peg, when the latter was associated with a substantial 
overvaluation overhang, has much in common with the sudden stop crisis mechanism. Both of them cause 
rapid improvements in the current account largely due to the curbing of imports. While this may be favourable 
from the viewpoint of restoring the external balance, it might be too costly in terms of the domestic balance. 
Restraining imports of intermediate goods will impact negatively on domestic producers and will ultimately 
curb aggregate output. Empirically sudden stops are argued to be among the most painful types of shocks in 
terms of output losses and duration, especially for emerging markets.188 Such a line of argumentation is 
applicable to Belarus as the 2015 adjustment had much in common with the sudden stop effect. Hence, one 
may expect output losses of prolonged duration associated with this effect. On the other hand, part of the 
sudden stop effect may be due to overvaluation rather than to the shift to a floating regime. From this 
perspective, despite being painful, such an effect is more likely to be interpreted as a ‘back to fundamentals’ 
adjustment.  
As to the currency-induced credit risk, one should take into account that due to the high real interest rates 
after 2011189, many Belarusian firms resorted to more active borrowing in foreign currency (Figure 4.11), even 
those that could not match repayment with stable currency revenues. In this case, the introduction of a floating 
exchange rate (given the exchange rate overhang fortified by the peg) becomes a trigger for non-payments by 
such borrowers. Again, this problem has become vital for Belarus. However, such aspects are not directly 
associated with monetary/exchange rate policy, but rather need to be addressed by banking regulation and 
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Figure 4.11 / Currency structure of loans and deposits, % of GDP, 2000-2016  
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On balance, the introduction of the floating exchange rate regime so far has brought about positive 
macroeconomic outcomes by helping restore equilibrium and serving as a more effective shock-
absorber. At the same time, it breeds some new risks that need to be addressed by policy.  
The regime of monetary targeting with tight intermediary goals is the other key component of the new 
monetary framework. The re-orientation to low and stable inflation as the primary goal (instead of the 
exchange rate) of monetary policy has become the most prominent step forward.  
When pondering over the new monetary policy regime, the logic of ‘imperfect environment’ and ‘scarce 
options to choose from’ was still prevailing in Belarus. In early 2015, the authorities aimed at answering 
the question ‘which monetary policy framework can immediately substitute for exchange rate targeting 
(given the failure of the latter), securing acceptable outcomes in terms of price and financial stability 
against the background of a fragile institutional framework?’. In the crisis-type environment of early 2015 
such a choice could be treated as reasonable. However, from a longer-term perspective, one could still 
pose the question whether this was the right choice (for a discussion see Box 4.3).  
The line of argumentation for adopting monetary targeting as a policy framework for the medium-term 
perspective by the NBRB looks as follows:191 (a) the NBRB has direct control over base money 
(operational target); (b) base money drives and defines broad money supply (intermediate target); and 
(c) broad money is the root cause of inflation (primary goal). The justification for monetary targeting was 
supported by econometric analysis on various aspects of the expected impact undertaken both by the 
NBRB and by independent analysts 192. In other words, this was a type of justification claiming that ‘this 
regime is employed as it is feasible’, but not ‘this regime is the best choice among alternatives’.  
Clearly, there are potential pitfalls (Box 4.3) associated with the monetary targeting framework in the 
case of the Belarusian macroeconomic environment. At some point, the authorities will probably seek for 
a more effective policy regime at par with the necessary institutional changes to support it. At present 
there are a number of studies pointing to the advantages of inflation targeting in the case of Belarus.193  
BOX 4.3 / CAVEATS ASSOCIATED WITH MONETARY TARGETING IN BELARUS 
There are a number of arguments to support (with some caution) the introduction of monetary targeting in 
Belarus. At the same time there are reasons to suspect its low effectiveness as a monetary framework.  
First, by definition this regime almost fully ignores the impact of expectations on the monetary environment. 
However, for Belarus the issue of inflation expectations emerged after the 2011 crisis and up until now 
inflation expectations are high and volatile, contributing a lot to the actual inflation dynamics.194  
 
191
  Officially the NBRB assumes a gradual shift to the inflation targeting framework in the longer term. However, there is no 
schedule (even indicative) and road-map for such transformation, which means that in the foreseeable perspective 
(2-3 years) it will not occur, barring any emergency. 
192
  Mironchik and Bezborodova (2015); Pelipas and Kirchner (2015). 
193
  Zaretski (2012). 
194
  Kruk (2016). 
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Second, this regime is mainly backward looking. Its operational and intermediary targets are mainly formulated 
based on historic data, and can hardly take into account real-time data on a regular basis which may contain 
the impact of unexpected shocks. Hence, the policy regime is suffering from lack of flexibility.  
Third (partially associated with the previous item), monetary targeting overemphasises the long-term context 
of monetary policy, while restricting the possibilities of inciting a short-term economic impetus. The latter 
means that this framework can hardly realise the dual mandate of monetary policy – price stability and output 
smoothing, and is likely to focus on price stability only. For Belarus, given the coincidence of an adverse 
external shock and slowdown in the business cycle, both goals seem to be important.  
Fourth, there is a traditional objection to monetary targeting: the inherent instability in the money demand 
function and, respectively, difficulties in forecasting it. Available research is ambiguous whether or not this 
objection will be relevant in the case of Belarus.195  
Fifth, some specifics in the relations between the NBRB and commercial banks give rise to doubts about the 
full control of the NBRB over base money. Since 2010, when the NBRB undertook large-scale swap deals, a 
great part of its liabilities has been accounted for outside base money. Moreover, in the last couple of years, 
commercial banks have held large amounts (in comparison to base money) of liquidity in deposits at the 
NBRB and in NBRB bonds.196 Hence, base money is affected not only by NBRB interventions but by 
commercial banks’ operations as well.  
Sixth, monetary targeting tends to breed some conflicts between the setting of base money as a monetary 
target and the interest rate as a policy instrument. Too high real interest rates and a distorted yield curve lead 
the monetary authorities into the temptation of direct control over interest rates. Such practices were widely 
used in previous years under the exchange rate peg, and persisted even under the monetary targeting 
framework.197 However, a steady adherence to direct interest rate control and commitments on monetary 
aggregates may induce contradictory signals.  
Seventh, broad money can hardly be treated as a proper anchor in many respects. For instance, knowing, 
understanding and perceiving this indicator as the nominal anchor by the public is doubtful. Moreover, given 
the very high dollarisation ratio, in case of significant exchange rate fluctuations the NBRB may face problems 
in meeting either broad money targets or the inflation target. A similar situation took place in 2015 when the 
NBRB formulated a target of 30% growth for broad money. But some unexpectedly large fluctuations took 
place during the year, which caused a 40.9% growth of broad money by the year end. Despite this, the 
inflation (primary) target was hit, while the intermediary one was not. So, the anchor is sensitive to the factors 
outside the NBRB’s control, which may be a challenge in meeting its commitments.  
A relative tightening of fiscal policy accompanied the dramatic changes in the monetary sphere. Unlike 
monetary policy, this was not an immediate decision. The fiscal authorities have been facing pressure 
from increasing obligations on debt repayments since 2012 (Figure 4.12). It included both debt service 
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  Pelipas and Kirchner (2015), Mironchik and Bezborodova (2015), Kruk (2011). 
196
  During last year the larger part of funds from 2010 swap deals was repackaged into NBRB’s bonds. 
197
  Murin (2016). 
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(where the increase was more or less gradual) and principal payments (in which case the increase was 
quite sharp).Overall, this did not cause radical adjustments in fiscal expenditures.  
Figure 4.12 / Budget performance (revenue ‘+’, expenditure ‘-‘) and external debt repayment, 
2010-2015, % of GDP 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance; Belstat; author’s calculations. 
In 2012-2014, the government cushioned the challenge mainly through debt refinancing, thus 
postponing the problem for later periods. This solution was chosen as the share of budget revenue 
denominated in foreign currency was much lower than its forex obligations. Moreover, revenues from 
export/import duties (the major component of forex revenues) were shrinking further due to unfavourable 
conditions in export markets. Given the mismatch between foreign currency obligations and 
expenditures, debt service would have either led to additional foreign currency demand by the 
government at the domestic market (which was considered highly undesirable) or would have required 
painful adjustments in expenditures. Thus, the government opted for debt refinancing but, nevertheless, 
gave rise to some restrictive trends in expenditures.  
Some downward adjustment in public expenditure also did take place. Within current expenditure, the 
most profound reduction occurred in the public procurement of goods and services, and budget transfers 
(which include both social transfers and subsidies to firms). The cuts in these two items taken together 
contributed to a reduction in expenditures roughly by 0.8 percentage points of GDP. Furthermore, there 
were significant cuts in public capital expenditures: by 0.9 percentage points of GDP over the period 
2012-2014. It may be interpreted that the savings generated by these cuts were directed towards debt 
repayments.198  
In 2015 the fiscal stance remained roughly the same, with a few new elements. A new deal with Russia 
(in respect to oil duties) was the most influential one. It secured an increase in public revenues roughly 
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by 2.5% of GDP. Moreover, these funds were forex-denominated, which made it possible to use them 
directly for debt repayment.  
Technically this resulted in a larger headline fiscal surplus, as oil duties increased the revenue side but 
did not affect the expenditure side, as debt repayment is accounted ‘under the line’.  
Furthermore, additional internal restructuring of expenditure and revenue cushioned to some extent the 
real contraction of the most sensitive items of budget expenditures such as wages in the public sector 
and social transfers. Thus there were further cuts in public capital expenditure: in relative terms they 
reached a historical low in 2015 (4.2% of GDP vs. an average value of 6.4% in 2010-2014 and about 
10% of GDP in previous decade). In addition, the authorities sought sources of additional revenue and 
targeted two groups of taxpayers: households and profitable state-owned enterprises. The rate on 
personal income tax was raised in 2015 from 12% to 13%. Hence, this tax was the only one that secured 
higher revenues. As regards profitable SOEs, a number of new regulations increased budget revenues 
due to higher than usual charges on their profits. In addition, the tax administration tightened tax and 
penalty collection, which contributed to an increase in non-tax revenues to 5.0% of GDP (3.6% of GDP 
in 2010-2014, and about 2.5% in previous decade).  
Overall, fiscal policy was not used as a counter-cyclical tool during the recession in 2015 and even 
acquired some pro-cyclical features. The fiscal challenges directly impacted on the demand stimulation 
measures. Thus the authorities abstained from significant adjustment of the nominal ‘base wage rate’ 
which resulted in a reduction by some 7.5% in real terms (Figure 4.4). Furthermore, the government 
recommended to link wage and salary increases more closely to the labour productivity dynamics.199  
Reflecting all these policy changes, the macro environment in Belarus also changed. Before 2015, the 
stylised macroeconomic picture was a combination of low unemployment and GDP growth (albeit low 
and weakening during the last years), on the one hand, and substantial foreign trade deficit, exchange 
rate overhang and high inflation, on the other hand. Since 2015, the picture has changed to the reverse: 
the actual exchange rate roughly corresponds to the equilibrium rate, the current account deficit is close 
to its estimated mid-term equilibrium of around 3% of GDP200 with signs of disinflation; however, all of 
this is coupled with output contraction and growing unemployment.  
In terms of output performance, 2015 turned out to be the worst year in the past two decades. GDP fell 
by 3.9% year on year; gross fixed capital formation dropped by 15.9% (and made a negative contribution 
to GDP growth of -5.9 percentage points), real consumption expenditures by households and state 
organisations fell by 2.4% (and made a negative contribution to GDP growth of -1.6 percentage points). 
The only component that made a positive contribution to GDP (+5.3 percentage points) was net exports. 
However, the positive effect of net exports can be attributed to the fact that real imports dropped more 
than real exports. On the supply side, all major industries were in recession. Construction output fell by 
9.5% year on year while the manufacturing sector reported a 6.2% contraction in output.  
In 2015, average real wages dropped by 3.1%, and real disposable incomes decreased by 5.6%. Rising 
unemployment became an important new characteristic of the economic status of households. Official 
 
199
  This practice was introduced in the second half of 2014 by a special Resolution of the government. 
200
  IMF (2010) estimates the mid-term equilibrium level of the current account deficit at about -2.7% of GDP. 
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unemployment statistics (1.1%) only cover registered unemployed individuals and cannot shed light on 
the real scope of the problem. The significant decline in employment (the number of jobholders fell by 
80,500 people in the period from December 2014 to December 2015) is a better indicator of the 
deteriorating situation in the labour market.  
In foreign trade, Belarus reported a surplus for goods and services for the first time in many years 
(USD 174.3 million201). This outcome can be attributed to the depreciation of the national currency and 
the ongoing recession.  
In the monetary sphere, the results of the year 2015 were ambiguous. The authorities managed to avoid 
a full-fledged financial crisis and the NBRB was successful in pursuing disinflation. The average annual 
inflation (CPI) rate slowed to 13.5%, which was a progress compared to the past. Disinflation was not 
only the result of restrictive monetary policy. The contraction in demand (in particular, private 
consumption) lowered inflationary pressures and contributed to disinflation. The significant depreciation 
of the national currency (by 37.6% to the basket and 56% to the US dollar) was mostly caused by 
external shocks and did not translate into immediate financial shocks thanks to the change in the 
exchange rate regime.  
At the same time, the tight monetary policy under the monetary targeting framework probably exerted a 
pro-cyclical effect, reinforcing the cyclical slowdown. Furthermore, the growing amount of non-
performing loans has become an increasing concern for the banking system, giving rise to doubts about 
the stability of banks in the new economic reality.  
Finally, external indebtedness became a more acute issue. While gross external debt in absolute terms 
went down by USD 1.8 billion, due to the exchange rate depreciation it hiked in relative terms, to 69.7% 
of GDP in 2015 from 52.8% a year earlier; government external debt rose to 26.8% of GDP from 20.1% 
(Figure 4.6).  
Overall, macroeconomic performance in 2015 was disappointing. The country faced the first recession in 
20 years and was reminded of the problem of unemployment. Despite the relative price stabilisation, the 
risks for the financial system and its overall fragility are still on the agenda.  
In 2015, both the authorities and the general public were more or less ready to face these challenges. At 
the same time, there was an expectation of an upcoming rapid recovery. But this did not materialise in 
2016 as the recessionary environment persisted. Questions like ‘why is the recession so persistent’ and 
‘what are the right priorities for economic policy’ resurged on the agenda. The consolidated position of 
the authorities on the obvious restrictions in respect to both the QFA-SBC system and the macro 
incentives (as in the first half of 2015) began to erode. So, in 2016, the uncertainty about the future 
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The roots of the recessionary environment 
In the current macroeconomic environment, Belarus needs to find new impetuses to invigorate growth. 
The question is whether and how policy can contribute to such impetuses.  
A ‘big picture’ of the macro environment in Belarus is somewhat similar to the interpretation of the 
current slowdown in developed countries as secular stagnation: the natural interest rate is below the 
actual level of the interest rate, which causes a downturn/slowdown in the business cycle.202 However, 
for the developed market economies this situation is considered to be consequent to the problem of the 
zero lower bound, which is not the case for Belarus. For Belarus the steady overhang in real interest 
rates seems to be associated with the high and volatile inflation expectations after the currency crisis of 
2011 (Figure 4.13). 
Figure 4.13 / Decomposition of the nominal interbank interest rate, 2005-2015, % 
 
Source: Own estimations based on Kruk (2016). 
In 2011, Belarus experienced an upsurge of very high inflation associated with the currency crash. While 
this adjustment helped in easing (albeit temporarily) the macroeconomic imbalance, it also destroyed the 
confidence in the monetary policy and induced a spike in inflation expectations. 
The estimated series of inflation expectations203 suggests that the level of expected inflation has tended 
to be steadily higher than actual inflation. It suggests that economic agents probably still do not have 
enough confidence in the declared commitments of the NBRB and tend to consider the inflation threat as 
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Figure 4.14 / Actual inflation (CPI) and inflation expectations, quarterly change (annualised 
rate), %, 2005-2015 
 
Source: Own estimations based on Kruk (2016). 
BOX 4.4 / MONETARY POLICY CHALLENGES UNDER HIGH INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
Propagating inflation through expectations may be considered as a separate channel within the monetary 
transmission mechanism (along with interest rate, exchange rate and bank-lending channels). In other words, 
even in the absence of underlying fundamental preconditions, inflation expectations may become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.204 In order to suppress propagation through such channel, the authorities may need to 
tighten the policy stance more intensively than it would be the case in the absence of this channel, in 
particular, by raising interest rates. On the one hand, such a level of nominal interest rate may already be 
factored in the inflation expectations and the real ex ante interest rate; i.e., the current level of nominal interest 
rates will equalise the ex post real rate with the ex ante real rate if the actual inflation rate has been as high as 
current inflation expectations. On the other hand, if actual inflation is much lower than the expected one, the 
ex post real rate will be much higher than the ex ante one.  
This creates something of a trap for the monetary authorities. If they keep interest rates high, based on the 
expected inflation, the impact of expectations on actual inflation will be mitigated, but the losses in terms of 
foregone output will be high as well, due to high ex post real interest rates. If they pursue a rapid reduction of 
nominal interest rates, current nominal rates will not guarantee ex ante real interest taking into account the 
high inflation expectations, which will constitute a shock for the money market. This constellation may set the 
stage of the mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Furthermore, an increase in absolute value and in the volatility of the ex ante real rate (and high probability of 
an even higher ex post real rate in national currency) might also be a point of concern (Figure 4.13). Given the 
high inflation expectations, depositors might require higher ‘guaranteed’ interest on national currency, i.e. a 
higher ex ante real rate on savings in national currency. If such a premium is not secured, the depositors tend 
to shift more to foreign currency deposits (Figure 4.11), thus reducing the demand for national currency. Here, 
the NBRB again faces a dilemma that does not allow for a good solution: ignoring increasing deposit 
dollarisation means accepting less control over monetary aggregates and higher sensitivity to shocks; 
otherwise, interest rate should be maintained high, which leads to dampening output. 
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Inflation expectations have become a challenge for the monetary authorities in many respects (see 
Box 4.4). Persistent high inflation expectations are thus a challenge for monetary policy, effectively 
reducing its room for manoeuvre. Thus suppressing inflation expectations should probably be regarded 
as one of the priority goals of monetary policy and macroeconomic policy as a whole. In this regard, 
although the monetary targeting regime is probably superior to the exchange rate peg in terms of 
reducing the risks of currency crises, it does not help in addressing the problem of high and persistent 
inflation expectations.  
From the point of view of the macro environment, the danger of high and volatile inflation expectations is 
primarily associated with their role in driving up real interest rates, which gives rise to a sustainable gap 
between actual and natural interest rate.  
Firms may be reluctant to invest, having in mind the poor growth potential and the low expected returns 
on investments even in the case of an improving external environment.205 This predefines the 
environment for declining capital investments and a lowering natural interest rate. But the gap between 
the natural interest rate and the actual level of the interest rates in the Belarusian financial market 
amplifies the reluctance to invest. Finally, it leads to a depression investment environment. While in the 
past fixed investment was an important growth driver, since 2011 it has been stagnating and even 
decreasing both in absolute terms and, especially, in relation to GDP (Figure 4.15).  
Figure 4.15 / The dynamics of gross fixed capital formation, 2000-2015 
 
Source: Belstat; author’s calculations. 
In terms of the long-term environment, weakened fixed investments may be treated as the reflection of 
structural weaknesses and the erosion of the previous growth engines. In other words, this structural 
trend facilitates the adjustment of the capital stock to a more reasonable lower level, given the excessive 
and unproductive building of capital in previous years.  
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  The view is empirically supported through estimations of the natural interest rate for Belarus according to the Laubach-
Williams methodology (Laubach and Williams, 2003, 2015). The corresponding exercise exhibits a gradual decrease of 




















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gross fixed capital formation in constant prices, log scale
Share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP, % (right axis)
 THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: POLICY DILEMMAS  119 
 Research Report 413  
 
Breaking the current constellation of ‘dampened capital investments’ requires numerous changes 
relating both to structural and short-term issues. Structural consolidation can secure a trend of 
increasing natural interest rate. However, a stable monetary environment is not less important. Instability 
in expectations causes an obvious conflict between the price stability and output smoothing goals for the 
NBRB. From this viewpoint, prioritisation of price and financial stability leads to a tough stance of 
monetary policy in terms of output, which dampens business activity.  
The outlook for the near future is that this stance will be continued, with the actual real interest rate 
exceeding the natural interest rate.206 Hence, the situation with dampened fixed investments is likely to 
continue in the near future, deferring the recovery from the cyclical recession. Furthermore, as the 
weakened fixed investment is more a structural issue rather than a cyclical one, the preconditions for a 
return of the previous model of investment-driven growth in the medium term seems unlikely as well.  
Risks to financial stability 
The emphasis of the authorities on price and financial stability since 2015 nevertheless has not 
eliminated the risks to financial stability. Numerous traditional financial weaknesses – due to the high 
level of dollarisation and the unstable inflation expectations – are still on the agenda. But nowadays this 
list of threats has been supplemented by debt issues. The level and quality of both public and business 
sector debts pose risks for future macroeconomic stability. Each challenge may be amplified by quasi-
fiscal liabilities, while it is still unclear which strategy will be used for eliminating them (if any).  
There were several reasons for the deterioration of the quality of debt in the business sector. During the 
decade of the ‘lending binge’, many non-financial companies were actively changing the structure of 
their capital base by increasing the share of borrowed funds. Over the past ten years, the equity-assets 
ratio in the economy decreased from 79.4% to 57.3%.207 Moreover, the policy push for ‘modernisation’, 
which was intensified after 2012, aggravated the debt challenge in the state-owned enterprises.208  
The cost of borrowing is another attribute of the debt burden challenge, especially given that real interest 
rates in recent years have increased dramatically. Furthermore, in 2013-2014, many companies were 
taking forex loans seeking to alleviate the debt burden while taking an excessive exchange rate risk. In 
many cases, loans in foreign currency were taken by businesses that had no currency earnings. As a 
result, the quality of debts became highly dependent on exchange rate fluctuations.  
Two groups of firms – state-owned enterprises (in the first place, the beneficiaries of directed lending) 
and foreign currency borrowers lacking sufficient export revenues – were the most affected with respect 
to debt sustainability.  
 
206
  World Bank (2016); IPM (2016). 
207
  According to NBRB estimations, by the end of the first quarter of 2016, private debt was roughly 4 times higher than 
average monthly revenues. This indicator has roughly doubled during the last three years. The most general approach 
to assessing the debt quality threshold using the latter assumes the value of 3. 
208
  Having adopted modernisation plans, SOEs had to secure financial sources for implementing those plans. Most often 
the bulk of funds for purchasing new equipment was borrowed, given the lack of own sources for capital investments. 
Furthermore, the modernisation campaign contributed to a growing share of loans denominated in foreign currency, as 
imported equipment was mainly purchased with foreign currency and many SOEs preferred to obtain forex loans at 
lower interest rates. 
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The recession of 2015 and the significant depreciation throughout the year reinforced the debt service 
problems, especially in indebted SOEs. The wood processing industry provides a case in point for these 
problems. During the period 2008-2014, large financial resources were channelled into the SOEs in this 
sector through directed lending for the modernisation of their production facilities.209 However, the 
business plans that justified this campaign turned out to be unduly optimistic: real demand in the 
targeted markets contracted, the international prices for final goods actually halved, revenues in the 
domestic market also fell below expectations. By 2015, the majority of these SOEs de facto were 
insolvent: their debt service liabilities exceeded their revenues which triggered a debt swap intervention 
by the government.  
The changed environment brought also problems for the businesses borrowing at market rates when the 
business model proved to be ineffective in the new conditions, for instance for firms depending on 
imports or dealing with real estate. In the first case, firms suffered competitiveness losses due to the 
depreciation which exceeded considerably the adjustment in domestic prices. In the sphere of real 
estate, changes in relative domestic prices led to a tightening in lending conditions (requirements for 
additional collateral, requirement for advance repayments, restricting refinancing, etc.). Plus, all debt 
holders who had originally borrowed in foreign exchange and had no (or very few) sources of revenues 
in foreign currency also experienced problems with debt servicing.  
Figure 4.16 / The dynamics of overdue payments and non-performing loans, % of GDP, 
2007-2016 
 
Source: Belstat; author’s calculations. 
So, Belarus is de facto already facing a debt problem; however, its extent is still not clear. Publicly 
available financial statements of enterprises do not contain sufficient information to estimate the 
acuteness of the problem at the firm level. For instance, a number of accounting practices can mask the 
actual financial condition of a firm and its ability to service and repay debts. Moreover, in some cases 
financial statements (for the SOEs that are still not corporatised) are unavailable. From the available 
statistics, a rapid increase in overdue payments and NPLs might be a good evidence for the mounting 
challenge (Figure 4.16).  
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  There is lack of official statistics on directed lending, especially concerning a breakdown by sector or by enterprise. 
However, a couple of times officials mentioned a figure of about USD 3 billion that have been injected into woodworking 
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On the part of the banks, there are publicly available data on the share of non-performing loans in their 
portfolios. Banking statistics report a gradual increase in the share of non-performing loans throughout 
2015 and a sharp increase since the beginning of 2016 up to roughly 13% of the total portfolio by the 
end of the first quarter of 2016. However, if not for the debt swap of 2015, the level of NPLs would have 
amounted to roughly 17% of the total portfolio.  
The current share of NPLs, which has already reached an alarming level, still may underestimate the 
real situation. First, state-owned banks that were mostly engaged in directed lending could be expected 
to exhibit high shares of NPLs. However, the level of NPLs reported by such banks is regularly lower 
than that in private banks. The most probable explanation is that there are state guarantees which allow 
classifying potentially fragile loans as belonging to the categories of ‘good’ assets. However, the ability 
of the government (central and local) to deliver on their guarantees is at least questionable, given that 
the bulk of such guarantees do not have an explicit source of financing. So, financial risks to state-
owned banks due to NPLs might be underestimated.  
Second, Belarusian legislation and banking practice allow for assessing collateral according to its book 
value, not fair-market value. Given some significant recent price corrections in many markets (real estate 
is a point in case), the gap between the accounting value of the collateral and its fair-market value may 
have increased. Respectively, the actual quality of such loans may have deteriorated, which would not 
be reflected in the statistics.  
Third, in some cases banks may be reluctant to disclose the real situation with non-performing loans, as 
it could further hamper their own financial situation. For instance, the counterparts at the interbank 
market could become reluctant to provide liquidity to banks with a high share of NPLs; savers could 
withdraw their deposits.  
The implications of the debt burden could be damaging for the national economy in many respects. The 
companies encountering debt problems are to give up or downsize their investment plans. If this is not 
sufficient to stabilise their financial situation, they will have to cut costs further and consider downsizing 
or even phasing down their activities. Banks that are burdened with non-performing loans are forced to 
provision, which affects their lending capacity and reduces borrowing opportunities, which ultimately 
impacts negatively on economic activity. In turn, substandard bank portfolios affect banks’ operations; 
further significant deterioration may be a threat to their solvency, potentially creating risks for the 
banking system as a whole.  
The authorities seem to be aware of the risks associated with increasing levels of indebtedness in the 
corporate and banking sector. Banks facing deteriorating quality of assets have been advised to seek 
recapitalisation; however, this recommendation may be difficult to implement, especially for state-owned 
banks. Recapitalising them will generate significant new claims on public resources which may be a 
threat to public debt sustainability. Given this challenge, the authorities seem to be undecided about the 
possible options in respect to large state-owned banks. As concerns the smaller state-owned bank – 
Belinvestbank – they opted for a traditional scheme of direct recapitalisation (alongside with the transfer 
of some its assets to the Development Bank), as this is not so burdensome for the economy as a whole. 
Besides, there are not many alternative options. In the past, the authorities have reverted to other bank 
bailout options, such as liquidity injections into banks by the NBRB, which is equivalent to outright 
printing of money. At present the NBRB has been resisting the repeat of such interventions, at least for 
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the time being. However, if there are credible threats of a full-fledged banking crisis, its attitude may 
change.  
Other possible options of addressing indebtedness in the corporate and banking sectors that are being 
discussed include: provision of additional collateral against outstanding debt and accelerated 
repayments of outstanding debt. But again, the implementation of these solutions may be problematic. In 
many cases, it may require initiating bankruptcy procedures of borrowers, which may be highly 
undesirable considering the impact on employment, social stability, controllability, etc.  
This trade-off mirrors the underlying conflict between distortions stemming from the QFA-SBC system 
and the desire to secure macroeconomic stability. The QFA-SBC system (not banks themselves) has 
become the primary source generating NPLs. Hence, the key to a successful solution of the problem 
must include responses not only in respect to banks, but also in respect to the fundamentals of the QFA-
SBC system and the accumulated overhang of quasi-fiscal liabilities. The latter means that policy needs 
to address two issues: (i) which mechanisms of financial intermediation would secure efficient allocation 
of capital in the future, and (ii) how to absorb the losses stemming from the past.  
In this context, the option of establishing a special agency for managing non-performing loans has been 
considered by the government as a sort of an intermediator to find individual solutions between banks 
and borrowers in each case.  
In the second half of 2016, the authorities established the ‘Agency on Assets Management’, with a 
mandate to restructure and manage loans granted to agricultural firms. This new body is due to 
accelerate the process of Belagroprombank restructuring rather than to provide a systemic response to 
the NPL challenge in the entire banking system. But even in respect to agriculture, it is still unclear 
whether the agency will manage to perform a radical overhaul of the outstanding loans, the system of 
loan granting and, more broadly, the SBC system in agriculture as a whole. In principle, the formal 
powers delegated to the agency might allow it to do so.210 However, the respective regulations do not 
provide clear clues as to ‘who should absorb the losses’. They envisage numerous sources of funds for 
purchasing non-performing assets, but the issuance of bonds by local authorities is likely to become the 
dominating one. The actual functioning of the Agency should provide more evidence for understanding 
its role and assignments in respect to NPLs by agricultural firms. 
At present the government does not seem to have a clear strategy for dealing with the accumulated QFA 
overhang. International experience and conventional wisdom assume that in a broad sense there might 
be three major options for addressing the challenge: (i) triggering bankruptcy of insolvent borrowers (or 
conciliation procedures with additional enforcements in banks’ powers); (ii) supporting borrowers with 
simultaneous restructuring/recapitalisation of banks; and (iii) ‘rebooting’ the system after absorbing the 
losses by the government (i.e. by increasing public debt). The first option seems to be unacceptable for 
the government because of social and political considerations. The second and third options will actually 
mean that the QFA overhang is going to be transformed into open public debt. This is undesirable as 
well, as it will pose threats to the sustainability of public debt, which has already materialised as a 
medium-term risk.  
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As of today, the risks to public debt sustainability are mainly associated with the currency structure of the 
debt, where hard currency obligations are dominating. Even in the case of a relatively stable absolute 
amount of public debt, the debt to GDP ratio is already approaching alarming levels211 and may increase 
further at par with possible further depreciation of the rouble. Furthermore, while the level of future forex 
debt service will be rising, the amount of future forex revenue of the government is uncertain; the level of 
international reserves is also quite low. Thus the government will need to solicit new forex borrowings in 
order to service its forex obligations or roll over old debt. Hence, public debt sustainability (more 
specifically, its forex component) may become questionable if new borrowings become unavailable, or if 
the debt burden continues to rise. If problems with sovereign debt emerge, these may be rather 
damaging for the economy, probably even more so than a private debt crisis, as it entails major risks 
both to macroeconomic and financial stability.  
Apparently the authorities are fully aware of these risks. Recently a Council of Financial Stability has 
been established, with the principal mission of monitoring and counteracting systemic risks to financial 
stability. 212 Its mandate mainly envisages the coordination of the activities and the development of joint 
action plans of three economic bodies – NBRB, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance. While it 
does not have instruments of direct intervention, the Council might become important in terms of 
macroprudential regulation, as it is aimed to secure coordination and synchronisation of activities of the 
above-mentioned governmental bodies. A high level of representativeness in the Council – NBRB chair 
and vice-chairs, deputy prime minister, ministers and deputy ministers of finance and economy – is to 
secure high priority of financial stability considerations. However, it remains to be seen how effective the 
Council will be in its real life functioning.  
BELARUS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The history of Belarus’ relations with the two main international financial institutions (IMF and World 
Bank) is not very rich. Two stand-by arrangements with the IMF were agreed in the 1990s (1993 and 
1995) but subsequently were scaled down on the initiative of the Belarusian side, due to contradictions 
between IMF conditionality and national policy priorities. Later on, and until 2009, cooperation between 
Belarus and the IMF took place only at the level of technical assistance programmes. As regards the 
World Bank, cooperation was more intense. A number of projects were implemented (e.g. in healthcare, 
environment, infrastructure), but they were relatively insignificant in terms of scale and scope. Relations 
with the EBRD were of a similar pattern, but with a greater financial engagement of the Bank in the 
country’s business sector. Overall, the period before the financial crisis was a period of semi self-
isolation of Belarus vis-à-vis the international financial institutions. The Belarusian authorities were even 
somewhat suspicious of these bodies as being too focused on the promotion of undesirable standards 
and practices. In turn, the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD treated Belarus as an outlier from the 
common patterns in other countries and were not ready to adjust their agenda to the country’s specifics.  
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the urgent need by Belarus of external finance to support 
the currency peg opened the way for a new phase in bilateral relations. In 2008 Belarus applied for IMF 
financial assistance through a stand-by arrangement. Stabilising the balance of payments in the face of 
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  Due to considerable depreciation during the past years and real GDP contraction, which together resulted in a rapid 
decline of GDP measured in US dollars. 
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  Resolution of the Council of Ministers and NBRB No. 454/16 of 13 June 2016. 
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a sudden and sharp deterioration of the current account was the primary official goal of the programme. 
Given the very short duration of the negotiation process – Belarus applied for financing in mid-October 
2008, and the programme was approved by the end of December of the same year – the two sides 
needed much flexibility vis-à-vis their traditional positions in respect to each other.  
The Belarusian side was aware of the lack of alternative sources of emergency finance. Russia, which 
had been considered as the source of finance by default, at that same moment was itself in the midst of 
a deep crisis and was unlikely to lend the needed amount at acceptable terms and conditions. Moreover, 
just before the global crisis (at the turn of 2007-2008) Belarus was shyly ‘reopening’ (in both the political 
and economic dimensions) to the world outside Russia. Belarusian banks started borrowing from abroad 
and international banks became more active in the Belarusian market. Furthermore, the authorities 
adopted and promoted (without external pressure) a number of structural reform programmes that 
envisaged (although in rather ambiguous terms) privatisation, developing the infrastructure of the 
financial system (including the establishment of a stock market), attraction of foreign investors into the 
banking sector, etc.  
In this environment, the Belarusian authorities were more flexible in the negotiations with the IMF. They 
undertook a number of commitments not only with respect to short-term macroeconomic indicators, but 
also as regards a number of structural issues, which earlier had been considered as a taboo in the 
negotiations with international financial institutions. The IMF, in turn, took a more flexible stance with 
respect to structural issues, which in the past had been considered as a starting point for negotiations 
with Belarus.  
The overall emphasis of the programme was on immediate stabilisation policies, accompanied by 
elements of structural reforms (see Box 4.5). The successful implementation of stabilisation polices was 
expected to become the basis for subsequent more deep and systemic structural reforms. The 
programme envisaged the extension of five tranches of funding totalling SDR 1.6 billion,213 which was 
about 420% of Belarus’ quota in the Fund. The first tranche was scheduled for January 2009, the last 
one for February 2010.  
The core stabilisation measures within the approved programme envisaged: (i) single-shot devaluation 
by rough 20% and shifting the peg from the US dollar to a currency basket; (ii) tightening of monetary 
policy as measured by base money growth; (iii) abolishment of the interest rate ceilings on loans; 
(iv) abolishment of non-market and preferential refinancing for state-owned banks; (v) recapitalisation of 
banks and introduction of a new deposit-insurance scheme; (vi) introduction of standards on special 
provisioning based on international good practices; (vii) balancing the central government budget; (ix) a 
temporary freeze in the nominal wage rate set by the government; (x) restricting the capital expenditures 
in the consolidated budget; (xi) increase in utility tariffs; and (xii) reserving more funds for social 
protection and improving the mechanisms of social security.214  
Throughout 2009 Belarus abided strictly by the IMF conditionality. The majority of the stabilisation 
measures were implemented without major caveats. The parties seemed to be happy with the process 
of programme implementations. However, the situation changed in 2010. The Belarusian authorities 
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were keen to achieve rapid economic recovery and return to the habitual growth rates of output and 
incomes before the presidential elections. They considered restoring the practice of domestic demand 
stimulation as a safe option for this. Thus, just after having received the last tranche according to the 
programme, they returned to the policy design that had been prevailing before the crisis.  
As regards the agreed structural adjustment measures (Box 4.5), their implementation was piecemeal 
and partial.  
BOX 4.5 / STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT MEASURES AGREED UPON IN THE MEMORANDUM 
TO THE 2008 STAND-BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELARUS AND THE IMF215 AND THEIR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
› Abolishment of directed loans financed through government deposits in state-owned banks; abolishment of 
direct financing of the government programmes by the NBRB through non-financial organisations. 
Before 2009, the bulk of directed loans had been financed through this mechanism. This condition was rather 
painful for the authorities, as besides the structural context, it also affected the investment demand. Given this 
trade-off the authorities found a rather simple solution. Throughout 2009 and the larger part of 2010 
government deposits in commercial banks indeed were frozen. The government began accumulating its 
deposits almost exclusively at the NBRB. However, at the same time the NBRB intensified liquidity injections 
to banks, thus compensating for (and even exceeding216) the funds usually available for directed lending. So, 
de jure the commitment was fulfilled, but de facto the harmful practice targeted for abolition within the 
programme was not reduced and even expanded. 
› Narrowing the practices of direct price regulations. 
The government took the commitments to abstain from the practice of setting ‘a ceiling for price index growth’ 
on a monthly basis for each industry. This commitment was fulfilled both formally and informally. However, 
temporary returns to the practice of comprehensive direct price regulations took place during the currency 
crises in 2011 and 2014-2015. 
› Privatisation of state-owned banks. 
The authorities committed to: (i) find strategic investors for the state-owned Belinvestbank and BPS-bank; and 
(ii) put up for sale minority stakes in the two largest state-owned banks – Belarusbank and Belagroprombank. 
Later on, the programme was supplemented by the idea of establishing a specialised agency for non-
performing loans which would acquire the majority of directed loans from the banks’ balance sheets. The only 
commitment that was fulfilled in this field refers to the BPS-Bank: in late 2009 it was sold to Russia’s 
Sberbank. Nevertheless, the idea of privatising both BPS-Bank and Belinvestbank was in principle 
appreciated by the authorities. The government did its best to strike a deal on Belinvestbank as well and was 
close to success in the negotiations with a large German bank. However, the environment of the global crisis 
dissuaded the German counterpart, which decided to abstain from the purchase. 
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  Over 2009-2010, the share of government deposits in banks’ liabilities decreased by 6.8 percentage points, down to 
12.1%. The share of the NBRB’s funds increased from 5.1% to 19.2%. 
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The sale of minority stocks in the two largest banks contradicted the plans of the authorities for actively 
engaging them in directed lending. Hence, from the very beginning they were reluctant to make progress in 
this respect. Thus, after a couple of rounds of declarations, preparations and discussion, the initiative was 
abandoned.  
The idea of a special agency for non-performing loans was meant to prevent a further expansion of directed 
lending, which contradicted the general logic of the programme. Again, after a couple of rounds of 
discussions, the authorities rejected the initial idea by the IMF. As a kind of compromise, they suggested 
establishing the Development Bank with a wider mandate, which nevertheless was expected to absorb 
directed loans from commercial banks’ balance sheets. A final decision was made only in 2011, and the 
Development Bank began its operations in 2012. However, so far the initial idea for its establishment has only 
been partially implemented: state-owned banks are still burdened with non-performing loans and perform 
some directed lending.  
› Privatisation of state-owned enterprises. 
The government took commitments on promoting the privatisation of 147 large and medium-sized enterprises. 
Later on, this was reduced to the commitment to conduct public privatisation tenders on five state-owned 
enterprises from the list of the largest ones. This was envisaged as a pilot with a view to providing experience 
on the conduct of such deals to further facilitate the privatisation process. In 2009 and the first part of 2010, 
some preparatory steps were made. However, the selection of enterprises for privatisation gave rise to doubts 
about the actual willingness of the government to deliver on this commitment. The selected enterprises were 
not among the ‘largest state-owned enterprises’ and were not too attractive to investors. Moreover, the 
requirements to potential investors were formulated in a way as if they were meant to discourage them. 
Nevertheless, the tenders were opened; however, no bids were submitted. So, formally the government again 
fulfilled its commitment, but failed it informally. 
By 2015 Belarus had repaid the IMF loan and the programme was officially closed. The experience of 
this programme was ambiguous. On the one hand, it demonstrated (mainly referring to the experience of 
2009) that Fund-supported stabilisation policies may have a favourable effect for enhancing 
macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, both parties were dissatisfied. The prevailing perception 
within the Belarusian authorities was that IMF loans were too heavily conditioned. Actually, the 
authorities sought to bypass some of those aspects of the programme that conflicted with their own 
policy priorities and were just trying to report some degree of formally meeting the requirements. The 
latter caused disappointment and reduced trust on the side of the IMF. An eventual new IMF-supported 
programme would thus require rebuilding trust and a credible commitment at the highest level.  
Furthermore, based on the experience of the previous programme, the IMF is increasing the focus on 
structural issues in Belarus. In its assessments, the IMF highlights that minor adjustments have shown 
to be reversible, unless being anchored in ‘deep and thorough structural reforms’. The Fund has hinted 
that it could consider a new programme for Belarus, which should be addressing structural weaknesses 
and promoting long-run growth. In 2012-2013, the IMF formulated its vision of the priorities for structural 
reforms in Belarus:217 (i) financial sector reform, emphasising reduction in directed lending; 
 
217
  IMF (2013). 
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(ii) elimination of excessive direct regulations in commodity and labour markets; (iii) liberalisation of 
trade, with emphasis on WTO accession; (iv) privatisation and thorough reform of state-owned 
enterprises; and (v) consolidating the social protection system.  
At the same time the IMF continues to provide technical assistance to Belarus. Thus it supported the 
NBRB in launching a campaign of assets quality assessment in the Belarusian banking system in 2015. 
The majority of banks are to accomplish this procedure by the end of the first half of 2016. Furthermore, 
in April 2016 the IMF-World Bank FSAP218 mission conducted some assessments and surveys. The 
results of these assessments (if publicly available, at least partially) will shed some light on the actual 
situation in respect to debt quality in the banking system and the degree of risk for financial stability.  
Aversion of the IMF agenda and availability of other sources of external finance (first of all, the Eurasian 
Fund for Stabilisation and Development, EFSD) made the Belarusian side reluctant to seek a new IMF-
supported programme in 2011-2015. The EFSD, established in 2009, provides to governments of 
member state of the Eurasian Development Bank financial credits to support stabilisation programmes 
aimed at making their economies more resilient to external and domestic shocks. Soon after that – in 
2011, during the currency crisis – Belarus applied for a stabilisation loan. Presumably the Belarusian 
authorities approached EFSD with the implicit expectation that, on the one hand, its conditionality would 
clash less with their policy objectives and, on the other hand, that ESFD monitoring may be subject to 
political pressure.  
The stabilisation programme of 2011 was of a short-term nature and almost entirely focused on 
macroeconomic policy. Stabilisation measures mainly aimed at the tightening of monetary and fiscal 
policies, which was expected to mitigate the domestic demand overhang. These commitments were 
represented in the form of targets in selected macroeconomic indicators (net foreign assets of monetary 
authorities, fiscal balance, tariffs on utilities and transport).  
In the sphere of structural reforms, privatisation and some restrictions in directed lending were the only 
issues that were touched upon by the programme. Privatisation commitments assumed that in 
2011-2013 the government would raise some USD 2.5 billion annually in privatisation as revenue. With 
respect to directed lending, threshold values were set for the NBRB’s claims on banks, the net 
disbursement on directed lending, and the government deposits in commercial banks.219 The 
programme assumed that the loan of USD 3.0 billion would be extended in six tranches.  
In implementing this programme, the Belarusian authorities were not as strict as in the case of the IMF-
supported programme of 2008, even with respect to formal criteria. Within every phase between two 
consecutive tranches, at least some target parameters were not met. As to the privatisation commitment, 
the authorities ignored it altogether during the whole period of programme implementation. Despite this, 
subsequent tranches were usually granted, which reasonably was expected by the authorities as a 
politically motivated decision. Violation of programme commitments became the reason for suspending 
only the last tranche at the end of 2013.220 By that time Belarus had received some USD 2.6 billion, and 
the need for the last tranche was not that urgent.  
 
218
  Financial sector assessment programme. 
219
  After the end of the 2008 IMF programme, the government resumed this practice of reserving funds for directed lending. 
220
  The last tranche was not granted at long last, after two suspensions of decisions on it. 
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The experience of the EFSD-supported programme seems to have matched the expectations of the 
authorities that cooperation with EFSD would not be a compelling constraint on continuing with their 
desired course of economic policies. Moreover, in subsequent years Belarus was apparently trying to 
play a strategic game with the IMF and EFSD, probably seeking to instigate a kind of ‘competition’ 
among them with the goal of getting access to cheaper and less conditioned borrowings. According to 
this logic, the best solution for Belarus would be to borrow from both institutions.  
In early 2015, the situation changed. First, the need for new borrowings became more urgent, while such 
borrowings were not readily available either from Russia or from the EFSD. Second, in early 2015, 
expectations were that President Lukashenka would approve the start of deeper structural reforms. The 
severe recession was sometimes considered as a possible trigger of these reforms.  
In fact the Belarusian government developed a draft ‘roadmap’ of structural reforms in partnership with 
the World Bank.221 It envisages the following priorities for reforms: (i) ensuring an even playing field in 
the access to finance for state-owned and private firms; (ii) eliminating various form of financial support 
to SOEs; (iii) strengthening state property management mechanisms; (iv) reducing excessive 
administrative regulations in the labour market; and (v) fine-tuning of social protection for the 
unemployed. The authorities consider this document as the framework for the negotiation of a new IMF-
supported programme. Based on this, they made an official request for IMF financing. However, the 
Fund came up with supplementary requirements that were aimed at making reforms irreversible and this 
put the negotiations in limbo. Furthermore, the approval of an EFSD financing programme in early 2016 
reduced the urgency of IMF funding for the Belarusian side and this probably affected their negotiation 
stance. Hence, the negotiations that started in 2015 are still ongoing and their outcome is uncertain. 
In turn, the approval of the EFSD programme in March 2016 has become, in a sense, a pleasant 
surprise for the authorities, given the rejection of the sixth tranche under previous financing programme, 
and the financial difficulties in Russia, the main donor of the EFSD. The Belarusian side had applied for 
a new financing programme with the EFSD in March 2015, most probably relying on a politically 
motivated loan similar to the previous one. 
In the course of 2015, the EFSD team insisted on numerous amendments and improvements to the draft 
programme. According to their official position, they wanted ‘to develop additional mechanisms that 
would reduce risks of programme failure’. So, the decision of the EFSD to approve a new programme 
came somehow unexpected, especially given that the Belarusian side did not undertake any new 
serious commitments in favour of Russia and/or the project of Eurasian integration. 
Two interpretations of the EFSD have been put forward. The first one looks at the political background, 
in particular the desire of the Russian side to prevent a new funding programme with the IMF by 
installing an EFSD programme. The second one looks at the new deal as an instrument of refinancing 
previous debts from the EFSD and Russia. Moreover, the new programme contributes to more 
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Finally, the design of the EFSD programme has become rather ‘light’. Although mentioning the 
importance of structural changes, it does not focus too much on concrete measures. It mainly includes 
the steps that have already been implemented (or are being implemented) by the Belarusian authorities 
– such as raising utility tariffs, abolition of directive ‘volume’ indicators for SOEs, curbing new inflows of 
directed lending222, price liberalisation, implementing new procedures in the forex deal-making process, 
etc. The majority of these steps are treated as structural changes.223 Furthermore, the programme 
envisages a number of indicative parameters – such as fiscal balance for the general government, 
restrictions on wage increases in the budget sector, ceilings on broad money growth – which again 
mainly repeat those already adopted by the Belarusian authorities. 
Given this ‘light’ design of the programme and the high degree of its political determination, the 
programme has not become a strong pillar for the economic environment. The authorities consider it 
mainly as a ‘money-pumping’ source: it allows being more flexible and to hurry not too much when 
dealing with the bulk of challenges. 
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Annex Table 1 / Belarus: Selected economic indicators, 2000-2015 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Population, th pers., average  9'980 9'929 9'866 9'797 9'730 9'664 9'605 9'561 9'528 9'507 9'491 9'473 9'465 9'466 9'475 9'493 
Gross domestic product, BYR bn, nom. 1) 9'134 17'173 26'138 36'565 49'992 65'067 79'267 97'165 129'791 137'442 164'476 297'158 530'356 649'111 778'095 869'702 
   annual change in % (real) 1) 5.8 4.7 5.0 7.0 11.4 9.4 10.0 8.6 10.2 0.2 7.7 5.5 1.7 1.0 1.7 -3.9 
GDP/capita (EUR at exchange rate) 1'200 1'400 1'600 1'600 1'900 2'500 3'000 3'400 4'500 3'600 4'300 3'900 5'200 5'800 6'200 5'100 
GDP/capita (EUR at PPP) 5'000 5'400 5'700 6'200 7'200 8'100 9'000 10'000 10'900 10'600 11'700 12'500 13'100 13'300 13'700 13'500 
Consumption of households, BYR bn, nom. 1) 5'012 9'531 15'114 20'332 26'130 32'955 39'792 49'175 66'244 74'997 88'470 139'955 244'863 318'332 392'116 437'136 
   annual change in % (real) 1) 8.0 17.9 11.4 7.4 9.6 15.0 13.0 13.7 17.2 0.1 9.5 2.3 10.8 10.9 4.3 -2.4 
Gross fixed capital form., BYR bn, nom. 1) 2'302 3'893 5'747 8'683 12'656 17'254 23'511 30'487 43'225 49'346 64'698 113'230 178'455 244'296 263'693 248'350 
   annual change in % (real) 1) 2.3 -2.3 6.6 20.6 19.9 19.5 31.6 16.4 23.8 5.0 17.5 13.9 -11.3 9.6 -5.3 -15.9 
Gross industrial production                                  
   annual change in % (real) 7.5 5.9 4.0 6.7 15.3 10.0 11.2 8.6 11.3 -3.1 11.7 9.1 5.8 -4.9 2.0 -6.6 
Gross agricultural production                                 
   annual change in % (real) 9.5 1.7 0.4 6.8 12.6 1.7 5.9 4.1 8.9 1.0 2.5 6.6 6.6 -4.2 2.9 -2.8 
Construction industry                                  
   annual change in % (real) -11.8 1.2 6.8 16.0 14.6 12.1 20.1 15.9 21.1 4.6 12.9 6.7 -8.6 4.6 -5.7 -10.0 
Reg. employment, th, average 4'444 4'422 4'387 4'347 4'326 4'414 4'470 4'518 4'611 4'644 4'703 4'691 4'612 4'578 4'551 4'470 
   annual change in % 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 2.0 1.3 1.1 2.0 0.7 1.3 -0.3 -1.7 -0.7 -0.6 -1.8 
Reg. unemployed persons, th, end of period 95.8 102.9 130.5 136.1 83.0 67.9 52.0 44.1 37.3 40.3 33.1 28.2 24.9 21.0 24.2 43.3 
Reg. unemployment rate, in %, end of period 2.1 2.3 2.9 3.1 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 
Average monthly gross wages, ths BYR 59 123 189 251 348 464 582 694 868 982 1'217 1'900 3'676 5'061 6'052 6'700 
   annual change in % (real, gross) 12.0 29.6 7.9 3.2 17.4 20.9 17.3 10.0 9.0 0.1 15.0 1.9 21.5 16.4 1.3 -2.5 
Consumer prices, % p.a.  168.6 61.1 42.6 28.4 18.1 10.3 7.0 8.4 14.8 13.0 7.8 53.2 59.2 18.3 18.1 13.5 
Producer prices in industry, % p.a. 2) 186.8 70.6 38.8 35.0 23.7 12.1 8.6 21.2 15.2 13.6 13.6 71.4 76.0 13.6 12.8 16.8 
General governm.budget, nat. def., % of GDP                                
   Revenues  34.8 33.5 33.0 33.4 44.2 47.4 48.4 49.5 50.6 45.7 41.5 38.7 38.5 40.3 38.7 41.0 
   Expenditures  35.4 35.1 33.2 35.0 44.1 48.0 47.0 49.0 49.2 46.4 43.3 35.9 37.7 40.1 37.3 39.0 
   Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-)  -0.6 -1.6 -0.2 -1.6 0.0 -0.7 1.4 0.4 1.4 -0.7 -1.8 2.8 0.8 0.2 1.3 2.0 
Public debt, EU-def., % of GDP . . . . . . . . . 34.7 39.5 45.9 38.5 37.6 39.8 40.0 
Central bank policy rate, % p.a., end of period 4) 80.0 48.0 38.0 28.0 17.0 11.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 13.5 10.5 45.0 30.0 23.5 20.0 25.0 
Current account, EUR mn 4) -497 -590 -345 -402 -956 368 -1'097 -2'188 -3'499 -4'316 -6'187 -3'518 -1'446 -5'737 -4'034 -1'582 
Current account, % of GDP 4) -4.0 -4.4 -2.2 -2.6 -5.2 1.5 -3.8 -6.7 -8.2 -12.5 -15.1 -9.5 -2.9 -10.5 -6.9 -2.0 
Exports of goods, BOP, EUR mn 4) 6'535 7'461 7'674 8'094 10'436 12'199 14'938 16'928 22'319 14'494 18'311 28'499 35'391 27'701 27'492 23'396 
   annual change in %  . 14.2 2.9 5.5 28.9 16.9 22.5 13.3 31.8 -35.1 26.3 55.6 24.2 -21.7 -0.8 -12.7 
Imports of goods, BOP, EUR mn 4) 7'647 8'558 8'705 9'439 12'406 12'889 16'879 20'033 26'902 19'494 25'251 30'913 34'952 31'183 29'537 25'305 
   annual change in %  . 11.9 1.7 8.4 31.4 3.9 31.0 18.7 34.3 -27.5 29.5 22.4 13.1 -10.8 -5.3 -10.3 
Exports of services, BOP, EUR mn 4) 1'096 1'285 1'433 1'503 1'574 1'880 2'114 2'572 3'239 2'614 3'583 3'906 4'901 5'690 6'113 5'939 
   annual change in %  . 17.2 11.5 4.9 4.7 19.5 12.4 21.7 25.9 -19.3 37.1 9.0 25.5 16.1 7.4 -1.8 
Imports of services, BOP, EUR mn 4) 598 895 903 769 802 916 1'353 1'514 1'939 1'561 2'247 2'334 3'140 3'983 4'424 3'873 
   annual change in %  . 49.8 0.9 -14.9 4.3 14.2 47.7 11.9 28.1 -19.5 43.9 3.9 34.5 26.8 11.1 -9.6 
FDI liabilities (inflow), EUR mn 4) 129 107 262 152 131 246 282 1'313 1'544 1'321 1'041 2'787 1'137 1'703 1'445 1'309 
FDI assets (outflow), EUR mn 4) 0 0 -218 1 1 2 2 11 22 72 38 87 121 199 57 100 
Gross reserves of NB, excl. gold, EUR mn 4) . . 402 369 507 935 812 2'683 1'921 3'369 2'591 4'648 4'390 3'589 2'820 2'510 
Gross external debt, EUR mn 4) 2'251 3'382 3'751 3'340 3'624 4'334 5'199 8'484 10'834 15'382 21'449 26'305 25'518 28'807 32'982 34'175 
Gross external debt, % of GDP  18.2 25.0 24.5 21.5 19.6 17.9 17.8 25.8 25.4 44.6 52.2 71.3 51.9 52.5 56.0 70.1 
Average exchange rate BYR/EUR 739 1'272 1'704 2'353 2'698 2'684 2'715 2'959 3'046 3'983 4'007 8'051 10'778 11'834 13'220 17'828 
Purchasing power parity BYR/EUR 182 323 463 601 719 833 921 1'015 1'253 1'365 1'476 2'504 4'283 5'145 5'985 6'771 
1) According to SNA 1993. - 2) Domestic output prices. - 3) Refinancing rate of NB. - 4) Converted from USD. 
Source: wiiw databases incorporating Eurostat and national statistics. Forecasts by wiiw. 
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Annex Table 2 / The largest companies in Belarus, 2014 
Classification criterion Company name Ownership 
The largest producers by the value 
of sales at producer prices 
Belaruskalii (potassium fertilisers) State-owned 
Belarussian Metallurgical Plant State-owned 
Minsk Automotive Plant State-owned 
Minsk Tractor Plant State-owned 
Minskenergo State-owned 
The largest tax payers (share of 
contribution to budget revenue, %) 
Gazprom Transgaz Belarus (4.9%) Foreign owned 
Belaruskalii (potassium fertilisers)(3.8%) State-owned 
Naftan (oil refinery) (3.5%) State-owned 
Mozyr oil refinery (3.5%) 
Joint venture (Belarus state 
and foreign) 
Lukoil Belarus (2.5%) Foreign owned 
Grodno Tobacco Factory "Neman" (2.3%) State-owned 
Tabac-invest (1%) Private 
Minsk Plant of Grape Wines (1%) State-owned 
The largest exporters 
Belarus Oil Company (trade in oil products) State-owned 
RN Zapad (Rosneft West) (foreign trade and local 
distribution of fuels) Private 
Belarusneft (oil and gas extraction and processing) State-owned 
Belarussian Metallurgical Plant State-owned 
Interservice Belarus (trade in oil and oil products) Private 
The largest employers (number of 
employees) 
Evrotorg (retail rade) (22.6 ths) Private 
Belpochta (Belarus Post) (20.5 ths) State-owned 
Belarus Bank (19.5 ths) State-owned 
Minsk Automotive Plant (18.8 ths) State-owned 
Minsk Tractor Plant (18.8 ths) State-owned 
BelTeleCom (17.8 ths) State-owned 
Belaruskalii (potassium fertilisers) (17.6 ths) State-owned 
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Annex Table 3 / Composition of Belarusian exports and imports: top 20 export and import 
commodity groups (HS-2 digit level), 2014 
Exports 
HS 2-digit 
code Commodity group 
Share in total 
exports, % 
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION … 33.5 
31 FERTILISERS 8.5 
87 VEHICLES OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY ROLLING-STOCK, AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
THEREOF 6.9 
4 DAIRY PRODUCE; BIRDS' EGGS; NATURAL HONEY; EDIBLE PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NES 6.6 
84 NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; PARTS THEREOF 4.6 
39 PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF 3.1 
72 IRON AND STEEL 2.9 
73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL 2.5 
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS … 2.5 
2 MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL 2.4 
44 WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL 2.2 
99 OTHER 1.7 
94 FURNITURE; BEDDING, MATTRESSES, MATTRESS SUPPORTS, CUSHIONS … 1.6 
38 MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 1.4 
40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 1.2 
16 PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, OF FISH OR OF CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS OR OTHER AQUATIC 
INVERTEBRATES 1.2 
90 OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, … 1.0 
62 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, NOT KNITTED OR CROCHETED 0.9 
7 EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND TUBERS 0.8 








code Commodity group 
Share in total 
imports, % 
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION; … 33.5 
84 NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; PARTS THEREOF 4.6 
87 VEHICLES OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY ROLLING-STOCK, AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
THEREOF 6.9 
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS … 2.5 
39 PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF 3.1 
72 IRON AND STEEL 2.9 
73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL 2.5 
8 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS; PEEL OF CITRUS FRUITS OR MELONS 0.6 
30 PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 0.4 
90 OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, … 1.0 
29 ORGANIC CHEMICALS 0.7 
23 RESIDUES AND WASTE FROM THE FOOD INDUSTRIES; PREPARED ANIMAL FODDER 0.3 
48 PAPER AND PAPERBOARD; ARTICLES OF PAPER PULP, OF PAPER OR OF PAPERBOARD 0.5 
40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 1.2 
3 FISH AND CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS AND OTHER AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES 0.4 
38 MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 1.4 
64 FOOTWEAR, GAITERS AND THE LIKE; PARTS OF SUCH ARTICLES 0.6 
7 EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND TUBERS 0.8 
76 ALUMINIUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF 0.6 
21 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS 0.1 
 
OTHER 35.5 
Source: wiiw calculations based on the UN Comtrade data 
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Annex Table 4 / Inward and outward FDI indicators for Belarus, 2005-2015 
Direction Unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
FDI inflow EUR mn 245 280 1311 1544 1321 1041 2787 1110 1690 1418 1444 
FDI inflow EUR per capita 25 29 137 162 139 110 294 117 179 150 152 
FDI inflow in % of GDP 1 1 4 4 4 3 8 2 3 2 3 
FDI inflow in % of GFCF 4 3 13 11 11 6 20 7 8 7 10 
FDI outflow EUR mn 2 2 11 22 72 38 87 94 186 30 108 
FDI outflow EUR per capita 0 0 1 2 8 4 9 10 20 3 11 
FDI outflow in % of GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FDI outflow in % of GFCF 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
FDI inward stock EUR mn 2014 2077 3044 4778 5952 7479 10048 11011 12120 14617 16440 
FDI inward stock EUR per capita 209 217 319 502 627 789 1062 1164 1280 1542 1731 
FDI inward stock in % of GDP 8 7 9 11 17 18 27 22 22 25 34 
FDI outward stock EUR mn 12 14 31 52 101 155 227 344 527 522 628 
FDI outward stock EUR per capita 1 1 3 5 11 16 24 36 56 55 66 
FDI outward stock in % of GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 






















Annex Table 5 / Recent larger greenfield FDI projects in Belarus 
Launch date FDI project 
January 2016 Denmark-based digital advertising company Adform is to expand operations at its office in Minsk. The firm plans to create between 30 and 60 new jobs in software development in 2016 following a USD 21.25 million investment from the Scandinavian pension fund Danica. 
November 2015 Wood processor and furniture manufacturer Vakaru Medienos Grupe (VMG), a subsidiary of Lithuania-based SBA Group, plans to expand its manufacturing plant in the Mogilev Free Economic Zone. The company plans to double its current 60,000 sq m facility to 120,000 sq m. 
September 
2015 
Taifun, a manufacturer of construction chemicals and subsidiary of Poland-based Grupa Atlas, has established a new production plant in Grodno. The 4000 sq m asphalt 
felt paper production facility is the company's third plant in the country. 
August 2015 Telecommunications company Velcom, a subsidiary of Austria-based Telekom Austria, plans to open a new data centre in the Minsk oblast in October 2016. The  USD 30 million centre will provide cloud services to Belarusian clients as well as clients abroad. It will comprise four machine halls with 200 server cabinets in each. 
May 2015 
Penetron Belarus, a subsidiary of US-based ICS Penetron International, plans to open a new production facility in Homyel. Expected to be operational by summer 2015, 
the plant will manufacture the full range of the company's capillary waterproofing products. Output will be used initially to meet domestic needs in Belarus before the next 
phase expands exports to Ukraine and the nearby Baltics. 
May 2015 Caparol, a subsidiary of Germany-based Deutsche Amphibolin-Werke von Robert Murjahn, has opened a manufacturing plant in the Free Economic Zone Brest. It will produce water-dispersion paints, plaster, filling and presizing. The products will be sold to customers in neighbouring countries. 
May 2015 China-based ZTE, a provider of telecommunications equipment and network solutions, plans to establish a new factory in the China-Belarus Industrial Park. The 
company will partner with Germany-based VASL Speditions- und Handelsgesellschaft in the project. Construction of the facility is expected to be launched in June 2015. 
May 2015 Hong Kong-based China Merchants Group plans to invest USD 500 million to develop a logistics hub in the China-Belarus Industrial Park. The facility could encompass  1 million sq m with plans for around 50,000 sq m to be developed during 2015. 
September 
2014 
US-based General Motors, an automobile company, plans to establish an assembly plant in Minsk. The facility is expected to produce between 20,000 and 25,000 cars 
per annum which will be new models to the region. 
October 2013 Poland-based Grupa Atlas, a manufacturer of construction chemicals, has established a subsidiary, Typhoon Isolation, in Minsk in order to open a production plant. The facility is located in the Free Economic Zone Minsk and is the company's second plant in the country. 
July 2013 
Wood processor and furniture manufacturer Vakaru Medienos Grupe (VMG), a subsidiary of Lithuania-based SBA Group, has invested USD 102.29 million to construct 
an industrial complex in the Mogilev Free Economic. The complex will initially create 700 new jobs with plans to increase the workforce to 1000 people by the end of 
2013. It will produce furniture for IKEA, which will be exported to Russia. 
June 2013 France-based PSA Peugeot-Citroën has opened a new manufacturing facility in Abchak near Minsk. Located on the premises of the joint venture Unison, it will initially 
manufacture 2000 to 2500 cars for the local market. 
June 2013 Culligan-Bel, a division of US-based water filtration specialist Culligan, will launch an assembly facility in Zaslavl by the end of 2013. The company hopes that Belarus will become its base in Europe for water treatment equipment. It will create 50 jobs initially and more than 150 jobs may be created in the future. 
February 2013 
Russia-based Omsk Carbon Group, a leading producer of carbon black, will set up a production plant in an economic zone in Mogilev in 2015. Omsk Carbon Mogilev will 
manufacture carbon black for automobile tyres, initially producing up to 80,000 tonnes. The cost of the project is USD 130 million and 450 jobs will be created. The 
products will be for both domestic and international markets. 
January 2003 Arvi, Lithuania, which engages in fertilisers and sugar production, plans to construct a production and processing complex. The company plans to invest EUR 23.5 million 
and is to begin manufacturing in 2015. 
Source: fDi Intelligence, from the Financial Times Ltd 2016. 
 ANNEX  137 
 Research Report 413  
 
Annex Figure 1 / Real GDP in selected countries, index 2010 = 100 
 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national and Eurostat statistics. CIS Statcommittee Database, National 
Statistics Office of Georgia, National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova. 
Annex Figure 2 / Employment in selected countries, LFS definition, index 2010 = 100, 
corrected for breaks 
 
1) Registration statistics. 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national and Eurostat statistics. CIS Statcommittee Database, National 
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1) Includes fishery. 
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1) Mining, manufacturing and utilities. 
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Annex Figure 5 / Economic administration in Belarus 
 
Source: Grushevaya and Shappo (2015). 
Annex Figure 6 / Export dynamics in selected countries, nominal index 2010 = 100 
 
Remark: Serbia, break – from 2010 general trade, special trade before. 
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Annex Figure 7 / Import dynamics in selected countries, nominal index 2010 = 100 
 
Remark: Serbia, break – from 2010 general trade, special trade before. 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national and Eurostat statistics, CIS Statcommittee Database, UN 
COMTRADE. 
Annex Figure 8 / Share of exports to the EU in total exports, %, 1995 to 2015 
 
Remark: 1995 exports to EU-15, from 2000 exports to EU-28. 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national and Eurostat statistics, CIS Statcommittee Database, UN 
COMTRADE. 
Annex Figure 9 / Share of imports from the EU in total imports, %, 1995 to 2015 
 
Remark: 1995 imports to EU-15, from 2000 imports to EU-28. 
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Annex Figure 10 / Share of manufacturing (SITC 5,6,7) in total exports in selected 
countries, %, 1995 to 2015 
 
Remark: 1995 exports to EU-15, from 2000 exports to EU-28. 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national and Eurostat statistics. UN COMTRADE. 
Annex Figure 11 / Top 10 EU import commodities from Belarus, 2015 (million EUR, in the 
bubbles), rate of change in 2013-2015, % (Y-axis) and share in total, % (X-axis) 
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